



The First and Second World Wars

WAR BACKGROUNDS EDITION OF

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WESTERN CIVILIZATION

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THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS

War Backgrounds Edition of
WESTERN CIVILIZATION

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EDITED BY
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Preface

This edition of *Western Civilization* seeks to provide college students and those in the special Army, Navy, and Air Forces training programs with a well-integrated narrative of the chief political and social developments of the last three decades. Well aware of the impossibility of writing a definitive account of these years, we have sought nevertheless to present a straightforward summary of the chief events. Any summary of a period which has already been styled "The Second Thirty Years' War" must necessarily stress combat and conflict, but we have tried also to indicate some of the more peaceful and constructive phases of those years. A new chapter outlining the principal military, naval, and political events since Pearl Harbor has been added.

Maps, charts, and pictorial illustrations, some of which were especially prepared for this edition, have been included to provide general references and to stimulate the use of the many excellent atlases and historical handbooks now available to teachers and students. We have prepared bibliographies for each chapter which, while not exhaustive, are more complete than those sometimes included in a work of this kind.

We are sincerely indebted to Professor Walter Consuelo Langsam for his sympathetic yet always penetrating work of editing the manuscript. We likewise thank the readers of earlier editions of *Western Civilization* who have in various instances kindly supplied corrective suggestions which should render this and subsequent printings alike more concise and more accurate.

FRANCIS J. TSCHAN
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J. DUANE SQUIRES

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Approach to Catastrophe

THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION of the various European states during the forty-three years of peace prior to 1914 had created a number of social and political tensions which carried within them the seeds of war. Similarly fruitful in latent antagonisms had been Europe's involvement in Asiatic and African imperialism. Viewed with retrospective wisdom, it seems clear that the European peoples were headed straight for the disaster of a general war. Yet it should not be thought that there were no persons in pre-1914 Europe who did not sense the impending calamity and make earnest efforts to prevent it. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence to show that many men and women in all countries were keenly aware of the imminent perils confronting European civilization. Some of their attempts to prevent the catastrophe of a general war deserve to be recalled by later generations. Partly privately and partly governmentally supported, these endeavors will be briefly summarized.

Premonitions of war

I. PRIVATE EFFORTS FOR PEACE BEFORE 1914

The dream of a European continent permanently at peace had long fascinated the minds of many of its idealists and philosophers. Men like Dante in the fourteenth century, Hugo Grotius and William Penn in the seventeenth, Gottfried Leibniz, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth, were the forerunners for many similar peace advocates in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹ The ideas and suggestions of these moderns as they took form in private organizations fell into several categories: (1) stimulation of moral and religious ideals leading to belief in peace; (2) development of private transnational endeavors to bring about tolerance and understanding among national groups; (3) the use of modern technology

Pioneers of peace

¹ The efforts of no fewer than thirty-four early French advocates of peace have been evaluated by Elizabeth Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941.

in all its social and economic aspects to create world unity and friendliness; and (4) the foundation of awards and rewards for outstanding service in the cause of international good will.

Seeking to stimulate the pacific and brotherly aspects of religion and morality, the American Peace Society had been founded by David Low Dodge in the United States in 1815. Thanks in part to the efforts of Americans like William Ladd and Elihu Burritt, the peace movement was soon paralleled in Europe. In 1872 from June 17 to July 4 a "World Peace Jubilee" was held in Boston. Present were many musicians and musical groups from Europe, including Johann Strauss who came to the United States to lead a one-thousand-piece orchestra in his famous waltz, "The Blue Danube." By 1889 there were enough pacifist societies to warrant the holding of annual congresses; these were convened regularly until 1914. In 1894 Pope Leo XIII issued a famous encyclical on peace, and in 1881 the first of many Eucharistic Congresses assembled. Protestants and Jews held similar gatherings. Early in 1914 an interfaith World Conference for International Peace Through Religion was held at Geneva. Writers like the American William James and the Englishman Norman Angell published their respective works, *The Moral Equivalent of War* and *The Great Illusion*, almost simultaneously in 1910, and both were widely read on each side of the Atlantic.

Moral and
religious
efforts

Private
trans-
national
endeavors

In the development of private transnational endeavors to bring about tolerance and understanding, the European mind was likewise fertile and hopeful. For example, the success of the Crystal Palace Exposition in London in 1851 stimulated imitation in many other cities and countries. During the ensuing sixty years it has been estimated that there was an average of more than one such "world's fair" a year. Along a different line, in 1887 a Polish physician, L. L. Zamenhof, proposed in a carefully worded treatise that in order to facilitate mutual understanding the nations adopt a new and universal language which he had invented and called Esperanto. Preposterous as this seemed to many persons, it actually had a considerable vogue and won advocates in all countries of Europe. Approaching the problem from still another viewpoint, a Frenchman named Pierre de Coubertin, after years of endeavor, in 1896 had the satisfaction of opening the first modern revival of the Olympic Games of antiquity. Coubertin believed that sports and athletics as expressed in the Olympic Games were a way of peace and friendliness.² His conviction was

² The Olympic Games were held in 1896 at Athens; in 1900 at Paris; in 1904 at St. Louis; in 1908 at London; and in 1912 at Stockholm. Because of the war they were abandoned in 1916, but were held again in 1920 and thereafter quadrennially through 1936.

similar to that of the Englishman Robert Baden-Powell who founded the Boy Scouts in 1908.

Modern technology was the cause of a large number of social and economic proposals for world unity and friendliness. The obvious shrinking in physical distances under the impact of science and invention necessarily brought men and states closer together in countless ways. In 1883, for example, at the instigation of Sandford Fleming, a Canadian engineer, the device of "standard time" was introduced, shortly to become worldwide in its application. From 1889 onward, the socialist labor parties of workingmen in all countries held periodic international congresses at which their common problems were discussed. The agenda of the International Labor Congress, planned to assemble in Vienna on August 23, 1914, was significant in its expression of the plain man's aversion to war as an instrument of national policy. Such semibusiness organizations as the International Rotary Club, founded in the United States in 1905, and the International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, founded also in 1905 in Liège, Belgium, indicated that the employing groups in all states were likewise cognizant of the desirability of peace.

Standard time

Finally, prewar Europe witnessed the establishment of various private foundations for granting rewards for service or promise in the areas of international good will. Among the better known of these endeavors was Cecil Rhodes' bequest, already mentioned, for the foundation of international scholarships at Oxford University. Similarly outstanding was the peace-prize organization established by the will of a Swedish industrialist and millionaire, Alfred Nobel, who died in 1896. The Nobel Foundation first began to grant its prizes in the fields of science, art, literature, and peace in 1901. One of the awards that year went to the aged Swiss, Henri Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross almost forty years before.³

International business

Despite all the hopes manifest in the private efforts which have just been summarized, it was only too clear to realists long before 1914 that the curse of international war had not finally been exorcised. In 1897, four years prior to his reception of the Nobel Peace Prize, in a communication written for a few intimate friends, Henri Dunant penned the following prescient words:

Peace foundations

Henri Dunant

³ During the first thirty years, Great Britain, France, the United States, and Germany were virtually equal in the number of prizes won by their nationals in art, literature, and peace, but in the sciences Germany won more than the next two nations combined.

Similar to these two European peace foundations were two in the United States: the World Peace Foundation established in 1910 by Edward Ginn, the publisher; and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, established also in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie.

War is not yet dead. If it has changed its form, it is only to become more terrible. Everything that makes up the pride of our civilization will be at the service of war. Your electric railroads, your dirigibles, your submarines and flying bridges, your snap-shot photography, your telegraphs, telephones, photophones, and so many other wonderful inventions will perform splendid service for war. . . .

Train your noble race-horses for battle. Train your innocent doves to be messengers of destruction. Train swallows for your birds of war. Use horses, mules, oxen, elephants, camels and dromedaries for military transport, and to be your fellows in the field. Use the whole creation for your slaughter. Drive all together with you to the blood-bath. . . .

But do not forget that then this civilization, on which you prided yourselves so much, will infallibly lie in ruins, and with it will go your welfare, your trade, your industry, your agriculture, and perhaps also your national freedom and your domestic happiness.⁴

II. PUBLICLY SUPPORTED ENDEAVORS IN THE QUEST FOR PEACE

General diplomatic conferences

Clearly to be distinguished from those peace projects which were privately sponsored is another series of nineteenth- and twentieth-century endeavors which were publicly supported. As will be remembered, following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 there had been several international congresses at irregular intervals until 1823, wherein the powers sought to make peaceful adjustments for currently threatening problems. This practice of the "concert of Europe" was the precedent for other public conferences held intermittently until 1914. Each of these gatherings was an *ad hoc* affair; i.e., it was called specifically for one purpose, and usually had no institutional continuity. Among the public international conferences during the years between 1871 and 1914 were such assemblages as those in Berlin in 1878 and 1885, the Brussels Conference on slavery in 1890, the Algeciras Conference in 1906, and the London Conference to consider the problems of the Balkan Wars in 1913.

Special conventions

In addition to these general diplomatic conferences, pre-1914 Europe developed the practice of special international conventions, agreements by which the signatory states mutually promised to alter their own laws or policies in respect to a specific field. Examples of these were the international convention of 1884 to protect undersea cables, that of 1904 with regard to international automobile traffic, and that of 1912 seeking to control the manufacture and distribution of opium. These international conventions, however, were enforced solely by

⁴ Martin Gumpert, *Dunant: The Story of the Red Cross*, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 286-87.

the several national governments; there was no international organization behind them.

A further stage in the development of publicly supported peace efforts during the nineteenth century was the creation of special international unions, each one dealing with a single type of problem. These unions invariably had a governing body which met periodically, and a permanent bureau which executed decisions of the governing body and gathered information for its guidance. Among these public international unions were the Universal Postal Union formed in 1874, the Interparliamentary Bureau of Weights and Measures established in 1875, the Interparliamentary Union organized in 1889, the International Code devised in 1902, the International Institute of Agriculture set up in 1905, and the International Office of Public Health created in 1907. Although more than four hundred useful meetings of these and similar unions took place in Europe during the half century prior to 1914, it will be noted that their subject matter was uniformly nonpolitical in nature and usually removed from the type of controversy that breeds international warfare.

In finding solutions to the problems which were actually potential sources of serious dispute among the nations, i.e., matters of power politics, national prestige, national honor, and ethnic unity, the generation before 1914 was less successful. It is true that various devices and techniques were developed, like "good offices," mediation, and conciliation. In several instances these were effectively employed to prevent or terminate international conflict. The efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt, already described, in seeking to bring an end to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, are a case in point. Examples of peaceful change in the European status quo, thanks to the techniques of good offices, mediation, and conciliation, were fairly numerous. These changes, however, usually appertained to the minor rather than to the major powers.

Perhaps, however, the most significant effort of pre-1914 Europe in publicly supported endeavors to prevent international war were the two Hague Conferences held respectively in 1899 and in 1907. These came about as the result of the increasingly successful practice of international arbitration between European states, either on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. More than one hundred such arbitrations occurred between 1871 and 1900. Mostly these resorts to adjudication had been voluntary, but many advocates of the idea were already envisaging a system of compulsory arbitration. Toward the end of the nineteenth century their hopes seemed not impossible. In August, 1898, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia proposed the calling of an international conference to consider "the most effective means of insuring

Special
international
unions

Difficulties
in political
settlements

The Hague
Conference
of 1899

to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments."

Its results

It is known today that the Russian ruler's motives in thus suggesting an international conference to consider arbitration and disarmament were not wholly altruistic; but neither were they wholly insincere. With the hearty approval of the Dutch government, the Conference actually met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, and remained in session until July 29. In attendance were 96 delegates from 26 national states, including all the great powers of Europe, Asia, and the new world. The Conference adopted three conventions and several "declarations." Among the conventions was an agreement to establish a permanent panel of highly competent arbitrators from which list, if any two disputing states desired, a group could be named to consider the specific controversy. Although this was arbitration purely on a voluntary basis, fifteen international disputes were settled by the so-called Hague Court from its establishment to the outbreak of the first World War in 1914. But with the exception of the Newfoundland fisheries' case involving the United States and Great Britain, none of these fifteen disputes were concerned with a so-called vital interest of a great power.⁵

A second convention of the Hague Conference of 1899 authorized the offer of mediation as the friendly right of third-party states in case a war threatened. Still another convention set forth at great length the "rules of civilized warfare," to conformity with which each state bound itself. These rules dealt with subjects like prisoners of war, injury to property, expanding bullets,⁶ poison gas, and aerial bombardments. As far as disarmament was concerned, however, no state was willing to be the first to take such a step. The most that could be brought about in 1899 was a pious statement that the Conference recommended a scaling down of military expenditures, but this was well understood by all the delegates to be wishful thinking only.

The Second
Hague
Conference,
1907

In the interim between the first and second Hague conferences occurred the South-African and the Russo-Japanese wars, and the omens were far from encouraging when, again at the invitation of the tsar of Russia, the Second Hague Conference assembled in June,

⁵ A German delegate to the Hague Conference of 1899 summed up the general feeling of the leaders of Europe in a letter to the Kaiser: "Little disinterested states as subjects and little questions as objects of arbitral activity are conceivable; great states and great questions are not."

⁶ The discovery had recently been made at the government arsenal in Dum Dum, India, that soft-nosed bullets would inflict horrible wounds by expanding upon impact with the body. These "dum-dum" projectiles were supposedly outlawed by the agreements of 1899. On the whole problem of endeavoring to formulate rules for international war, see the article entitled, "Warfare, Laws of," in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 1934, XV, pp. 359-64.

1907.⁷ Although forty-five states were represented at this gathering, rather less was accomplished than before. Again the major powers, led by Germany, blocked suggestions for effective disarmament and proposals for a compulsory arbitration system. The most that the conference could do was to recommend a codification and revision of the rules relating to maritime warfare. This was actually attempted by the "Declaration of London" in 1909. The declaration, however, due largely to British objections, remained still unratified in 1914 and was therefore not applied during the first World War.

Such was the contribution of the public conscience of prewar Europe, as distinguished from private aspiration, to the impending threat of a general European war. International conferences, international conventions, special international unions, techniques like "good offices," mediation, conciliation, and arbitration—all were excellent instances of a sincere effort to shorten the lag between the social behavior of western civilization and the possibilities implicit in the sweep of modern science and technology. There was nothing seriously wrong with the machinery which the governments of Europe had devised to prevent war and bring about international harmony. But as 1914 approached there was abundantly evident a glaring lack of national willingness to trust this machinery in major crises. It has been well said that ". . . in the present development of civilization States will not accept grave risks for the maintenance of abstract justice; they will only accept such risks when their own existence or vital interests are involved."⁸

III. A CONTINENT DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF

The statesmen of Europe between 1871 and 1914 were always skeptical of the pacific schemes of private individuals and organiza-

⁷ The Conference received with pleasure the announcement that Andrew Carnegie proposed to erect for any future Hague gatherings a "Palace of Peace" as his gift to the pacifist movement they represented. Although no further Hague conferences were ever held, the building was finished in 1913. To show their approval of Carnegie's benefaction, all the powers assisted in its erection: Great Britain gave the stained-glass windows; France presented Gobelin tapestries; Italy offered the fine marble for the corridors; Germany gave the entrance gates; and Japan presented additional tapestries. Although not used for conference purposes, the Hague Palace of Peace was the headquarters of the Hague arbitrations after 1913 and of the Permanent Court of International Justice after 1921.

⁸ Hugh R. Wilson, *Diplomat Between Wars*, Longmans, Green & Company, 1941, p. 342. Although uttered with regard to the outbreak of the second World War in 1939, this dictum would equally be true for the antecedents of the struggle of 1914-18. Perhaps the high point in publicly supported peace endeavor before 1914 was the Joint Resolution unanimously passed by the American Congress on June 24, 1910, calling upon the president of the United States to take the lead in organizing the world for peace, with international security protected by a police force of the combined navies of all the powers.

The pre-
1914 alliance
system

tions and doubtful as to the effectiveness of publicly supported projects for international understanding and peace. In this state of mind they fell back upon what they conceived to be historic precedents and proceeded to organize systems of diplomatic alliances, primarily defensive in nature, but under certain conditions capable of being turned toward aggressive purposes. While superficially like similar diplomatic groupings which had previously existed, nevertheless the alliance systems of the European powers after 1871 developed characteristics of their own which made them unique in modern history.

The alliances which dominated Europe in the twentieth century were formed in times of peace when no great issues were pending; they were intended to have and gradually acquired a degree of permanence; and they took such hold of both governments and public opinion that in spite of mutual dissatisfaction within each group, no statesman dared to withdraw from the bond which his predecessors had signed.⁹

The "Three
Emperors'
League"

The pre-1914 alliance system of Europe was initiated by Bismarck in his key position as chancellor of the German Empire. Following the Prusso-German victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870, Bismarck felt that the primary aims of Germany henceforth should be the continuance of German ascendancy in European affairs and the maintenance of her conquests, notably that of Alsace-Lorraine. Knowing full well the hostility felt by large sections of the French public toward his own country, Bismarck believed that France must be kept diplomatically isolated. In consequence, he encouraged in 1872 the formation of the "Three Emperors' League"—an informal understanding among the German Kaiser, the Russian tsar, and the Austro-Hungarian monarch that they would act in concert to preserve the status quo of Europe. In a sense, it was a revival of the Holy Alliance of post-Napoleonic days. In 1881 this understanding among the three rulers was secretly made more formal by a written treaty. For six years this confidential agreement was in force, but in 1887 it finally lapsed, never to be renewed.

Austro-
German
alliance

Meantime, however, Bismarck had taken a decisive step toward a binding understanding with Austria-Hungary. In 1879 Germany signed with that country a comprehensive treaty, intended to become a permanent basis for the foreign policies of the two nations. Its terms were mutually defensive in nature and were for years kept strictly secret. They constituted the treaty basis for the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary which endured until 1918. In 1882 Italy adhered to the Austro-German agreement, thus making it a

⁹ Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War: 1914*, 1930, Vol. I, p. 8.
Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

Triple Alliance; as in the case of the earlier agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the new Triple Alliance was in the beginning purely defensive in character. In 1881, moreover, Serbia had signed a similar treaty with Austria-Hungary which remained in effect for twenty years. Likewise, in 1883 Romania entered into a parallel arrangement which was still nominally in force in 1914.

In 1887 Bismarck gladly promoted the so-called Mediterranean Agreements among Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Austria-Hungary by which the status quo in the Mediterranean littoral was to be preserved. Also in this year, 1887, following the dissolution of the League of the Three Emperors, Bismarck signed a secret agreement with Russia, called the Reinsurance treaty. By this latter understanding, Bismarck put the capstone to his complex diplomatic structure. In one way or another, Germany now had understandings with every important state in Europe except France, while France, completely isolated in a diplomatic sense, seemed wholly unable to challenge the dominance of her historic rival.

But no sooner had this masterpiece of alliance-diplomacy been completed than it began to crumble. Bismarck was forced out of office in 1890, and by his successors the good will between Germany and Russia which he had so sedulously fostered was allowed to disintegrate. The results were promptly to manifest themselves. In the very next year the event which Bismarck had labored to prevent for two decades came to pass: Russia and France on August 27, 1891, signed a diplomatic agreement pledging their co-operation and friendship should there arise any question or situation of a nature to threaten the general peace of Europe. In 1894, under terms whose exact nature was kept secret until 1918, France and Russia solidified their agreement by signing a military alliance. This understanding, however, became known in its main outlines, and for exactly a decade it furnished an effective counterbalance to the German alliance system.

Henceforward, for the undisputed but soberly exercised predominance of Germany, there was substituted a balance of power. Two vast combinations, each disposing of enormous military resources, dwelt together at first side by side but gradually face to face.¹⁰

Not unnaturally, at the turn of the century, both sides began to look about for further members. The one important European state not yet closely tied to either of the alliance systems was Great Britain. For decades the statesmen of the latter country had followed a "hands-off" policy with regard to European affairs, and even in the early

"Mediterranean Agreements"

Reinsurance treaty

Franco-Russian alliance

England's isolation

¹⁰ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 1931, p. 9. Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

1890's this attitude of isolation was still popular with most British leaders. Yet some among their number, like Joseph Chamberlain for example, were beginning to say that its usefulness as a national policy was over, and that in its place there should be substituted a working relationship with one of the continental alliance systems. For many reasons, at first thought, the Triple Alliance seemed the one with which Great Britain should affiliate. Between 1898 and 1901, therefore, responsible officials, alike in Great Britain and in Germany, toyed with the idea of British adherence to the Triple Alliance. Both sides were sincere in desiring friendly relations with each other, but each held tenaciously to the viewpoint that the friendship should be on its own terms.¹¹

Discouraged by the apparent impasse in their efforts to secure a friendly understanding with Germany and irritated by various impolitic actions of the German government in connection with the South-African War, British leaders determined upon a settlement of their numerous and hitherto chronic misunderstandings with France. Fortified by the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902, the British signed an accord with France on April 8, 1904. This understanding, soon known as the *Entente cordiale*, settled Anglo-French colonial quarrels the world over. In particular, France relinquished her claims in Egypt, and Great Britain reciprocated by withdrawing her claims in Morocco. These portions of the Anglo-French agreements were promptly published, but secret provisions arranging an eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain were not made public until 1911.

This abandonment of "splendid isolation" by Great Britain was made still more significant by an Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. In this accord, as in the earlier one between France and Great Britain, the outstanding colonial differences between the two countries were amicably compromised. After 1907, therefore, there was in European statecraft a new three-member combination, definitely seeking to counterbalance the Triple Alliance. The newer grouping was familiarly known as the Triple Entente. Its influence was enlarged by secret understandings between France and Italy in 1902 and between Russia and Italy in 1909. Thus the latter power had the dubious distinction of having straddled the alliance system. By keeping one foot in either camp, in case of crisis Italy could adhere to its agreements in whichever way would prove most advantageous to her.

After 1907 the European powers found themselves in an unprecedented situation. Europe was divided into two extensive and poten-


Anglo-
French
entente

Anglo-
Russian
agreement

¹¹ Unquestionably one of the stumbling blocks which proved fatal to the Anglo-German negotiations was Germany's desire for a great navy, officially proclaimed in the preamble to the German Naval Law of 1900.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE, JUNE 1914

PRINCIPAL RAILROADS CONNECTING CAPITALS



The rival alliance systems after 1907

tially hostile alliance systems by the automatic workings of which a quarrel between any member of one alliance and any member of the other might readily involve the entire membership of both. Under the increasing tensions of the years between 1907 and 1914, both alliances ". . . tended to be deformed from their originally defensive character. They tended to become widened in scope to cover policies involving offensive military action."¹² The Triple Alliance, particularly Germany, professed to be alarmed by the "encirclement" policy of the Triple Entente, while the latter watched with apprehension the increasing armaments of the Triple Alliance.¹³

Military and naval accords

Both sides endeavored to tighten the existing accords among their members and to make more precise the exact nature of military and naval co-operation which the partners would give each other in case of a general war. For ten years after 1904 British and French military experts worked in friendly collaboration, and in 1912 naval understandings between France and Russia, and France and Great Britain, were made. In 1909 parallel efforts to achieve precision in the use of Austrian and German armed forces were entered into by the military leaders of those countries. Similar accords were reached between Germany and Italy in connection with military affairs in November, 1913, and with regard to naval co-operation in March, 1914.

Schism complete

The schism of Europe was now complete. By 1914 relations between the two alliance systems, as a result of various tests of power during the previous decade, had become strained to the breaking point. These preliminary crises, all of which had been surmounted peacefully, will be summarized in the ensuing section. Here it may be noted merely that, as a consequence of these earlier trials of strength and of the bitternesses resulting therefrom, the elaborate alliance system begun in the Bismarckian era and "designed originally as a guarantee of peace, proved, when put to the test, to be the mechanism for unchaining a general war."¹⁴

IV. RUMBLINGS OF THE COMING STORM

There have now been set forth the underlying causes of conflict which by 1914 had brought the major European powers so close to the brink of a general war that any fortuitous incident might push

¹² Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Macmillan Co., 1928, Vol. I, p. 224.

¹³ These increases in the land and sea forces of the Triple Alliance were paralleled by similar increases in the armies and navies of the Triple Entente. Excellent tables showing the growth of European armaments from 1871 to 1914 are given by Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934, pp. 117-20. In 1914 the land and sea forces of the Entente were numerically larger than those of the Triple Alliance.

¹⁴ Schmitt, *op cit.*, p. 114.

them over the precipice. To recapitulate them, it may be said that they were five in number: (1) the existence of those great systems of rival diplomatic alliances which have just been discussed; (2) the enmities and rivalries resulting from those colonial and imperial struggles summarized in a previous chapter; (3) the growth of a fervid nationalism in all European states, in some instances, as in Austria-Hungary, threatening to break up the existing form of the state, but in others like the Balkan countries serving as an aggrandizing and aggressive force; (4) the enormous growth and international competition in armaments, leading to the evolution of a condition of mind and of culture known as "militarism," particularly strong in the empires of the tsar and the kaiser; and (5) the constant excitation of public opinion, for the first time in history largely literate, by every institution of education and propaganda which the mechanical and scientific age had produced.

But before any of these factors or all of them together finally brought an end to Europe's forty-three years of peace, several premonitory international crises occurred. In each of them there were elements which were to be repeated in 1914. From each of them the responsible statesmen of Europe came away either with emotions of satisfaction and the wish for further triumphs in the future or with sentiments of bitterness and the desire for revenge "next time." Four of these international crises which kept Europe in a state of high tension during the decade before 1914 will be examined: two in Morocco in 1905 and in 1911, and two in the Balkans in 1908-9 and in 1912-13.

In 1905 the latent ill will between Germany and France was sharpened by a series of incidents involving the control of Morocco. It has been noted that when the Anglo-French *entente* was formed in 1904 the eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain had been agreed upon. Concerning the proposed division of this portion of Africa, Germany had not been kept informed, and to it her diplomats did not propose amiably to concur. Germany had commercial interests in Morocco and felt that an "open-door" status of that country rather than control by one or two powers was the proper solution. To this suggestion France did not feel agreeable. Hence an impasse had developed early in 1905. This the Germans sought to solve by forceful methods. On March 31 at Chancellor Bülow's request Kaiser William II made a spectacular visit to the chief port of Morocco, Tangier, thus ostentatiously dramatizing Germany's interest in that country. A few weeks later Bülow let it be known that the resignation of the French foreign minister, Delcassé, who with Lord Lansdowne of Great Britain had been chief architect of the Anglo-French

Underlying causes for a general war

First Moroccan crisis, 1905

entente, would be highly pleasing to Germany. In June, 1905, this took place, and the humbled French consented to a conference to settle the future of Morocco.

Germany had thus won a diplomatic success. Actually, however, it was highly superficial. France had been deeply antagonized. British statesmen were irritated at German methods and drew closer the recently forged bonds with France. Russia, the French partner since 1891, was irked also, and turned down the German kaiser's Björkö proposal in the summer of 1905 for a revival of the old Three Emperors' League of Bismarckian days. Even the settlement of the Moroccan question at the conference, held in Algeciras, Spain, in 1906, endured only a few years and a separate agreement in 1909 between France and Germany had no more permanence.

In 1911 the friction between the two countries broke out once more. Native unrest in Morocco had given the French an excuse to send a punitive expedition to the Moroccan capital, the city of Fez, in April of that year. This action, maintained the Germans, would probably be used as an excuse by the French to claim exclusive rights in Morocco; hence, on July 1, a German warship was dispatched to the Atlantic port of Agadir. At this apparently trivial action—actually the first move in a game whereby Germany still hoped to secure a part of Morocco for her empire—the Triple Entente powers, especially Great Britain, took grave offense. On July 21 a prominent member of the British cabinet, David Lloyd George, made a stirring speech in which he broadly hinted that Great Britain did not propose to stand idly by while her French partner was deprived of her just rights in Morocco. It was now the German turn to draw back and seek to find a compromise solution. On November 4, 1911, a Franco-German agreement sought to achieve this end. Germany surrendered her political claims in Morocco, while France ceded to the Germans approximately one hundred thousand square miles of the French Congo. German statesmen were aggrieved and surprised at the vehemence of British support of France, while the latter felt encouraged to take a bolder line in future clashes with her neighbor across the Rhine.

Meantime, in 1908-9 a serious outbreak of rivalry in the Balkans had brought Europe close to war. Early in October, 1908, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Aehrenthal, arranged that his country should proclaim the immediate annexation of the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These districts nominally belonging to Turkey had been held by Austria-Hungary in trusteeship since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Because these provinces were inhabited largely by Slavs closely related to their kinsfolk in adjacent Serbia, and because this latter country had long coveted eventual annexation

Second
Moroccan
crisis, 1911

A Balkan
crisis,
1908-9

of Bosnia and Herzegovina to herself, Aehrenthal's action aroused violent anger in Serbia. By itself this could not have caused a serious war, for Austria-Hungary was much more than a match for Serbia. But behind Serbia during the crisis stood Russia in the person of that state's foreign minister, Isvolsky. Moderately sympathetic were the foreign ministers of France and Great Britain. But behind Austria-Hungary stood Germany. The crux of the problem from the legalistic viewpoint was whether one state—i.e., Austria-Hungary—had the unilateral right to modify a decision of an international congress. Isvolsky demanded a conference of the major powers to consider the matter; Aehrenthal blandly demurred. In March, 1909, thanks to parallel suggestions from Germany and Great Britain, the crisis was solved by an exchange of notes between the powers, ratifying Austrian action.

The consequences of the Balkan crisis, like those in Morocco, were serious. The Triple Alliance had seemingly won a victory. But the true cost was greater than at first realized. After 1908 Serbia nursed undying vengeance against her great neighbor to the north, and became the focus of all the irredentist desires of the South Slavs living under Habsburg rule. Russia, humiliated by her defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905, was still further humiliated—or so men like Isvolsky never tired of saying—by her forced backing down in 1909. France and Great Britain were irked by the success of Germany and Austria-Hungary and determined to take a stronger stand in a future Balkan crisis.¹⁵ Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, drew the conclusion that the way to succeed in sparring with her rivals was to be brusque and uncompromising. Italy was offended at Aehrenthal's action and after 1909 became lukewarm in her devotion to the Triple Alliance. Germany, sensing Italy's defection, was henceforth convinced that her one dependable ally was Austria-Hungary, and that the path of wisdom was to co-operate loyally with the latter.

In 1912-13 renewed tension developed in connection with the Balkan wars of those years. In this instance, the chief point of irritation was again the clash of interests between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. As already indicated in the section on the Balkan Wars, the Habsburg power was determined not to permit the territorial enlarge-

*Its con-
sequences*

*Renewed
Balkan
crisis, 1911*

¹⁵ This irritation on the part of Great Britain and France was reflected in the intensification of preparedness plans after 1909. In that year Great Britain witnessed the greatest naval scare in its history, an hysterical outburst of public opinion to the effect that Germany was secretly building a mighty navy that would shortly be greater than the British fleet. This hysteria abated in the face of the facts, but it was still strong enough in 1912 to defeat a final effort to bring about an Anglo-German naval understanding, the so-called "Haldane Mission" of that year.

Its con-
sequences

ment of Serbia to the point where that small state would have an outlet to the sea. Serbia was extremely anxious for such access and was in general supported by Russia. But Germany and Great Britain in the persons of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey co-operated fairly well in advocating a compromise solution: viz., the creation of an independent Albania. Germany in particular warned Austria-Hungary against any precipitate violence, and 1913 passed off without a war. But, as in 1908-9, the indignation of Serbia toward her northern neighbor was intense. Now entirely unconcealed, anti-Habsburg agitation grew apace in Serbia; plots against Habsburg authority were meditated by excited Serbian nationalists and quietly overlooked by responsible Serbian statesmen like Premier Pashitch; sympathy with Serbian aspirations was frequently offered by high officials of friendly powers, men like Foreign Minister Sazonov in Russia and President Poincaré in France.

Nor in Vienna was there any great degree of satisfaction with the development of Austro-Serbian relations. Steadily the conviction hardened in the minds of Austro-Hungarian leaders that neither in 1908-9 nor in 1913 had their country's action been really decisive. Men like Count Berchtold, the new minister of foreign affairs for the Dual Monarchy, were of the opinion that the Serbian problem and all that went with it in the way of irredentist agitation in the southern provinces of the Habsburg domains was a cancer threatening the very life of the Monarchy. At the first favorable opportunity, they believed, this cancer must be excised, even though it would require a war to do it.

A few short months after the events just described, that is to say in the summer of 1914, this opportunity came. The Austro-Hungarian authorities acted as they had made up their minds to do. War was declared on Serbia. But this decision instead of initiating the final act in the unhappy drama of Austro-Serbian relations became the prologue of an immensely greater tragedy: the first World War.

V. EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Superficial appearances To an uncritical observer at the beginning of 1914, it must have seemed that Europe and its peoples were at the crest of their prestige and influence in the modern world. Forty-three years of peace and progress in every material art and science had made European civilization and its counterpart in the United States apparently dominant over most of the earth's surface. The triumphs of applied science and invention, the foliation of education and popular enlightenment, the

sweep of imperial conquest, and the rise of powerful national states—all these elements which have already been outlined rendered Europe and the culture associated with that name words to conjure with.

Yet beneath this glittering exterior, and despite all the genuine accomplishments of the human heart and mind related to it, there was a somber reality. As the early years of the twentieth century sped by, and one international crisis followed another, that reality became clear: European civilization in its traditional form was actually in the process of disintegration. It was disintegrating because it had lost those ties of unity which had once bound most European peoples together, and there had not yet been found any adequate new ones. The old sense of a common heritage was being effaced by the appeals of new philosophies stressing human differences rather than likenesses. The one-time conception of a common mission for the European mind which had resulted in a community of feeling in western Europe was steadily being dissipated, leaving no deep bond of unity to transcend the recurring political, social, and economic cleavages. Actually, the World War of 1914-18 was the result of this European cultural disintegration, and not its cause as sometimes stated.

Nevertheless, there was prodigious strength in the human and social organization of Europe, power which, applied to destructive purposes, was to wreak such devastation as had not been known for centuries. Looking back upon this process, one of the great figures in the first World War, as well as in its continuing second phase after 1939, has set forth in measured words his estimate of European civilization on the eve of the war. His judgment may be quoted as the just summary of the Europe that went forth to battle and to perish in 1914:

In the beginning of the twentieth century men were everywhere unconscious of the rate at which the world was growing. It required the convulsion of the war to awaken the nations to the knowledge of their strength. For a year after the war had begun hardly anyone understood how terrific, how almost inexhaustible were the resources in force, in substance, in virtue, behind every one of the combatants. The vials of wrath were full: but so were the reservoirs of power. From the end of the Napoleonic Wars and still more after 1870, the accumulation of wealth and health by every civilized community had been practically unchecked. Here and there a retarding episode had occurred. The waves had recoiled after advancing: but the mounting tides still flowed. And when the dread signal of Armageddon was made, mankind was found to be many times stronger in valour, in endurance, in brains, in science, in apparatus, in organization, not only than it had ever been before, but than even its most audacious optimists had dared to dream.

The Victorian Age was the age of accumulation; not of a mere piling up of material wealth, but of the growth and gathering in every land

Basic realities

The power of Europe

of all those elements and factors which go to make up the power of States. Education spread itself over the broad surface of the millions. Science had opened the limitless treasure-house of nature. Door after door had been unlocked. One dim mysterious gallery after another had been lighted up, explored, made free for all: and every gallery entered gave access to at least two more. Every morning when the world woke up, some new machinery had started running. Every night while the world had supper, it was running still. It ran on while all men slept.

And the advance of the collective mind was at a similar pace. . . . Every year brought in new thousands of people in private stations who thought about their own country and its story and its duties towards other countries, to the world and to the future, and understood the greatness of the responsibilities of which they were the heirs. Every year diffused a wider measure of material comfort among the higher ranks of labour. Substantial progress was made in mitigating the hard lot of the mass. Their health improved, their lives and the lives of their children were brightened, their stature grew, their securities against some of their gravest misfortunes were multiplied, their numbers greatly increased.

Thus when all the trumpets sounded, every class and rank had something to give to the need of the State. Some gave their science and some their wealth, some gave their business energy and drive, and some their wonderful personal prowess, and some their patient strength or patient weakness. But none gave more, or gave more readily, than the common man or woman who had nothing but a precarious week's wages between them and poverty, and owned little more than the slender equipment of a cottage, and the garments in which they stood upright. Their love and pride of country, their loyalty to the symbols with which they were familiar, their keen sense of right and wrong as they saw it, led them to outface and endure perils and ordeals the like of which men had not known on earth.

But these developments were no monopoly of any one nation. In every free country, great or small, the spirit of patriotism and nationality grew steadily; and in every country, bond or free, the organisation and structure into which men were fitted by the laws, gathered and armed this sentiment. . . .¹⁶

¹⁶ Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-6. Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

Since 1914

The First World War (1914-1918)

I. JULY, 1914

SHORTLY AFTER ELEVEN O'CLOCK on Sunday morning, June 28, 1914, the Austrian heir apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, were assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo, the provincial capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These territories, it will be remembered, had been forcibly annexed by Austria-Hungary from Turkey in 1908, to the great resentment of the Serbs who had coveted them also. The archduke's assassin, Gavrilo Princip, was one of three Bosnian youths between seventeen and twenty years of age, whose distorted minds had conceived of this cold-blooded murder as a patriotic deed, intended to show the Habsburg power the enmity of the recently annexed peoples and to inspire further resistance from the Bosniacs toward their overlords.

The murder
of June
28, 1914

About the motivations and complices of this crime soon revolved an intense controversy. The Austro-Hungarian government, properly indignant at the outrage, insisted that behind the apparently spontaneous murder plot of a few youthful Bosnian terrorists stood a malignant Serbian government at Belgrade. Hence, in the opinion of the statesmen in Vienna, any kind of strong punitive action against Serbia, even war itself, would be fully justified. On the other hand, Serbian government leaders maintained an attitude of complete innocence and insisted that the incident was purely an internal affair of the Habsburg Monarchy. Although this has been made clear only by careful postwar historical research, the truth lay approximately midway between these two positions.

Reactions in
Vienna and
Belgrade

The antagonism between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, several times noted in preceding pages, had been steadily growing since 1903. The Austrians believed that Serbian nationalism was an obstacle to their penetration of the Balkans and a threat to the national unity of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time, the Serbs, particularly since their victories in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, believed that Austria-Hungary was a tyrannical and decrepit state whose dissolu-

Roots of
the crime

tion ought not be long postponed and whose downfall would usher in a new era of power and territorial gains for Serbia. To further the creation of a "Greater Serbia" there had been founded at Belgrade in 1908 a patriotic society open to all Serbs known as the "Narodna Odbrana," or National Defense group. This organization, however, was officially dedicated to a program of peaceful nationalism, stressing patience and hope in achieving Serbian aims.

Not satisfied with the moderation of the Narodna Odbrana, in 1911 a group of hot-headed radicals formed a secret nationalistic society, commonly known as the "Black Hand." This organization was a terroristic one, whose members believed in "direct action" and plotted murder with equanimity. Although not supported by Serbian government leaders, and indeed often at odds with them, the Black Hand had a singular appeal to certain strata of the populations alike of independent Serbia and of Habsburg-dominated Bosnia. Its bloody symbolism and ritual attracted scores of irresponsible youth who were willing to try anything that savored of excitement and patriotism.

The
"Black
Hand"

Preparations
of the plot

Members of the Black Hand in Belgrade furnished six bombs and four revolvers to Gavrilo Princip and two young Bosnian colleagues who came to the Serbian capital in May, 1914. The conspirators thereupon journeyed back to Sarajevo where Austrian army maneuvers were to be held in June. At these Archduke Francis Ferdinand was to be a guest. With what seemed like deliberate tactlessness, the culmination of the exercises was scheduled for June 28, the five hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of Kossovo (1389) wherein the Serbs had been defeated by the Turks. On this day Princip and his colleagues planned to murder the Austrian prince. The details of the plot thus projected by the minions of the Black Hand were probably not known to Serbian government officials in Belgrade. But early in June rumors that something was in the wind were circulating in that capital and were, in fact, indirectly passed on to the Habsburg government by Serbian diplomats. Nevertheless, the assassins-to-be were able to slip quietly out of Serbia and make ready their plans in Sarajevo. It is probable that there was considerable laxity in police precautions on both sides of the border, the Serbs not bestirring themselves energetically to apprehend the conspirators, the Austrians negligently ignoring the mutterings of public opinion in Bosnia and the possibility that they might culminate in deeds of violence.

Its
execution

In Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28, the crime developed almost precisely as planned. As the archducal couple drove down the main street of the town, Nedelyko Chabrinovich hurled a bomb at their car. On this occasion the intended victims escaped, and the assailants

was seized by the police. But a few moments later a second attempt resulted otherwise. At a street corner where the royal automobile was temporarily halted by a chauffeur's error, Princip at point-blank revolver range killed both the archduke and his wife. Promptly arrested by the police, Princip and his colleagues were shortly put on trial for murder and presently convicted; since they were all too young to receive the death penalty they were given twenty-year prison sentences, and they eventually died in jail.¹

Far more important than the fate of the three young fanatics, however, were the repercussions of their deed over Europe. The Austrian foreign minister, Count Berchtold, shrewdly suspecting more than he was ever able to prove, determined to hold Serbia responsible for the outrage and lay such demands upon that country as would end once and for all its aggressive attitude toward the Habsburg power. In order to be sure of success in this program, it was essential that Austria-Hungary secure the endorsement of her powerful partner in the Triple Alliance, the German Empire. Accordingly, exactly a week after the crime, a confidential secretary carried to Berlin Berchtold's ideas and his request for German support and approval. On Sunday and Monday, July 5-6, German government leaders, including the Kaiser, unofficially but cordially expressed their sympathy with the Austrian desire to solve the Serbian question, if need be, by force. While the Germans did not think that an Austrian attack on Serbia would result in a general European war, they realized that it was remotely possible. Even so, they did not hesitate to give a free hand to the Vienna government to go ahead. This was the fatal "blank check" of the German government in 1914, and from it came most of the Austrian intransigence in the ensuing weeks.

International
repercussions

German
decisions,
July 5-6

The events of those weeks have been narrated more frequently and at greater length than any similar happenings in modern history. On the voluminous records of this period one authority has said:

Thanks to the opening of archives after 1919 and to the publication of biographies and autobiographies of innumerable persons, great and small, the record of what happened between the murder at Sarajevo on June 28 and the outbreak of a general European war five weeks later is extraordinarily full—so full, indeed, that much more is known about this crisis than about the circumstances leading up to the Crimean War of 1854 or the Franco-German war of 1870.²

¹ Following the Allied victory in the first World War the assassins of June 28, 1914, were extolled as national heroes in Yugoslavia. In January, 1930, at Sarajevo there was unveiled a memorial tablet in Princip's memory.

² Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "July 1914 Once More," *Journal of Modern History*, XIII (1941), University of Chicago Press, p. 225.

Europe on
the eve
of war

It is difficult for a modern student, knowing what he does, to realize how imperfectly some facts were understood in 1914. It should be noted that whereas in retrospect many elements appear obvious, indeed almost inevitable, they were far from being grasped as clearly in the month of July, 1914, as they have been subsequently. This much may be said of the whole critical period between the murder in Sarajevo and the outbreak of a general European war: there was no deliberate desire for such a war in any government or people of Europe. But some important qualifications must be remembered. Bellicose currents of opinion did exist in all states; international mistrust had become the rule rather than the exception; the idea of an inevitable war was widespread; both alliance systems unfairly attributed plans of aggression to the other; and every great power approved policies wherein the risk of war was imminent.

After some weeks of argument before he could win the support of the Hungarians led by their premier Count Tisza, Berchtold on Thursday, July 23, dispatched the long-anticipated Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Rumors of its contents had reached London and Paris as well as Berlin by the middle of July, and on Wednesday evening, July 22, a complete text was in German hands. The Germans thought it was severe in its content and demands, but in view of the understanding of July 5-6 felt obliged to approve it. The ultimatum reviewed at length the troubled story of Austro-Serbian relations; accused the Serbian government of indirect responsibility for the murder at Sarajevo; and made ten demands upon the government at Belgrade for reparation and apology. It closed with a curt request for a reply within forty-eight hours, i.e., by Saturday evening, July 25, at six o'clock. It was a stiff ultimatum—though not, as sometimes stated, the most severe in modern history—and had been made deliberately harsh in the hope that its rejection, in whole or in part, would give the Habsburg Monarchy a good pretext for a declaration of war upon Serbia.

A few moments before the deadline, Serbia handed in its reply. Conciliatory in form, it was less so in substance. Five of the ten Austrian demands were accepted. But five others were evaded or answered with strong reservations. Nevertheless, the general effect produced upon most Europeans was favorable to Serbia. It seemed that her attitude did not in any sense preclude further diplomatic negotiations, and even the Kaiser, after reading the Serbian reply, was sure that a peaceful Austro-Serbian compromise could be devised. However, as had been previously planned, except in the unlikely contingency of complete and abject acquiescence, the Austrian government immediately declared the Serbian reply unsatisfactory. It

Austrian
ultimatum
to Serbia

Serbian
reply

broke off diplomatic relations with Belgrade that same Saturday night, and three days later, on Tuesday noon, July 28, declared war against Serbia. This precipitate action was regretted by the German government, but once again, constrained by the understandings of July 5-6, it could bring no real pressure on Austria-Hungary to delay the declaration. Instead, the Germans comforted themselves by the hope that the war could be "localized" between the Habsburg Monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.

Actually this was a remote contingency. The president of France, Raymond Poincaré, had been in Russia on an official visit between July 20 and July 23 and during this period in response to Russian queries emphatically stated that France would act strictly in conformity with the Franco-Russian treaty of alliance of 1894. Such a declaration meant that France was ready to go to war on the side of Russia if Germany should intervene in any conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia. This attitude of France as expressed by its president was quite analogous to that of Germany as set forth in the understandings with Austria-Hungary on July 5-6. From the moment the position of France was clear, the Russian government acted firmly. It made plain to the statesmen at Vienna that Russia would not stand aside and let Serbia be crushed by Austrian armies. Indeed, it is highly probable that Russia encouraged the Serbs to hand in a less abject reply to the Austrian ultimatum than they might otherwise have done. As early as Saturday afternoon, July 25, Russian military circles began plans for entrance into war on the side of Serbia. A report of this determination was forwarded to Germany that same day, but the Kaiser's leaders, both civil and military, surprisingly ignored it as bluff.

The British government in the person of Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey on Sunday, July 26, for the second time suggested a conference of the four less interested powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain—to mediate the growing differences between Austria and Russia. The Germans, though, were highly dubious of the impartiality of their Italian allies and rejected Grey's proposal. However, sensing that the situation was developing ominously, Berlin began to urge Vienna to go more slowly and to take seriously suggestions for a peaceful compromise. This recommendation was countered by the Austrian *fait accompli* of war on Serbia by Tuesday noon, July 28. Angered by such action, the Russian government in its turn now officially authorized steps of grave import. Despite the telegraphed importunities of the Kaiser to the tsar, on Wednesday, July 29, the Russians ordered *partial* mobilization, and on the next day, *complete* mobilization of all the armed forces of the tsar's empire.

Franco-Russian attitude

Anglo-German peace suggestions

When the news of this action became known, all real hope for a peaceful way out of the impasse vanished.

This factor of Russian initiative in ordering complete mobilization of its armed forces was the signal to put into effect the dread political maxim which had been accepted by European military men for decades: "Mobilization means war." The first answer to the Russian decision was a series of similar actions by the other powers. Even earlier, on July 29, the British fleet had been directed to take war stations; on July 31, the Austrian government ordered general mobilization; and on Saturday, August 1, respectively at 4:45 and 5:00 P.M., France and Germany did likewise. The plans of general staffs in all countries to be used in the event of war were now in full flood. Determined to get a head start on its less completely prepared neighbors, Germany declared war on Russia at 6:00 P.M. on Saturday, August 1. Forty-eight hours later a similar declaration was made on France. The pretexts given for each were trifling; the actual reason was the inexorable pressure of prearranged plans which had to be put into effect as war approached.

The "Schlieffen Plan"

In order to attack France successfully, German strategists had long proposed to violate Belgian neutrality and sweep into northeastern France on a front much broader than the Franco-German boundary as delimited in 1871. This was the so-called Schlieffen Plan, worked out by a German general of that name as early as 1898. Belgium had been a neutralized state since 1839, with every great power in Europe having pledged itself not to violate Belgian neutrality. Nevertheless, on Sunday evening, August 2, Germany sent to Brussels an ultimatum demanding the right to march through Belgium toward France. If possible, Germany hoped Belgium would submit peacefully; if not, it would mean war. By Monday noon, August 3, this demand and its proud rejection by Belgium were both known in London, where the government had been vacillating for days over Great Britain's action.

Belgium and Great Britain

That afternoon Foreign Secretary Grey made a historic speech before the house of commons, insisting that Great Britain had obligations of morality and honor to go to the help of Belgium, if and when an aggressor nation invaded that small state.³ On Tuesday morning, August 4, the German army was marching through Belgium. The British government, therefore, immediately notified Berlin that unless the invaders were withdrawn Great Britain would declare war on Germany. Since no answer to this ultimatum was

³ This thesis was the official explanation for the British entrance into the World War. It is questioned by Sir Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time*, London, 1928, p. 56.

forthcoming, at the stroke of midnight on August 4, 1914, the British Empire entered the spreading conflict.⁴

On August 5, tiny Montenegro entered the war on the side of Serbia; on August 7, Portugal proclaimed her adherence to her historic alliance with Great Britain. On August 23, Japan, Britain's ally in the Far East since 1902, declared war on Germany. Meantime, on August 2, Turkey had signed a secret alliance with the Germans, and three months later entered the war as an active belligerent. On August 3, Italy, breaking with her partners in the Triple Alliance, declared her neutrality and after a nine-months' period of hesitancy entered the war on the side of the Franco-Russian-British alliance in May, 1915.

Other
declarations
of war

II. THREE-DIMENSIONAL TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE

1. THE BATTLES OF FIGHTING MEN AND DIPLOMATS

It has often been observed by students of military affairs that no man or group of men can fully anticipate all the characteristics or consequences that arise from any war. How true this was the experiences of the years from 1914 to 1918 abundantly demonstrated. The exact strategic plans which the leaders in all countries had so carefully prepared, and which were supposed to lead to infallible and speedy victory, were all proved ineffective. The conflict which most European army and navy men had foreseen as a short war was prolonged for more than four years, and only at the price of infinite human agony and gigantic economic and social upheaval was any end to it finally accomplished. In the realm of diplomacy likewise, the first World War was replete with fortuitous events, unexpected alliances, and abandonment of treaty obligations which belied the smooth assurances of prewar statesmen.

Inadequate
anticipations
of the war

The actual fighting during the months between 1914 and 1918 has been studied and described with a lavishness of detail that only modern scholarship could have made possible. Every major campaign, even every battle on land, sea, or in the air, has received careful treatment in thousands of books. Indeed, the trees of fact are so numerous that it is almost impossible to see the main characteristics

⁴ In a last effort to avoid this clash between Britain and Germany, the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, besought the British ambassador in Berlin to have the latter's government reconsider. In the course of this interview on the evening of August 4, the frantic German declared that the British were going to war with a country that desired only to be friendly with them "just for a scrap of paper," *i.e.*, the Belgian guarantee treaty. This unhappy phrase was given worldwide dissemination by the British as a perfect example of German perfidy and reckless disregard of treaties.



German attack, 1914



Deadlock



Spring, 1918



Autumn, 1918

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

(Adapted from *Life* Magazine, June 26, 1939.)

of the forest. In the following account the military phases of the first World War will be analyzed from two viewpoints: (1) chief time periods; and (2) technical innovations.

So far as time periods are concerned, the events of the first World War divided themselves into three: the first shock in 1914; the deadlock during 1915, 1916, and 1917; and the final convulsion in 1918.⁵ In the first period millions of men in the trained armies of

Chief time periods

⁵ Adapted from Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931, p. 558.

Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand and France, Russia, Great Britain, and Belgium on the other grappled along the frontiers both east and west. In a succession of furious battles the Germans came close to achieving the victory so carefully outlined in the Schlieffen Plan. By this celebrated military formula, the western allies were to be defeated by the fast-moving German army in the first seven weeks of the war, after which the victorious forces of the Kaiser were to be rushed across Germany to conquer the presumably more dilatory Russians.

The ferocity and costliness of these opening campaigns were unprecedented. On the western front alone during the first three months of the war, the British, French, and Belgians suffered over a million casualties, as compared with 677,000 for the Germans. Yet in spite of their nearness to complete victory, actually the Germans did not win it. Thwarted in their efforts to capture Paris by the Allied victory at the Marne in September, 1914, stopped at Ypres in their race to the Channel ports in October and November, as winter closed in the German forces dug a system of trench lines from the Belgian coast to Switzerland and settled down for a modern equivalent of siege warfare. Although in the opening weeks of the war the Germans won signal successes against the Russians, notably at the great battle of Tannenberg in East Prussia, and although trench lines in the East were always more fluid than in the West, by the end of 1914 approximately the same static situation obtained there also.

The period of deadlock in the West endured virtually unbroken until the spring of 1918. Foundered in the opposing systems of trench warfare, the two great armies before that date wholly failed to achieve any real "break-through." Notwithstanding the most heroic efforts, in no battle during the years of deadlock did more than a few square miles change hands at any one time, and the progress of the attacker was more often measured in feet than in miles. Five times in 1915, 1916, and 1917 the British and French strove to smash through the German positions; names like Champagne, Loos, the Somme, Arras, and Passchendaele came to have a connotation of horror and bloodshed to countless Allied homes. Likewise, the single great German attack upon the Allied positions, that of Verdun in 1916, failed to the accompaniment of heavy losses. Throughout all this period, with total casualties on both sides running into millions of men, the Germans uniformly suffered smaller losses than either the British or the French. Thus the bloody process of attrition went on, month after month, year after year, and men wondered if ever there would be an end to it all. Surveying the facts years afterward, Winston Churchill wrote with melancholy truthfulness: ". . . the Germans were strengthened

The first
shock

Deadlock
in the West

relatively by every Allied offensive—British or French—launched against them until the summer of 1918.”⁶

German success in the East

In the East the story was somewhat different. There, the Germans and their Austrian allies did succeed in 1915 and 1916 in driving the Russian forces deep into Russia, and in inflicting crippling losses in men and equipment upon the armies of the tsar. By the beginning of 1917, despite deeds of heroism on the part of countless individuals, the Russian army and the state were on the verge of disintegration. Meantime, in 1915, also on the eastern front, the Austro-German alliance had welcomed the adherence of Bulgaria to their side. With their new ally they crushed Serbia and Montenegro in the autumn of 1915, and Romania a year later. Turkish forces, assisted by German officers and men, in 1915 stopped a British invasion of Mesopotamia, and in 1916, after months of sanguinary fighting, ejected an Allied expeditionary force from the region of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, the Germanic group was unable to conquer Egypt or to secure the support of Greece, both objectives earnestly desired by their leaders.

Entry of U. S. into war, 1917

In 1917, the entrance of the United States into the war promised the Allies a means by which to break the impasse into which the war had sunk; almost at the same time the collapse of Russia into a revolutionary and hence chaotic condition seemed to the Germans to offer them a similar opportunity. Consequently, in 1918 there came again a period of decisive battle. On March 21 of that year the German armies on the western front began a series of five mighty assaults on the Allied positions. By the first of June the attackers were barely forty miles from Paris, and regions that had not experienced fighting since 1914 were once again in the thick of the battle. Although Germany seemed on the verge of triumph, nearness to victory proved to be not victory itself. By midsummer the wastages of war had exhausted the striking power of the German army.

The final convulsion, 1918

German defeat

On July 18, the tide turned with a rush. The Allied armies, now under the command of a single “generalissimo,” a French officer named Ferdinand Foch, began a sequence of effective counterattacks which lasted unremittingly to the end of the war. Harried in the northern part of the front by the British and Belgian attackers, in the southern portion by the Americans, and in the central region by the French, the Germans were driven steadily backward until by November 11 they were virtually expelled from France. German

⁶ Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 572. As indications of war weariness during the deadlock, it may be noted that there were mutinies in the French army in May, 1917, and in the German navy at Kiel a few weeks later.

losses of men and materials during these weeks of defeat and retreat were the largest to that time in the history of military operations. When the Armistice was granted on November 11, it came as a result of the request of the German high command itself. Beaten Germany perforce accepted victors' terms.⁷

Of great import in the Allied victory, both in the military sense and in its effect upon the war-weary populations of France and Great Britain, was the American Expeditionary Force, better known as the "A.E.F." The first American contingents landed in France in June, 1917. Monthly thereafter the American overseas' forces increased—in July, 1918, 306,000 Americans reached Europe, the equivalent of thirty German divisions—until they numbered 2,057,907, exclusive of navy personnel. First put into a quiet trench sector near Nancy, France, in October, 1917, the American army suffered its initial casualties on November 2. The first major action between Americans and Germans was at Cantigny, near Amiens, in May, 1918. Then followed heavy engagements at Belleau Wood and at Château-Thierry in June. By August, 14 American divisions were in the front line; 550,000 Americans fought in the Battle of Saint Mihiel in September, and more than 1,000,000 along the Meuse-Argonne battlefield in October and November. Small contingents of Americans were attached to the Italian army in 1918, and to the anti-Bolshevik forces in eastern Siberia and near Archangel, Russia, in the same year. The total American casualties were upwards of 52,000 killed in battle and more than 200,000 wounded.

The year 1918 was likewise decisive all along the far-flung line of the East. Italy, which had been waging a slow and costly struggle against Austria for more than three years, in the summer of 1918 forced the Austro-Hungarian armies back to their own soil, and during the first days of November compelled them to sue for peace. Bulgaria, battered into submission by an Allied force striking north from the Greek base of Salonika—Greece had entered the war on the Allied side in 1917—dropped out as a combatant on September 29. Turkey, defeated in Syria, overwhelmed in Mesopotamia, and almost abandoned by her allies, ceased fighting on October 30.

From the viewpoint of technical innovations, the first World War evolved four that were destined to be of great significance then and since. These were the submarine, the air arm, poison gas, and the tank. Each will be briefly considered. The British and their allies from the outbreak of the war in 1914 had undisputed control of most of the world's sea lanes. In spite of various sorties by the much

The American contribution to victory

Collapse of the eastern front

Technical innovations of the war

⁷ German colonial resistance, overcome much earlier in all Germany's colonies except East Africa, continued in that area until November 14, 1918.

advertised German fleet—whose construction had so exacerbated prewar public opinion in Great Britain—culminating in the Battle of Jutland off the Danish coast on May 31, 1916, no real victories were won thereby.⁸ Similarly negative were the results of individual German commerce raiders like the *Wolf* and *Seeadler*. In consequence, the German admirals turned their attention to the relatively untried weapon of the submarine, or "U-boat," as it was familiarly called.

The submarine
German use of U-boats to 1917

Germany entered the first World War with 43 submarines in service, but in 1915 began to increase the rate of their construction. By the end of the war 390 submarines had been placed in commission, and there were 419 more on the ways or projected. On February 4, 1915, a submarine blockade of waters surrounding Great Britain was proclaimed. The most celebrated result of this phase of the U-boat warfare was the sinking of the great British liner, *Lusitania*, on May 7, 1915, a few miles off the southern coast of Ireland. There were 1,198 casualties, including 128 Americans. The ramifications of this tragic event and some of the details connected with it have been sources of controversy ever since. But to many Americans the most important consequence was the development of a conviction which was well expressed in a cable sent by Edward M. House, confidential emissary of President Woodrow Wilson in Europe, to his chief on May 30: "I have concluded that war with Germany is inevitable. . . ."

The submarine war after 1917

Under American diplomatic pressure, the Germans relaxed their submarine warfare until February 1, 1917. At that time, having ready more than 100 new craft, and confident that a ruthless and unrestricted campaign against Allied shipping would speedily end the war, the Germans once again began the U-boat attack. It rose to a crescendo of success in April, 1917, when more than 800,000 tons of shipping were sunk. The desperate exigency of the Allies brought about a frantic search for methods of combating the submarine scourge. Of these the most effective was the so-called convoy system, introduced on a large scale in the late spring of 1917. During the remainder of the war, 16,537 ships—ninety-nine per cent of all that so sailed—were moved safely in convoy. Other devices employed to defeat the U-boats were depth bombs, "Q-ships," mine barriers, and incessant patrols by swarms of small Allied craft. In all, 178 German submarines were destroyed during the war, while the total Allied shipping losses aggregated over 11,000,000 tons.

The chief result of the unrestricted U-boat campaign was undoubt-

⁸ One effect of the Battle of Jutland was the impetus to American sea power. The U. S. Naval Expansion Bill of August 29, 1916, was passed as a direct result.

edly the entrance of the United States into the war on April 6, 1917. This event had been discounted in German calculations, which maintained that the victory would be won before American power would bestir itself. But the American indignation at the nature and consequences of the submarine campaign, fortified by other causes for irritation, proved a mighty incentive to action.⁹ The whole problem of neutral rights at sea had deep rootage in American minds, and the U-boat attack on these rights flouted one of the strongest national traditions of the United States. Increasingly the American public hearkened to the arguments of the interventionist group, and the great decision was taken on April 6, 1917. By overwhelming votes in both houses, Congress approved President Wilson's request for the acceptance of a state of war with imperial Germany.

The accomplishments of the A.E.F. have already been summarized. A few observations may be made on other phases of the American war effort in 1917-18. By common consent the industries of America became the "arsenal for democracy" for the Allies. Tremendous industrial expansion occurred, and far-reaching plans for still further development were made. Had the war lasted into 1919 the full power of American industry would have been manifest. As conditions were on November 11, 1918, much of the American equipment used by the A.E.F. was of European manufacture; in such items as heavy guns, tanks, and airplanes the United States was just beginning to get into production when the war ended. The monetary cost to the nation of the nineteen months of struggle was just over twenty-two billion dollars, a sum equal to the entire expenditures of the United States government from 1791 to 1914. No wonder that the German commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, after the conclusion of peace paid the cryptic compliment to the United States: "The Americans understood war."

So far as the air arm was concerned the outbreak of war in 1914 found it in a highly experimental condition. The belligerents first used it for reconnaissance purposes and later adapted it to combat activity. The rapidity of technical improvements in the airplane soon made it clear that the German dirigibles, the well-known Zeppelins, were inferior to heavier-than-air craft. Zeppelins first raided England in January, 1915, and dropped bombs; these raids continued intermittently until the end of 1916. By that time, however, the airplane had superseded the dirigible for all types of war activity. From the

The U. S.
and the
submarine
war

U. S. power

The
air arm

⁹ Prior to the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, ten American merchant ships had been sunk by German action; between that date and April 6, ten more were destroyed. In these sinkings twenty-eight Americans lost their lives.

beginning to the end of the war, German air raids on Great Britain caused about forty-two hundred casualties and some property damage, while Allied air raids on Germany were at least equally effective. While such activities always were on a relatively small scale compared with similar uses of air power after 1939, nevertheless they were the prototypes for those later developments.

Throughout the war newer and better planes were constantly being introduced, and tactics improved upon. Successful combat pilots were termed "aces," and became widely known: among these were the American Rickenbacker, the Frenchman Guynemer, the Canadian Bishop, and the German Richthofen. Although air supremacy was a seesaw matter for years between the Germans and the western Allies, by 1918 the palm was clearly in the latter's hands. Air raids on communications and the use of the airplane as a distributor of propaganda were both highly effective against the Germans and their allies during the latter part of 1918.

Toxic gases

Toxic gases had been occasionally employed at various times in the history of warfare, but their use had been condemned by the Hague Convention of 1899. Nevertheless, on April 22, 1915, the Germans introduced the use of chlorine gas on a large scale, at first with devastating effect upon their opponents. Within a few weeks, however, masks and respirators had been developed which in the hands of experienced men largely nullified the efficacy of the gas. New kinds of poison gas were eagerly searched for by belligerent chemists, and numerous varieties tried out on the battlefields in subsequent years; among these were phosgene and mustard gas. The usefulness of this type of weapon has been a matter of violent argument. Typical of its results are statistics drawn from American experience. In the A.E.F. thirty-one per cent of all battle casualties were caused by gas, as compared with sixty-six per cent by bullets. Variants of toxic gases also devised during the war were smoke screens chemically produced, and gaseous compounds that burst into flames when projected by special equipment.

The tank

The tank was a major surprise of the war. Developed in Great Britain from American tractors using the familiar "caterpillar" tractive principle, the tank was first employed along the Somme front on September 15, 1916. The British achieved a complete tactical surprise thereby and almost made a break-through. On November 20, 1917, at Cambrai a large-scale tank assault was even more effective. Further improvements were made in ensuing months, but the war ended before the full possibilities of the tank as a means of terminating the stalemate of trench warfare had been realized by either side. The Germans made some efforts to imitate the mechanical

monsters of the Allies, but these seem not to have been particularly successful.¹⁰

All through the military events which have thus been summarized, diplomacy played hand in glove with military and naval activity. German diplomacy, as already suggested, was efficacious in securing Turkish and Bulgarian adherence to its side. But Allied diplomacy was far more successful. It detached Italy from the Triple Alliance by the secret treaty of April 26, 1915.¹¹ It won the moral and belligerent support of more and more states until at the end of the war twenty-three nations stood in arms against four. Also it was most successful in spreading disunity in the Turkish Empire, where Britons like T. E. Lawrence, Mark Sykes, and Gertrude Bell aided greatly the latent disintegrative processes at work there. Likewise, in stimulating the subject groups in the Austro-Hungarian state to rebellion and independence, Allied diplomats were effective. Some of their efforts will be discussed in conjunction with later sections of this work; here it is sufficient to note them as indicating the truth of the maxim that diplomacy and war are not two separate things, but merely two aspects of the same thing.

German
versus
Allied
diplomacy

2. THE STRUGGLE TO KEEP THE HOME FIRES BURNING

It would be a capital error to think of the military and diplomatic phases of modern war as the only or even the most important aspects thereof. Of inestimable significance is the economic and social organization of the home front. This truth, valid in all conflicts throughout history, came to be of unusual importance between 1914 and 1918. Confronted by the enormous wastage of battle and the gigantic demands of the military, every government was compelled to adopt the most stringent kind of controls over the whole extent of its economy. Shortages of key raw materials, food, fuel, transport, and labor required elaborate price restraints, distribution controls, and government purchase and monopoly on an unprecedented scale. Aptly it has been said:

Universal
wartime
socialism

¹⁰ See "The First German Tank Attack on April 24, 1918," *Army Quarterly*, XIX (1930), pp. 381-84. For the development of the tank in England Winston Churchill and General E. D. Swinton deserve about equal credit; cf. the former's work, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-23, and Swinton's *Eyewitness*, London, 1932, *passim*.

¹¹ Other secret treaties negotiated by allied diplomats included a Franco-Russian agreement regarding the future of Constantinople, the Straits, and Persia, signed March 18, 1915; an Anglo-French-Russian agreement of May 16, 1916, partitioning Asiatic Turkey; and a Franco-Russian agreement of February 14, 1917, proposing a postwar Rhineland buffer state carved out of western Germany.

These agreements were first generally publicized in early 1918 following the Russian revolution. They had, however, been confidentially made known to President Wilson after the United States entered the war. See R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939, VII, pp. 43-75.

The nations gradually took on the aspect of huge experiments in state socialism. The old freedom of commercial intercourse disappeared, though the forms of it and the machinery of it were usually preserved. Government offices became vast corporations, with an ever growing personnel, conducting more and more of the people's business. A war, which was fought—according to one common doctrine—in order to preserve the capitalist system, could only be spun out into its third and fourth years by the practice everywhere of all those economic principles the belligerents were supposed to abhor.¹²

Certain manifestations of the principle that modern warfare is incompatible with nineteenth-century ideas of private enterprise will be cited from the experiences of each belligerent camp during the first World War.

On the Allied side the first shock to the business life of the various states came with the realization that their industrial establishments, as they then existed, were hopelessly inadequate for the remorseless demands of the army, navy, and air forces. In France the daily national production of shells in September, 1914, was only 36,000, whereas the French army needed 70,000 shells a day for their 75's alone. In Russia the shortages in arms and equipment by the end of 1914 were even worse, and mass desertions from the Russian armies were beginning to take place. In Great Britain the inadequate supplies of munitions furnished to the men at the front created a political crisis by the spring of 1915. In May of that year the governments of Great Britain and France shook up their traditional bureaucracies by creating ministries of munitions headed respectively by David Lloyd George and Albert Thomas. The great abilities and energies of these two statesmen were henceforth devoted to enormously accelerating home production and to organizing huge purchases of supplies in the United States.¹³ Russia found no leader of the caliber of these men, and notwithstanding the heroic efforts of volunteer groups like the Union of Zemstvos—"one of the most important experiments of wartime social history"—Russian industrial conditions steadily deteriorated. Cut off from her allies save through the undeveloped Arctic ports of Murmansk and Archangel, Russia lost the war primarily because of her economic shortcomings.

Production problems of the Allies

Labor problems

In France and Great Britain, labor demanded the exercise of its traditional privileges of rising wages in order to keep pace with the increase of the cost of living. There were sporadic strikes during the

¹² Frank P. Chambers, *The War Behind the War*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1939, p. 223; cf. the *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, Little, Brown and Co., 1937, VI, pp. 330-47.

¹³ The British government alone from 1915 to 1918 sent to the United States thirty different purchasing missions. These groups spent well over \$4,000,000,000.

war, but they were soon settled. With the huge increase in the number of men in uniform, acute labor shortages developed in both countries. Great Britain's adoption of military conscription on May 25, 1916, enhanced the labor difficulties in that country. In spite of every effort to find enough man power for the fighting forces and for the home front, the use of women alike in industry and in agriculture was a commonplace in all belligerent countries long before the end of the war. In Great Britain their importance in national economics was recognized by the grant of women's suffrage in 1918.

Not content with an almost dictatorial reorganization of their domestic economics—a reorganization which incidentally included hitherto unimagined experiments in money, credit, and banking—¹⁴ the French and British governments undertook equally drastic methods of reordering international economic life. Promptly they declared a complete blockade of all seaports belonging to Germany and her allies and proceeded to enforce it with every means at their command. The definition of contraband—goods which neutrals could not transport to Germany, directly or indirectly—steadily widened. By the end of the war there was scarcely a single article of commerce which was not on the contraband list. Because of the temptations of adjacent neutral states to trade with Germany at a profit, the Allies by the beginning of 1917 were rationing shipments to Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Holland and refusing to let these countries have more than an arbitrarily determined quota of any economic good. A system of black-listing and navicerts—both devices employed again by the British in the years after 1939—compelled neutral shippers to obey the regulations.

After the United States entered the war, Allied international combinations for economic purposes were expanded to include Americans and greatly extended in scope. By 1918 there were all-powerful inter-Allied councils for purchasing and finance, for munitions, for transportation by rail, for food, for shipping, and for all matters connected with the blockade. The inter-Allied organization for shipping controls was especially noteworthy. During the closing months of the war, its orders were absolute law to ninety per cent of the world's seagoing tonnage. Its secretary, an Englishman named Sir Arthur Salter, hoped to make his organization the nucleus for a postwar economic reconstruction of the whole world, but this ideal proved premature.

Allied control of international economy

Its power in 1918

The economic adjustments forced upon Germany and her allies—

¹⁴ For example, in Great Britain the government resorted to paper money on an unprecedented scale, the historic gold sovereign disappearing entirely from circulation. The national debt rose from £660,000,000 in 1914 to £8,000,000,000 in 1918. Five-sixths of Britain's war expenditures were financed on borrowed money.

German
economic
reorgani-
zation

the so-called Central Powers—were similar in certain respects to those just summarized, but much more drastic in others. Since Germany was clearly the most important of the four states of the Central Powers, her example usually led the way for analogous adjustments in their own economies. Shut off from world markets by the Allied blockade, and suffering from a natural lack of many vital raw materials, the Central Powers endured four years of warfare only by ingenious and rigorous methods of state control. In the second week of August, 1914, Walther Rathenau, one of Germany's foremost industrialists, was made director of the War Raw-Materials Department. Henceforth, for the duration of the war he and his colleagues wielded almost absolute authority over the nation's resources, ordering programs of conservation and utilization as they deemed best. It was the most extreme example of state planning that the world had yet seen and the unintended prototype of the Nazi "Four-Year Plan" of two decades later.

German
ingenuity

Germany, largely by her own resources, was forced to support her sixty-seven million people, maintain her armies, assist her less well-equipped allies, and remain almost entirely cut off from the world supplies of raw materials upon which she had previously drawn heavily. Every economy of central purchasing, price controls, and profit limitation was practiced. Every technique of synthetic chemistry was utilized to the limit, until the use of *Ersatzmittel*—substitute goods—was practically universal. Gigantic nitrate-fixation plants were erected to manufacture from air the basic ingredient of high explosives. Wood pulp was transmuted into paper, artificial silk, and synthetic yarn. Glycerine was produced from sugar beets, and oil from seeds.

Food
problems

German food supplies began to be rationed after January, 1915, and every imaginable food substitute was put into use. Cakes were made from clover meal and chestnut flour. "Cutlets" composed of nut meal appeared on hotel menus. Artificial sausages, soups, honey, and beer were common. Butter powder, used for "stretching" butter, was made from starch and sodium carbonate. "Vegetable butter" was manufactured from beets and carrots. Salad oil was produced from plant mucilage and tree sap. Pepper was made from ashes, jellies from gelatine and synthetic coloring matter. Coffee was compounded of various substances, including fruit stones, walnut shells, couch grass, maize, oat chaff, acacia seeds, potato pulp, fruit husks, turnip tops, heather, and tanning bark. In the worst winter of the war, that of 1916-17—in the preceding fall the potato crop had been less than half of normal—the so-called turnip winter, that commonplace vegetable became the staple food for the majority of Germans. The Imperial Health Office estimated that a man working eight hours a

day normally required about 3,300 calories in his daily food. But the rationing exigencies in 1916 had reduced this to approximately 1,340 calories, and later in the war to 1,100. Infant mortality mounted and the debilitating diseases of malnutrition steadily increased. Although food conditions in the western powers were often trying, they never approached in severity those in Germany and in the other Central Powers.

Owing to the huge drafts of men for the military forces, a serious labor shortage developed in Germany by 1916. This was met in part by the use of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and by forced labor from the occupied regions of Belgium and France. These areas, normally teeming with industry, were suffering from a large amount of unemployment, while Germany was in desperate need of additional workers. In consequence, at the end of September, 1916, the Germans determined to compel the unemployed of Belgium and northern France to come to Germany and work for their daily bread. Although economically logical, this decision was contrary to the usual practice of international law and was frequently carried out with unnecessary harshness. The Allies stigmatized the use of forced labor as a barbarity and encouraged the Belgian and French populations to resist it wherever possible. *La Libre Belgique*, the clandestine newspaper published in Brussels throughout the war under the very noses of the German conquerors, was tireless in denouncing the labor "deportations," and it may be doubted whether the net result was of much benefit to the Germans.

Similarly, with regard to materials, the German authorities requisitioned what they pleased, as they pleased, from all conquered territories. They resorted to every effort to secure supplies from the outside world, even sending commercial submarines to the United States during 1916 to pick up precious cargoes of vital raw materials like rubber. Finally, on December 5, 1916, the "Auxiliary Service Law" passed the reichstag. It sought to make the war drive complete by requiring the compulsory employment, for the duration of the war, of every German male between the ages of seventeen and sixty not already in the military forces. This legislation, supplemented by the "Hindenburg Program" of munitions production adopted at the same time, represented Germany's supreme reach for victory. Beyond it neither the Germans nor any other people could go.

As a matter of fact, the bow had been bent too sharply. The reaction to this gigantic effort by the middle of 1917 was an attack of war-weariness throughout Germany which excited the liveliest apprehension on the part of its leaders. The naval mutiny at Kiel that summer has already been mentioned. Talk of peace became

Labor problems

Raw materials

The German crisis of 1917

common among the German workers. The minority parties in the reichstag began to question the government's policy and for the first time in some strength to vote against the war expenditures. On July 12, 1917, the traditional political scheme of things was breached by the formal promise of the Kaiser to abolish the three-class system of voting in Prussia. Although made under compulsion, this promise was a step toward democracy.¹⁵ Exactly a week later, on July 19, the reichstag by a vote of 212 to 126 passed a resolution affirming the desirability of an early and a just peace. These promises and affirmations, plus the economic efforts mentioned, seemed to bolster the spirits of the people once more, and they prepared for 1918.

Economic difficulties of Germany's allies So far as the economic and social adjustments in the other Central Powers are concerned, only a few words need be said. In Austria-Hungary, the problems were similar to those of Germany and were met in a similar fashion. Hungary, because it had an abundance of foodstuffs, was the more fortunate portion of the Habsburg state, and it used its favored position in many devious ways to better its standing in the Dual Monarchy. In the end, these tactics created a rift between the Hungarians and the Austrians which boded ill for the future. Turkey during the four years that she was at war underwent a series of profound social and economic changes which, although often overlooked, actually paved the way for the much publicized reforms of Kemal Pasha in the 1920's. Partly for economic reasons, the Turks endeavored to strengthen their resources for war in the spring of 1915 by a cruel and wholesale persecution of the subject Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. It has been estimated that more than a million Armenians out of a total population of about a million and a half were torn from their homes and "deported." Of this number perhaps five hundred thousand perished.

3. THE CONFLICT OF PUBLIC OPINION

The third dimension in which modern wars are waged is that of ideas. It is not alone through battles or through production that nations may achieve victory; also vitally important is the morale of a people, the state of the popular mind—in short, public opinion. This was no new discovery in 1914, but thanks to the modern techniques for communication and to the almost universal literacy of many of the belligerents, the appeal to public opinion took on unique significance.

The control of public opinion

¹⁵ "It is a fact which has been pointed out by more than one writer that the German Reichstag gained enormously in real power during the war and that the British House of Commons lost. In 1917-18 the German legislature was the more powerful body." Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 550. See also F. R. Flournoy, *Parliament and War*, London, 1927, *passim*.

Popularly all such appeals are lumped under the term "propaganda," by which is meant *ex parte* argument endeavoring to motivate action. The propagandists of the first World War had three separate audiences to address: the people of their own country; the population of enemy states; and the citizens of nonbelligerent nations. To the first they sought to bring a conviction of the certainty of victory in a righteous war; to the second they attempted to carry discouragement and doubt in the outcome of the struggle; and from the third they hoped to win sympathy and perhaps actual participation in the war.

Propaganda between 1914 and 1918 was partly official in the sense that it was supported directly by the various belligerent governments, and partly unofficial in that it was put out by volunteer organizations like patriotic and intellectual groups. All mediums of public information were used: the movies, books and pamphlets, victrola records, posters, pictures, "confidential" letters, lecturers, and undoubtedly secret agents. Some of the propaganda was wholly false; other elements in it verged upon the truth. In general, the closer to the truth that a propagandist could come the more likely his arguments were to carry conviction. Thus, the Allies always had an advantage over Germany in many respects; for example, they could state with entire truthfulness that it was the Germans who had invaded Belgium and had sunk the *Lusitania*. The Germans were reduced to finding excuses for their actions, and these excuses, especially in nonbelligerent nations like the United States, never were as convincing as the accusations.

Propaganda

A few facts about the official wartime propaganda organizations of the chief belligerents may be cited. In Great Britain in September, 1914, a bureau of the Foreign Office was set up, commonly known as "Wellington House," to handle what was euphemistically termed "publicity." This office expanded greatly during the ensuing four years; headed by men like Charles F. G. Masterman and Sir Gilbert Parker, its efforts were always directed primarily to stiffening the home front and to deluging nonbelligerents, chiefly the United States, with arguments and appeals. In 1918 its services were augmented by the establishment of the so-called Crewe House, which handled propaganda in enemy countries. In France the official organization was termed *La Maison de la Presse* and was also a branch of the Foreign Office. It was created in February, 1916, with functions similar to those of its British compeer. In Germany, shortly after the outbreak of the war, a special section attached to the Press Department of the Foreign Office was organized with approximately the same duties as Wellington House. By each of these three establishments millions of dollars were expended.

The rival organizations

The opposing arguments

The arguments used by the propagandists were legion. Each side raked over the history of the other's past, digging out every unhappy and unfortunate incident that could be found and publicizing it as typical. Each side claimed that the other was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war.¹⁶ Each side accused the other of wanton cruelty in the conduct of the war and spread so-called atrocity tales. Each side insisted that its own war aims were constructive and just and that the other's were selfish and sure to result in nothing but future trouble. Each side sought to adapt its arguments to the psychology of nonbelligerents like the United States. In all these endeavors, particularly with regard to the American public, it may fairly be said that the Allies were much more successful than the Germans in gaining friends. Whether this was because their allegations were inherently more truthful or whether it was because they were more apt in grasping the psychology of other nations is still a moot question.¹⁷

The "color books"

One of the most popular types of printed argument employed by the propagandists was the "color book." So called because of the colors of their covers, these official publications purported to be representative selections of diplomatic documents pertaining to the period just prior to the war. Invariably they showed that the country in question had been slow to anger, eminently reasonable in trying to preserve peace, and hopeful to the last that the intransigence of the other side could be overcome without resort to arms. This presentation was made in the British Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Belgian Gray Book, the Austrian Red Book, the Italian Green Book, and others like them. Small wonder that humorists called this outpouring of documents the "rainbow library."

Their reliability

Since the war, it has been demonstrated with regard to every one of the color books that they were far from what they originally purported to be. Ardently defended at the time of their publication as

¹⁶ The insistence upon sole enemy responsibility for the war was the very cornerstone of the British propaganda on war origins; such was the postwar admission of one of the chief British propagandists, Wickham Steed, in his autobiography, *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922*, Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1924, II, p. 193. This accusation was formally incorporated into the peace treaty with Germany in 1919 as Article 231. It rankled in the German national mind until it was explicitly, if unilaterally, repudiated by Hitler in an address to the reichstag on January 30, 1937.

¹⁷ Not debatable, however, is the strength of the conviction in the British Empire that the claims of the European Allies were right. In the four years of the war the dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and South Africa recruited 1,415,000 men, of whom over ten per cent were killed or died. India recruited over 1,300,000 men, of whom more than a million were sent overseas. Other British possessions sent their shares of volunteers also.

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, it is now known they were actually incomplete, often deliberately garbled, and, in general, entirely unreliable in their announced objective of making clear how the war started. A few evidences may be noted. The German White Book of 1914 published 27 documents out of 1,123 which were in reality in existence for the period in question. The British omitted over 500 documents of importance. The Austrians left out over 250. The Russian and the French color books were the worst of all. They included a number of completely faked documents and omitted numerous passages of relevance and importance.

In the last year of the war, the use of propaganda to weaken the morale of the enemy was developed on an unprecedented scale. The Germans began dropping pamphlets from airplanes flying over the opponents' lines in 1914 during their march toward Paris and continued to do so intermittently thereafter. The French began the same practice in August, 1915. But it was not until 1918 that the real Allied propaganda attack on enemy morale commenced. In January and February of that year, a complex inter-Allied organization embracing French, British, and Americans was set up. Literally millions of pamphlets printed in the German language and using every sort of artful appeal to undermine German morale rained down upon the weakening German armies. In vain the Germans endeavored to counter with a similar barrage of their own. Their arguments were dismissed by the Allied soldiers with contempt, while the Allied appeals in thousands of cases were heeded by the Germans. The extraordinary number of German prisoners captured in the closing months of the war is testimony to the efficacy of psychologically sound propaganda.

Closely allied to the propaganda efforts of the belligerent nations were the systems of censorship that were devised immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Since radio was yet in its infancy, by a meticulous supervision of the press, mails, and cable lines, it was possible for the Allies to set up nearly an airtight control over news from Europe. By means of strict Allied censorship, direct flow of news from the Central Powers to the outside world was shut off to a mere trickle. "Passed by the censor," the phrase which every newspaperman and correspondent in Europe had to have stamped on his writing before it could be sent abroad, was no guarantee of truth. It simply meant that in the opinion of the Allied censors no harm would be wrought by permitting its dispatch. The influence of this incessant "slanting" of news to favor one side and damage the other over the entire period of the war is impossible to estimate, but it must have been considerable.

Efforts to
weaken
enemy
morale

Censorship

War aims**President Wilson's ideas**

No problem bulked larger in the maintenance of popular morale than the difficult question of war aims. As the months rolled along with their staggering toll of life and property, it was impossible even for the most ardent belligerent to avoid asking what were the ends and objectives of all this sacrifice. Not until the close of 1916, however, did the Allied leaders begin to realize the importance to public morale at home, in enemy lands, and among nonbelligerent peoples of a clear and precise formulation of the goals of the war. Such a realization was stimulated by the warning words of President Wilson in a letter to all the belligerent governments dated December 18, 1916: ". . . the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." Although the Allied leaders professed to be shocked at this statement of the American president and even more by his call a few weeks later on January 22, 1917, for a "peace without victory," there can be little doubt that he was correct. His comment produced from the Allies the first adequate formulation of their war objectives, set forth in their reply to the President of the United States on January 10, 1917. These were further clarified a year later by Lloyd George in a statement on January 5, 1918, and by President Wilson in his famous "Fourteen Points" address on January 8.

Peace proposals of 1917

But the expression given in 1917 did not convince all persons, even in the Allied countries, that the professed ends of the war were worthy of the tremendous sacrifices being demanded of the peoples everywhere. During 1917 a number of peace proposals were put forward. In the spring of that year, the new emperor of Austria-Hungary undertook peace feelers with France through the medium of his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, formerly an officer in the Belgian army. Nothing came of the affair, but it suggested that doubts about the war were rising in the highest circles of the Habsburg Monarchy. Something of the same sort was indicated on the Allied side later in the year by a letter to the London newspaper, *The Telegraph*, from the pen of Lord Lansdowne, an elder statesman of the Conservative party in England. Dated November 29, 1917, Lansdowne's missive called for an immediate effort for a negotiated peace between the Allies and the Central Powers. Although strongly supported by many persons in Great Britain, Lansdowne's letter proved futile. Such also had been the fate of a peace suggestion made by Pope Benedict XV on August 1, 1917.¹⁸ Likewise unavailing were the peace resolution

¹⁸ It is interesting to note that the nuncio who presented the papal proposals of 1917 to the German government was Mgr. Pacelli, later to be Pius XII, head of the Catholic Church during the second World War.

of the reichstag on July 19 already mentioned and the deliberations of an international socialist convention held at Stockholm in July and August.

All these discussions of peace proposals and war aims proved again, however, how vital to success was public opinion. The very fact that they were made stirred the propagandists, journalists, and statesmen in all countries to new efforts toward clarifying and ordering the objectives of the war. Surveying the whole field of wartime public opinion years after the termination of the actual fighting, a British general succinctly wrote: ". . . the propaganda departments and the popular press of the various countries alone enabled the war to be carried on so long."¹⁹ It was a judgment that was deserved.

Decisive effect of public opinion

III. THE COLLAPSE OF FOUR EMPIRES

1. RUSSIA

The most striking single political consequence of the first World War was the complete collapse of four imperial states which had long endured as important units on the map of Europe. These four in the order of their collapse were Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. In each of these countries phenomena associated with revolution appeared either in 1917 or in 1918, with dire results for the status quo. Dynasties were dethroned, ancient aristocracies were overthrown, and the whole social and economic order was rocked to its very foundations. Since chronologically it began before the others, the Russian revolution will be considered first.

The causes which precipitated the revolutionary crisis in the spring of 1917 in Russia included a large number of factors. Perhaps first in importance was the inadequacy of that country's industrial and transport system in furnishing munitions and supplies to the armies at the front. This fact has already been noted in connection with the constant Russian military reverses in the opening years of the war. It was accentuated by the almost complete isolation in which Russia found herself. Only from the undeveloped Arctic ports of Russia proper and from distant Vladivostok in eastern Siberia was it possible to secure a thin trickle of supplies from the outside world. Added to this economic weakness was the inability of the imperial bureaucracy to meet the demands of a great war. Mired in red tape and tradition, headed by a tsar who was lonely, inadequate, and uninspiring, Russian officialdom led the nation from one humiliation to another until by 1917 even the patient masses could endure it no longer.

Basic causes of Russian collapse

¹⁹ Frank P. Crozier, *A Brass Hat in No Man's Land*, London, 1930, p. 152.

Influence
of Rasputin

As early as March, 1915, revelations of high treason in the ranks of the army itself dispirited many, and rumors of graft and traitorous activities among the aristocracy never afterwards could be stilled. An outburst of national indignation was expressed in the meeting of the duma in August and September, 1915. Instead of listening to the protests of the Russian people as voiced through their national legislature, however, the tsar curtly closed the session. In 1915, also, a reputed monk, Gregory Rasputin, became one of the key figures of Russia. This evil man, a religious charlatan, as early as 1907 had won the friendship of the tsaritsa. Now, after eight years of crafty preparation, he was able to assert a malign influence over the whole framework of Russian policy. Through Rasputin's recommendations, given to the tsaritsa and then passed on to the tsar, the latter made and unmade statesmen and generals and remained deaf to any remonstrances. It was "petticoat politics" at its worst.

On the
verge of
catastrophe

By the autumn of 1915, the tsar had been persuaded by Rasputin that he should himself take command of the Russian armies and thereby win the victory that the entire nation so greatly desired. Deplored by his ablest advisers, this unfortunate decision eventually cost the tsar his throne and his life. For now, instead of keeping aloof from the actual military phases of the war, he had made himself personally responsible for the defeats and disasters which during ensuing months recurred with monotonous frequency. In 1916 there were serious transport, fuel, and food crises, and the cost of living shot sharply upward. Numerous strikes broke out in the cities; evasions of military duty increased; and hundreds of thousands of deserters from the army roamed the country, every one a potential source of trouble should conditions develop to the breaking point. Meantime, at the fighting fronts, the Russian army was losing every six months a million men in killed and wounded and half that number in prisoners.

The last
days of
tsardom

By August, 1916, the Allied diplomats in Petrograd were predicting in their reports to London and Paris that a colossal social revolution in Russia was inevitable unless a miracle should supervene.²⁰ The liberal Russian elements, who had long hoped for parliamentary responsibility analogous to that in Great Britain, were surfeited by

²⁰ There was a striking communication to this effect from the British ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, written in August, 1916. See his autobiography, *My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories*, London, 1923, II, p. 18. It was because of fears that this might happen that the famous British general, Lord Kitchener, set out for Russia in the summer of 1916, only to lose his life when his ship was sunk en route. Another Allied mission hastened to Russia as soon as the 1600-mile Murmansk railroad was completed after prodigious labors at the end of 1916. But by that time the Russian disintegration was too far advanced to be halted.

the blunders of the tsar's government. The more radical groups, especially the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic party, were even more eager for a change. As 1917 neared, talk of a revolution grew apace in all circles. In December, 1916, Rasputin was murdered by a coterie of influential aristocrats who could endure his pretensions no longer. Notwithstanding the anger of the tsaritsa, the tsar did not dare to punish the murderers severely, so great was popular approval of their deed. On February 27, 1917, the duma assembled for what was destined to be its last session. The tsar proving recalcitrant and blind to the realities of the situation, no concessions could be devised between his static ideas and the dynamic desires of the representatives of the people.

Early in March, therefore, the revolution began. Unexpected and unplanned, it was for the first few days leaderless and almost spontaneous. Like the similar activity in France early in 1789, it represented at first chiefly the release of social tensions which had for so long been accumulating. The Bolshevik leaders at that moment were far from European Russia: Lenin was in Switzerland, Trotsky in the United States, Stalin in Siberia. The original outbreaks were largely in the cities and characterized by few excesses. The army generally refused to apprehend the insurgents, and thousands of soldiers fraternized with the mobs. The tsar, facing the crisis but true to his unyielding and unimaginative philosophy, could think of nothing save to order the dissolution of the duma. On March 14, however, a determined group of the duma, refusing to obey, proclaimed themselves a regular provisional government. The next day, March 15, 1917, they and a number of the senior generals in the army compelled the tsar to abdicate his throne. Six days later, the man who had so recently been absolute monarch of the largest state in the world was placed under arrest and with all his family confined to the royal palace in Petrograd. Never again was any member of that family to emerge as a free person.

This well-nigh incredible series of events had immense repercussions. Two rival factions leaped to seize the power which had so recently been wrested from the tsar. First to succeed was a liberal group headed by men like Professor Miliukow, Prince Lvov, and Alexander Kerensky, a representative of the workers. These persons were able men, but they were not destined to retain their position. They stood primarily for three things: (1) a continuation of the war on the side of the Allies; (2) a series of political concessions promising freedom of speech, press, and assembly; (3) the calling of a constitutional convention to redraw the fundamental law of Russia. Excellent as these ideas might have seemed to a nation which had

Revolution
in March,
1917

Endeavors
of the
provisional
government

not gone through three years of devastating war and defeat, they wholly failed to meet the popular temper of Russia in 1917.²¹

The growth of Bolshevik power

That failure was the opportunity for the radical faction of the Social Democratic party. Profiting by the amnesty proclaimed by the provisional government, the Bolshevik leaders speedily returned to Russia. Stalin arrived late in March; Lenin, allowed to pass through Germany on the assumption that he would encourage a separate peace between Russia and Germany—an assumption later proved correct—, reached Petrograd on April 16. Trotsky arrived from the United States in May. These men and others like them promptly took hold of the emergent so-called soviets in the cities and rural regions of Russia. The soviets, or popular councils composed of workers, peasants, and common soldiers, probably sprang from the same psychological impulses that produced the committees of public safety in revolutionary France or the organization of minutemen in revolutionary America. Seized upon by the Bolshevik minority as a convenient agency through which the dogmatic views of Marxism could be disseminated, the soviets soon were controlled by the disciplined, enthusiastic, and unscrupulous revolutionaries who were determined to make Russia over into their own image. Far more than the promises of the provisional government, the ingenious Bolshevik slogan, "Land, Peace, and Bread"—curiously similar to that independently coined by the 1917 revolutionists in distant Mexico—appealed to the Russian masses.

More revolution, November, 1917

The provisional government underwent changes in personnel during the summer of 1917. Despite a heroic effort to reanimate the Russian armies for war and apparent successes at building a republican form of government at home, actually the situation was precarious. Kerensky, the key figure of the provisional government after his assumption of the premiership on July 22, early in the fall faced a military revolt led by General Kornilov. On November 7, 1917, an "All-Russian Congress of Soviets" opened its sessions at Petrograd. Dominated by the personnel of the Petrograd soviet, which, in turn, was dominated by Lenin and Trotsky, this All-Russian Congress executed what amounted to a *coup d'état*. Proclaiming itself the lawful government of all Russia, the Congress ordered the arrest of most of the leaders of the provisional government and appointed

²¹ Nevertheless, the provisional government was soon recognized by other countries as the lawful authority in Russia. The United States led the way in extending such recognition. It is a mark of the confusion of the time that a naturalized American named Alex Gumberg during 1917-18 simultaneously acted as adviser on Russian affairs to President Wilson's representatives in Russia, and as adviser on American affairs, first to Kerensky, and after his fall to Lenin. Gumberg served both masters with fidelity and impartiality.

a Council of People's Commissars as the new organ of government in Russia. On this Council Lenin sat as President, and Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Lenin immediately demanded the breakup of the great Russian estates and their division among the peasants; promised peace in the near future; and established soviet control over the food supplies and the industrial production of the country. Then he turned to face the problem of the long-promised constitutional convention, which met a few weeks after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. In the total vote of thirty-six million which elected the members of this convention, the Bolshevik faction secured barely twenty-five per cent. Nothing daunted, however, the Council of Peoples' Commissars, under Lenin's direction, dispersed the constitutional convention early in 1918, and ordered its members home. By this arbitrary use of power, the Communist minority made sure of its authority in Russia.

After a short period of calm, occupied principally by peace negotiations with Germany, there ensued a period of conflict and uncertainty which endured for more than three years. Angered by some of the actions of Lenin's government, the western powers authorized military intervention against the Bolsheviks in 1918-19. Stimulated by this intervention, a Russian civil war broke out between "Whites" and "Reds" which caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands; among the slain were the tsar and his entire family, executed on July 16, 1918, at Ekaterinburg, Siberia. As if foreign and domestic war were not sufficient, between 1918 and 1921 Russia underwent a wave of famine and disease hitherto unparalleled in modern European history. Despite these shocks, the will and organization of the Bolsheviks proved strong enough to retain them in power.

On November 21 Trotsky futilely invited all the belligerents to conclude an immediate armistice. Notwithstanding the outraged protests of its former allies, Russia agreed to an armistice with Germany on December 5, 1917, at Brest-Litovsk in Russian Poland. Almost precisely three months later, on March 3, 1918, to the amazement of many, the Russians signed a peace treaty at the same place. Under its terms, combined with the clauses of the separate treaty later imposed on Romania, Germany established a chain of puppet states tied closely to herself by economic and political links from the White Sea to the Black Sea. An indemnity was levied upon defeated Russia, which was also required to cede certain border regions in the Caucasus to Turkey.

Heralded in Germany as a victory which would open the grainlands of Russia to the hungry millions in the Central Powers and furnish a tangible proof of German military success, the Brest-Litovsk settle-

Confusion
and civil
war

Opening
of peace
negotiations
with
Germany

The Brest-Litovsk settlement, 1918

ment was actually a failure from the German viewpoint. Hundreds of thousands of men were needed to police the annexed regions. The promised foodstuffs proved much less than had been anticipated; only 113,000 tons of grain were secured from Russia and the Ukraine during the months between March and November. But even more unfortunate for the Germans was the renewed determination of the Allies to fight on to victory, no matter what the cost. Universally accepted in the Allied countries was the thesis that if Brest-Litovsk were typical of German peace terms, no price would be too great to prevent another such settlement. Thus the whole affair was a boomerang to German war aims and peace proposals.²²

2. TURKEY

Turkish weaknesses

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 may be summarized in a few paragraphs. The "Young Turk" party which had precipitated Turkey into the war in 1914 on the side of the Central Powers was under the control of a triumvirate of political spoilsmen named Talaat, Enver, and Djemal. For these three and their henchmen the war was a profitable venture, but for the masses of the people it was one long period of misery. The Germans sent troops under able commanders—von der Goltz, Falkenhayn, Liman von Sanders—to bolster up their Ottoman allies, and for the first two years of the war the Turks more than held their own. But the Germans were often on bad terms with the Turkish leaders and after 1916 could not stop the dry rot that was honeycombing the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, by that time a new threat to the integrity of Turkey had appeared: the Arab revolt.

Allied plotting in Turkey

Early in the war the nominal ruler of Turkey, Sultan Mohammed V, in obedience to the request of the all-powerful Young Turk triumvirate, had proclaimed a "Holy War" against the Allies, and had exhorted all Mohammedans to fight in opposition to them. This call was received coldly by the Arabian chieftains who dominated the huge peninsula in which the Mohammedan faith had originated and in which both Mecca and Medina were located; and actually it had small effect. The heads of the nomadic peoples of Arabia were curiously like the chiefs of proud American Indian tribes two cen-

²² The problems facing German leaders after Brest-Litovsk were many, so far as Romania and Poland were concerned. With Romania they made a separate treaty of peace on May 7, 1918. In the case of Poland, they continued negotiations with the anti-Russian Polish general, Pilsudski, with whom they had been in touch since November, 1916, to the end that a puppet state of Poland might be set up. These involved schemes were necessarily abandoned as 1918 wore away.

turies earlier. They objected strongly to an outside power's ordering them to do anything, but by cajolery and bribery some of them could be persuaded to participate in the power politics of the great states. In the effort so to persuade them, agents of the Central Powers and the Allies were both active, but the latter were in general the more successful.²³

The principal Allied line of approach to detach the Arabian leaders from their historic fealty to Turkey was the pledge that after the war there should be constituted a great Arab confederacy, free and independent of all outside powers. As to the geographical limits of this proposed state, there was some vagueness. Arabia certainly would be included. In 1915, Sir Henry McMahon on behalf of Great Britain intimated to Sherif Hussein of Mecca that the Arab state might also include Palestine and its eastern borderlands, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Fortified by this hint Hussein set about to prepare the tribes of Arabia for action. His task was facilitated by the harsh policies adopted by Turkey toward her Arab subjects. On June 5, 1916, the Arabian revolt against the Ottoman Empire began. The British relied on their strong military bases in Egypt, the Sudan, Aden, and lower Mesopotamia to give help to their Arab allies and on such skilled desert fighters as General Edmund Allenby and Colonel T. E. Lawrence to furnish respectively military leadership and effective liaison.

The Allied-Arab combination won a series of military victories in the last two years of the war that threw the Turks almost completely back to Anatolia. Meantime, a number of new factors entered to finish the disruption of the Ottoman Empire. In May, 1916, and again in April, 1917, the Allies in two secret treaties agreed to partition Turkey so extensively that after the war there would be left only an area falling within a 200- to 250-mile radius of Angora. Moreover, on November 2, 1917, in order to secure Jewish support for the Allied cause, the British government in the person of the foreign minister, Lord Balfour, promised that after the war it would "view with favor" the creation of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine.²⁴

Pledges to
the Arabs

The Arab
revolt

Pledges to
the Jews

²³ This was owing partly to the fact that the British especially had a corps of diplomatic and civil officials who had a profound knowledge of and respect for the Mohammedan and Arabian world. Moreover, the British were able to pay handsome subsidies to their Arab friends.

²⁴ One explanation for this promise, every word of which was carefully selected to cover all possible interpretations, was the British desire to express its appreciation to Chaim Weizmann, the British leader of Zionism, for turning over to the army a formula for extracting acetone from horse chestnuts. Acetone, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of high explosives, had been virtually a German monopoly, and inability to secure it threatened the vital supply of British munitions. Weizmann's discovery saved the day.

The possible inconsistency of such a promise with the understanding previously established with the Arabs by McMahon was passed over.

Although complete information about these contradictory pledges was not available to affect the Arab revolt, they were to give the British and the French many a headache in the decades following 1918. Thanks to the fighting spirit aroused by these promises, however, the forces opposed to the Turks came to be overwhelming, and at the end of October, 1918, as already indicated, Turkey dropped out of the war. In 1919-20 the anger and disgust of the people at the outcome of the conflict produced a revolution in Turkey led by an energetic nationalist named Kemal Pasha.

3. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The third imperial state to collapse as a result of the war was the Habsburg Monarchy. The same general phenomena which have been described in Russia occurred with even greater frequency in Austria-Hungary as the war dragged on: rises in the cost of living; industrial, transport, and production difficulties; strikes and growing popular apathy toward the war; desertion from the armies especially by members of the minority peoples; lack of confidence in the government; shortages of food and fuel; and the constantly mounting depression resulting from the losses in the armed forces of the state. The death of the old emperor, Francis Joseph, in November, 1916, and the accession of his grand-nephew, Charles, were the occasion for peace feelers already described. The May, 1917, session of the Austrian parliament witnessed a forensic explosion of nationalist passions. Yet Austria-Hungary endured the strain a year longer than did Russia. The probable explanation is that behind Austria stood the power of imperial Germany, in touch always with the situation in its lesser ally. Until Germany began to weaken, somehow Austria-Hungary found strength and nerve to continue the war.

Weaknesses
of the Dual
Monarchy

Czech
separatism

In the end, the Habsburg disintegration came, as might have been expected, from its polyglot racial composition. Tireless in their determination to extract from Austro-Hungarian defeat their long-desired victory, the leaders of the subject peoples by their constant agitation wore away the national morale. Some examples of their work may be noted. In December, 1914, Professor Masaryk, the Czech patriot, escaped to Switzerland, where he began an energetic promotion of Czech clubs in Europe and in the United States. He publicly opened his campaign against Austria-Hungary on the occasion of the Huss Quarto-Centenary at Geneva in July, 1915. Later in that year he went to London and in February, 1916, organized the Czech National Council, a committee which after a time won the cordial

support of the British and French governments. Constantly writing, speaking, and making friends for his cause, Masaryk and Czech colleagues like Edward Beneš predicted the coming end of the Habsburg state and the emergence of a Czech republic. In 1917, Masaryk went to Russia where he assisted in the formation of a Czech Legion. This was composed of Czechs who had been captured by or had deserted to the armies of the tsar before the Russian Revolution. Now freed, these men were eager to fight again.

After the Bolshevik revolution and the beginning of peace talk between Germany and Russia, Masaryk conceived the idea of transporting the Czech Legion across Siberia to Vladivostok, thence by sea to France where it could renew its hostilities. In 1918, Masaryk went to Japan, Canada, and the United States to prepare the way for this twentieth-century anabasis. While in the last country, Masaryk met President Wilson and impressed upon him the legitimacy of the Czech national ideal. On October 18, 1918, therefore, when the Czech National Council formally proclaimed its independence—Czech sympathizers in America had proclaimed it from Independence Hall in Philadelphia two days earlier—the reception from Washington, London, and Paris was cordial. An offer by Austria-Hungary to give Bohemia federal status in a postwar reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy was too late. On October 28, there was a bloodless revolution in Prague whereby administration in Bohemia passed into Czech hands. The next day Slovakia joined the new Czech state, and on November 14 the independent republic of Czechoslovakia was established with Masaryk as president and Beneš as foreign minister.

The South Slavs and the Polish minority of Austria-Hungary were not less successful. After numerous preliminary conferences during the opening years of the war, in July, 1917, at Corfu it was agreed that after the expected Austro-Hungarian defeat there should be a "constitutional, democratic, parliamentary Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" under the rule of the existing dynasty in Serbia, and that it should include all the subject South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy. This prospective kingdom was eventually to bear the name of Yugoslavia. In April, 1918, there was held in Rome a Congress of Suppressed Nationalities as found in the Habsburg domains, containing not only Yugoslav delegates but also Czechs and Poles.²⁵ All three groups solemnly affirmed their desire for inde-

The work
of Masaryk

Other
separatist
movements

²⁵ A Polish National Committee had been formed in August, 1917, with headquarters in Paris, in convenient proximity to the residence of Paderewski, the great pianist, who had thrown himself heart and soul into the struggle for an independent Polish state. Paderewski gave more than \$2,000,000 of his own earnings to this work.

pendent statehood. Soon thereafter the promise was made by the Allied Supreme War Council that Yugoslavia and Poland, like the proposed Czech state, should be constituted as independent nations after the conclusion of the war.

By November, 1918, Austria-Hungary, therefore, was on the verge of dissolution. Four of its largest minority peoples—the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Yugoslavs—were already to all intents and purposes lost to the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian navy mutinied at the end of October and passed partly under the control of the Yugoslav provisional government. The army was by this time defeated and disintegrating. Hungary was ready to abandon the historic partnership with Austria; late in October a revolutionary government appeared in Budapest. On November 11, after a reign of less than two years, the Emperor Charles abdicated his throne and fled his native land. The next day the German-speaking remnant of old Austria, shorn of all its ethnic appendages, proclaimed itself a republic. Four days later Hungary did likewise. "So closed the history of a dynasty and an Empire that had adorned the face of Europe for six hundred years."

4. GERMANY

The causes of German imperial collapse in 1918 were not dissimilar to those in the other empires whose downfall has been summarized: economic difficulties; war-weariness; the effects of Allied propaganda; and, finally, the stark realization that, despite all the efforts of the armed forces, total defeat was staring the nation in the face. The war had cost Germany by November, 1918, more than twice her entire national income on the 1913 level.²⁶ Her battle dead alone numbered more than two million, and the economic effects of the Allied blockade were becoming devastating to civilian life and morale.²⁷ Extensive strikes in 1917 and 1918 indicated the restlessness

²⁶ The direct war cost to Germany was 95 billion gold marks as compared with a national income slightly in excess of 45 billion gold marks in 1913; Leo Grebner and Wilhelm Winkler, *The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary*, Yale University Press, 1940. Austro-Hungarian war costs are calculated by the same authors at five times the national income in 1913.

For the sociological effects of the war on Germany consult the volume by A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, *The War and German Society: The Testament of a Liberal*, Yale University Press, 1937.

²⁷ It is interesting to compare the shattered morale of the Germans by 1918 with the excellent spirit in Belgium and northern France, which had been under the German armies of occupation for four years. The high morale of the latter was in part due to the work of the Commission for Belgian Relief organized in September, 1914, as a philanthropic enterprise under the general direction of the American Herbert Hoover. During its service throughout the war years and immediately thereafter, it expended \$1,300,000,000; used the services of 55,000 volunteers; maintained 4,000 branch offices; and kept alive and reasonably well 10,000,000 otherwise helpless people.

of German labor. The frantic efforts to win victory on the western front in 1918 had proved unavailing, and by midsummer the Allied counterattacks were in full swing. August 8, in the opinion of the German high command, was the "black day" of the war. The reverses sustained by the German army during the ensuing six weeks determined the generals to seek an armistice as quickly as possible.

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had been relieved of his office in the summer of 1917, and the military leaders of Germany, chiefly Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, had been in effective command of the nation since. Two inconspicuous civilian chancellors occupied that high office until the end of September, 1918. By that time the military situation in the West was so critical that both Hindenburg and Ludendorff insisted on the need of an immediate cessation of the war, lest Germany suffer a catastrophic defeat. On October 3, therefore, the Kaiser named a vigorous and capable liberal aristocrat, Prince Max of Baden, chancellor of Germany, and at once the latter began peace negotiations. In an urgent communication directed to the President of the United States, Prince Max declared that the German government would accept President Wilson's "Fourteen Points"²⁸ as announced on January 8, 1918, as a basis of peace, and requested Wilson to facilitate an "immediate conclusion of an armistice by land, by sea, and in the air." Between October 3 and November 5, three more German appeals were addressed to the American president, each one of them, like the first, being answered with formal courtesy but, until the fourth reply, with vagueness as to precisely how the war would be terminated.

Meantime, the German leaders made a last-minute attempt to convince their enemies that what President Wilson had stigmatized as "arbitrary power" was dead in Germany. With unprecedented speed the imperial constitution was amended and revised until a parliamentary and limited monarchy analogous to that in Great Britain had been established in Germany. Simultaneously, democratic and liberal reforms were instituted in each of the chief states of Germany. Ludendorff resigned from his high post in the army, and the remaining generals promised to be obedient to the orders of

The coming
of Prince
Max

Domestic
reforms

²⁸ Briefly summarized, these were: (1) open covenants of peace openly arrived at; (2) freedom of the seas in peace and in war; (3) removal of trade barriers; (4) disarmament; (5) readjustment of world colonial problems; (6) German evacuation of Russia; (7) German evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) German evacuation and restoration of France and Alsace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers; (10) autonomy for the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation and restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania; (12) autonomy for the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire; (13) formation of an independent Poland with access to the sea; (14) establishment of a League of Nations.

the civilian leadership, represented by Prince Max. All these changes, it was hoped, would convince the Allies of the genuineness of the German desire for peace and hasten the signature of the much wanted armistice.

Continued crisis in Germany

Wilson's refusal to accept them as satisfactory evidence of a truly contrite and humbled Germany, and his broad hint that the abdication of the German Kaiser would alone be proof of such conditions, naturally speeded demands already rising in Germany itself for the abdication of the emperor. That obstinate monarch had no intention of abdicating and for a time refused even to listen to such counsel. Prince Max's own emissary urging that William II for the good of the nation lay down his royal and imperial powers was rudely dismissed by the Kaiser. Thus the pride of one man blocked the completion of the political reforms from above which might have spared Germany a revolution from below. By the end of October it seemed clear that the Allies would not grant armistice terms until the titular ruler of the German Empire was ousted from office.

Anarchy and revolution

The impasse arising from the Kaiser's obduracy was the signal for a revolutionary movement of the masses to become dominant in Germany. On October 29, the German navy was ordered to sea in a last, despairing bid for victory. Believing that the effort would be tantamount to suicide, the crews refused to go aboard their ships or raise anchors. No attempts on the part of the officers could quell the mutiny. By the fourth of November, the great naval base of Kiel was in full revolt against the imperial government; on the fifth Lübeck was also; and likewise were Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and Bremen on the seventh. Chaos was spreading with fearsome speed in Germany. On November 7, a socialist writer named Kurt Eisner, at the head of a mob of workers and soldiers, announced that Bavaria was henceforth a republic. The king of Bavaria and certain of his colleagues in other German states abdicated the next day.

Abdication of the Kaiser

Convinced that only similar action on the part of the Kaiser would stem the growing anarchy, the German generals on November 9 reluctantly informed William II that, like it or not, he must take such a step at once. Even before he could act, however, announcement that he had done so was made in Berlin. On November 10, the confused and humiliated ex-emperor of Germany was hustled across the Dutch frontier to safety, while behind him, in Berlin, a German Republic was proclaimed.²⁹ The republican provisional government was headed by two members of the Social Democratic

²⁹ The bewildered ruler finally mustered enough composure to make a formal abdication of his powers as King of Prussia and German Emperor on November 28, but by that time his action was antiquarian.

party: Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann. With Prince Max's approval it replaced the former imperial cabinet and henceforth as the lawful government of Germany conducted negotiations with the Allies. In a spirit of genuine patriotism the entire German civil service remained at their posts, and Hindenburg promptly announced his support of the new regime. Thus the transition from empire to republic was accomplished with relative calm.

Convinced early in November that the German desire for peace was genuine, and satisfied that its negotiation would not be in the hands of bureaucrats of the old imperial order, the Allies consented to an armistice. On November 5, Wilson informed the Germans that Marshal Foch, the supreme commander of the Allied forces, would receive duly accredited representatives of the German government and inform them of the terms.³⁰ On November 7, the German Armistice Commission left for the Allied headquarters; it was received by Foch on the next day in his special train on a siding in Compiègne forest—the same car and the same place where the Germans imposed their armistice on the French on June 21, 1910. After two days of negotiation, the text was signed by the representatives of the German Republic at 5:00 A.M. on November 11, 1918. It went into effect six hours later. It was the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918, and the superstitious and mystical read into this numerical coincidence a profound meaning.

Under the terms of the armistice Germany agreed to the evacuation of all territories invaded by her and of Alsace-Lorraine; to the evacuation of the west bank of the Rhine and of the three bridge-heads at Mainz, Köln, and Coblenz; to the Allied occupation of this area and to the support of said army of occupation; to the Allied occupation of a neutral zone ten kilometers wide on the east bank of the Rhine; to the surrender of vast quantities of war materials and most of the German navy;³¹ to the restitution of all gold deposits removed from Belgium, Russia, and Romania; to the repatriation of all inhabitants from the evacuated territories; to the repatriation of all prisoners of war without reciprocity; to the annulment of her separate treaties with Russia and with Romania.

Consent to
armistice

Armistice,
Nov. 11, 1918

³⁰ The terms of this note of November 5, 1918, must be read in full to appreciate the clarity with which Wilson laid down the conditions under which the Allies were willing to negotiate peace. They dispose once and for all of the argument, often heard in later years, that Germany was "tricked" into signing the armistice.

³¹ Pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to their ultimate disposal, the surrendered German warships were interned at the British naval base of Scapa Flow. On June 21, 1919, the German crews aboard scuttled 53 ships as they lay at anchor. By 1939, British salvage firms had raised all but eight of the sunken warships; scrap from them went into the giant British liners of the 1930's, the *Queen Mary* and the *Queen Elizabeth*.

The food blockade continued

As an added humiliation and token of submission, Germany agreed that the Allied blockade should continue, but the Allies promised that they would consider the sending of foodstuffs to Germany should that be found "necessary."³² That such terms could be approved by the Germans was evidence *per se* that the proud imperial regime which had entered upon war in August, 1914, had completely collapsed.³³

IV. THE PEACE OF PARIS

Costs of the first World War

The first World War, after 1,565 days of bloodshed, had ended. Now the victors and vanquished alike faced the huge problem of restoring peace to disordered and impoverished nations. During the struggle nine million men had died in battle; seven million had been permanently disabled; and five million were "missing." The estimated number of civilian deaths was even greater than the number of battle casualties. The total net direct cost of the first World War has been calculated at more than one hundred and eighty-six billion dollars, while the indirect costs are estimated to have been as much more again. Epidemics of diseases like influenza and typhus raged widely after November 11, 1918, and hordes of refugees and homeless people wandered over much of Europe. Never in modern history had the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" seemed so real to so many individuals. All over the earth, feelings of anguish, bitterness, and despair contended with emotions of hope, relief, and desire to forget the fighting and go back to normal life again.³⁴

³² On January 16, 1919, negotiations on this matter of the necessity of Germany's receiving some foodstuffs began. On March 13, an agreement was signed in the presence of Herbert Hoover and Thomas Lamont as American witnesses that for cash Germany should receive from overseas sources 70,000 tons of edible fats and 300,000 tons of grain monthly thereafter. The formal Allied blockade of Germany was not lifted until July, 1919, after the signature of the treaty of peace.

³³ The student may wonder how such a wave of imperial dissolution as has been summarized for Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Germany could possibly have spared the British and French empires. Actually, in the case of the former there were slight mutterings of revolt at various times during the war, all of which were promptly put down. These included a short outbreak of the Boers in South Africa in 1914, some unrest in Egypt and in India, and an Irish uprising in April, 1916. Assisted by the Germans, the radical Irish party known as the Sinn Fein staged a rebellion during Easter Week. Although this was a fiasco, the Sinn Fein movement finally brought about the establishment of the Irish Free State in December, 1922.

³⁴ The scope of the first World War, its problems, and the amount of study that has been put upon it may be suggested by the fact that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1921 and 1937 published 150 volumes in its *Economic and Social History of the World War*. The well-known Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, located at Leland Stanford University, has the most extensive mass of materials in the United States on the first World War. It includes 1,375 newspapers, 8,400 periodicals, 160,000 books and pamphlets, 25,000 posters, 300,000 feet of film, 2,000,000 items of archival material.

In such an atmosphere of abnormal passion and tension the Peace Conference formally convened in Paris on January 18, 1919. The date and the place were both symbolic. Forty-eight years before, on January 18, 1871, the German Empire had been proclaimed in the Palace of Versailles. On January 18, 1919, retributive justice, as the Allies saw it, was to begin its sway. At the opening session of the Peace Conference, which met under the chairmanship of President Poincaré of France, seventy official delegates were present from the thirty-two Allied and Associated powers.³⁵ On motion of President Wilson of the American delegation, Premier Clemenceau of France was elected permanent chairman of the conference. There were no representatives present from any of the defeated powers, for the proposed treaty, unlike that written at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was to be a dictated, not a negotiated, peace.

The personnel and organization of the Peace Conference of 1919 were both interesting. The seventy official delegates included, besides the President of the United States, eleven prime ministers and twelve foreign ministers. Among these were such notables as Clemenceau and Tardieu of France; Lloyd George and Lord Balfour of Great Britain; Orlando of Italy; Paderewski of Poland; Pashitch of Yugoslavia; Benes of Czechoslovakia; Venizelos of Greece; Smuts and Botha of South Africa; Borden of Canada; Hughes of Australia; House, Lansing, White, and Bliss of the United States; Koo of China; and Makino of Japan. The shrewd and cynical Clemenceau, the versatile and affable Lloyd George, and the brilliant and strong-minded Wilson were the most striking characters.

Seventy such diverse personalities could not work together efficiently, and during the five months that the conference was in session there were actually but six plenary meetings. The bulk of the work of the conference was done, as in the case of most legislative bodies, by committees, each one of which had assigned to it some special phase of the peace problem for study and investigation. Of these committees there were eventually fifty-eight. To co-ordinate their work there was the Council of Ten, composed of two delegates each from the five principal powers; toward the end of March, 1919, when even this was beginning to seem unwieldy, the "Big Four"—Wilson,

The Peace Conference

Its personnel

Its organization

³⁵ All those states which had either declared war on, or had broken off diplomatic relations with, Germany were represented. The United States and certain other groups from the Western Hemisphere termed themselves "Associated" rather than "Allied" powers. The five chief powers—Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy—had 5 official delegates each; Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia had 3 each; and all the other states had either 1 or 2 delegates each. In addition to the official delegates there were great numbers of expert advisers attached to each national group. Great Britain and the United States, for instance, had more than 200 such experts each.

Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—began to act as a central executive committee for the whole.

The history of the Paris Peace Conference fell into three chronological phases. The first lasted from the opening session to February 14. On that date President Wilson had to leave for the United States to take care of his constitutional duties there in connection with the session of Congress terminating on March 4. During these first four weeks, however, President Wilson and his special committee successfully completed the original draft of the covenant of the proposed League of Nations and secured the pledge of the conference that it should be included as the first section of the treaty of peace. To Wilson this was the pivotal element in the entire peace settlement.

The second phase lasted from February 14 to March 14 and consisted chiefly of routine committee work. During this period, Wilson was in the United States; Lloyd George was in England most of the time; and Clemenceau was recovering from the effects of an attempt on his life by an anarchist. The third phase of the Peace Conference lasted from March 14 to the final signing of the treaty of Versailles on June 28. In this last phase definitive decisions were made on the crucial military, territorial, economic, and technical questions which faced the delegates.

The most important of these decisions involved the nationalist ambitions of (1) certain of the British Dominions; (2) Japan; (3) France; and (4) the emergent independent states of central and eastern Europe. The British Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa desired to annex outright near-by former German colonies; Japan had similar ambitions with regard to one-time German imperial rights in China. The newly organized states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia aspired to maximum size. Most important of all, because most clearly articulated and most determinedly pressed, were the nationalist ambitions of France. The French leaders definitely hoped for a permanent disruption and subjugation of Germany. This they planned to bring about by economic, political, and military techniques. It was in such a welter of desire, revenge, and idealism that the Peace Conference struggled to bring about some acceptable compromise which could be presented to the defeated powers as quickly as possible.

On the whole, President Wilson—"the only man of real stature at Paris"—believed that all these nationalist desires were antithetical in spirit to the pledges contained in the Fourteen Points on which the armistice with Germany had been negotiated. He therefore opposed them so far as was practicable without jeopardizing his own most cherished ambition, the establishment of a League of Nations. In the case

of the Dominion and Japanese wishes for outright territorial annexation of former German colonies, he was able to substitute therefor the so-called mandate principle. Under it these colonial areas were taken over by the victors, not as actual annexations, but as trusteeships for the League of Nations. So far as the territorial desires of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were concerned, Wilson proved generally sympathetic. Poland was organized as a large and supposedly powerful state; her access to the sea at Danzig, and much of her western borderlands, came to her as the result of a partial dismemberment of Germany. To Czechoslovakia it was agreed should be given much of Silesia. In the case of Yugoslavia's territorial aspirations, Wilson sided with her claims against Italy, greatly to the latter's discomfiture and indignation.

Toward French hopes for a destruction of that German unity so painfully developed during the nineteenth century, Wilson was unfriendly. He was willing to require German disarmament, the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine, and other minor boundary rectifications. He was willing also to approve the extravagant demands of the European Allies for German indemnities and reparations.³⁶ But he would not endorse the wishes of Clemenceau, Poincaré, and General Foch either for a separate Rhineland state or for outright annexation of the German coal-mining region known as the Saar. He also opposed the French suggestion to turn the League of Nations into a kind of permanent Grand Alliance to maintain the peace of Europe by keeping Germany forever humbled and inferior. French irritation at Wilson was so great that against his better judgment the American president promised that the United States, along with Great Britain, would each sign a special guarantee treaty with France, agreeing to come to her help in the event of future German aggression.³⁷

Wilson
and
France

Despite interdelegation and intradelegation differences of opinion and arguments which at times approached personal violence, by the end of April the Peace Conference was ready to present the first draft of the treaty to the Germans. On April 29, the foreign minister of the German Republic, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, and his colleagues

Germany
and the
treaty

³⁶ In the excitement of the British electoral campaign preceding the general elections for Parliament on December 14, 1918, a British orator had well expressed the reparations ideas of most ordinary people among the victors: "We shall squeeze the orange until the pips squeak"; Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933, p. 38. The disgust of many British economists with the exorbitant reparations demands as outlined in the treaty was well expressed by John M. Keynes of Cambridge University in his volume, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, London, 1920.

³⁷ The United States Senate did not consent to the ratification of this treaty, and, accordingly, it never went into effect. Since the British ratified their treaty conditionally upon similar action by the United States, it also was a dead letter.

reached Paris. Kept in close custody until May 7, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, on that day they were given the treaty and informed that they could have three weeks in which to study it and make written observations on its contents. Within the stipulated time voluminous German protests—actually fifty per cent longer than the two hundred and thirty printed pages required for the proposed treaty itself—were in Allied hands. The Peace Conference, however, treated these coldly and altered the document at only a few minor points. After additional fiery but ineffectual protests involving the resignation of certain German officials who refused to affix their signatures to the treaty, on June 23 Germany indicated her unconditional acceptance of the terms. Five days later, on June 28, the fifth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassinations, the formal ceremony of signature took place.³⁸

The treaty with Germany, because of the Parisian suburb in which it was signed, was called the treaty of Versailles. Its four hundred and forty articles organized in fifteen parts made it the longest document of its kind in history. Part One, composed of twenty-six articles, was the Covenant of the League of Nations, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.³⁹ The remaining fourteen parts delineated the new German boundaries; set forth German penalties and punishments; took away German colonies; laid down stringent rules for the limiting of German armed forces; provided for numerous economic and technical adjustments of German law and economics; and, finally, outlined a series of guarantees by which the Allies thought they could be sure that the treaty of Versailles would be carried out as its framers intended.

Outline
of the
treaty

German
losses

Territorially, Germany lost twenty-five thousand square miles in Europe inhabited by upwards of six million people; all her colonies totaling more than a million square miles were taken away under the mandate principle. In raw materials, she lost sixty-five per cent of her iron ore reserves, forty-five per cent of her coal, seventy-two per cent of her zinc, twelve per cent of her principal agricultural areas, and ten per cent of her manufacturing establishments. The German merchant marine, which in 1914 had aggregated more than five million tons, was now stripped of ships until only four hundred thousand tons were left. The Germany army was limited to one hundred thousand men with no reserves; the German navy was reduced to insig-

³⁸ The German representatives signed first, and the Allied delegates followed in the alphabetical order of their countries' names in French. The United States was listed under the phrase, "Amérique du Nord," in order to give President Wilson an opportunity to sign first for the Allied nations.

³⁹ The same 26 articles formed Part One of each of the other peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

nificance; the German air force was abolished. Initial reparation payments were set at five billion dollars before 1921, with a larger sum to be assessed then. It was an extremely severe peace which "realists" like Clemenceau applauded and "idealists" like Wilson trusted time and the League of Nations to soften.

The treaty with Germany having been completed, most of the dramatic interest departed from the Peace Conference. Wilson and Lloyd George went home and left the drafting of the remaining treaties almost entirely in the hands of the Council of Five and its technical advisers. The Council of Five consisted of Clemenceau and one representative each from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. As rapidly as possible, treaties with the lesser belligerents were drafted and presented to their reluctant plenipotentiaries. Each of these documents followed closely the spirit and pattern of the treaty of Versailles, and, like it, each was named after a Parisian suburb.⁴⁰

Austria was reduced from an impressive state with a population of more than thirty million to a small, landlocked area surrounding Vienna, containing approximately 6,500,000 people. Hungary shrank likewise from a population of over twenty million to about eight million people, mostly in the area immediately contiguous to Budapest. Bulgaria, although she suffered less proportionately than her greater allies, was reduced to one of the smallest of the Balkan states in area, population, and resources. Turkey, however, after some years of negotiation, by the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 won a better treatment than she had received in the original agreement of 1920. Even so, however, the old Ottoman Empire was utterly abolished, and modern Turkey took its place, limited to a minute area in Europe and to the great peninsula of Anatolia in Asia.

Looking at the five treaties which ended the first World War—the five are collectively called the Peace of Paris—it is clear that nationalism as developed during the nineteenth century was the guiding principle by which they were written. At the outbreak of the war in 1914, neither side anticipated so radical an alteration of the map as

Remaining treaties:

With Austria

With Hungary

With Bulgaria

With Turkey

Problems of nationalism and the treaties

⁴⁰ The settlement with Austria, known as the treaty of Saint Germain, was signed September 10, 1919; that with Bulgaria, known as the treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, was signed on November 27, 1919; that with Hungary, known as the treaty of Trianon, on June 4, 1920; and that with Turkey, known as the treaty of Sèvres, on August 10, 1920. This last never became operative, and was replaced by the treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

The United States had not formally been at war with either Turkey or Bulgaria, so had no treaties to make with them. It refused to ratify the other three, and signed separate treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, respectively on August 1, 24, and 29, 1921. On this anticlimactic conclusion to American participation in the war, see D. F. Fleming, *The United States and World Organization 1920-1933*, Columbia University Press, 1938, pp. 3-60.

the Allies actually brought about in 1919 and 1920. But the war years galvanized all manner of slogans and propagandist appeals into vitality and action. "Self-determination of nations" was the phrase which had most force at Paris. Thanks to the dynamic it implied, new states like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic republics—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—and old states like France, Belgium, Italy, Romania, and Greece were the European beneficiaries of the first World War. The frontiers which prevailed in Europe after 1919 were largely based on ethnical principles and were probably drawn as fairly as possible in the circumstances.

Nevertheless, even the most optimistic of the Allied statesmen recognized that the European boundary situation was far from perfect. To ameliorate the problem so-called minorities-treaties were therefore drafted. These were incorporated into the Peace of Paris, and special agreements of the same type were signed with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In each instance the signatory government pledged itself to accord protection and equal rights to every minority resident within its borders. The League of Nations was made responsible for the guarantee of these obligations. Similar pledges were exacted by the League from Finland, Albania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Iraq when these states were admitted to the Geneva organization. Unfortunately, however, this principle of guarantees to minorities was made applicable only to secondary powers. No great state was willing to bind itself by analogous obligations to accord liberties to minorities resident within its own frontiers: Italy and France, for instance, made no promises with respect to the South Tyroleans or to the Alsace-Lorrainers. In such discrimination between states, the minorities treaties were to find their greatest weakness.

Faults
of the
settlement

Therefore, the ink was scarcely dry on these treaties and on the Peace of Paris before it became clear that trouble was ahead. Slowly it was recognized that the very principle of "self-determination of nations," appealing though it was in theory, was no more capable of bringing peace and prosperity to Europe than had the analogous slogans of "squatter sovereignty" and "states' rights" been able to assure those same attributes to the United States six decades earlier. The doctrine of nationality so much on the lips of the peacemakers of 1919, often allied with a spurious profession of faith in democracy, brought to Europe a "Balkanization" of spirit and interest which boded ill for the future. Over the settlement of 1919-20 brooded the specter of a German attempt at revenge. Crushed as it was for the time being, Germany emerged from the Peace of Paris with two potential elements in its favor. In the first place, it was now freed of almost every alien group in its population and therefore ripe for

a surge of fanatical German racialism. In the second place, all along its eastern and southern borders after 1919 it confronted not the large empires of 1914, but a congeries of essentially weak and disunited small states. In this fortuitous result of zeal for the principle of nationality, unrepentant sections among the German people perceived an invitation for continental imperialism and an opportunity for sweet revenge. Because of that perception the Peace of Paris lasted for less than twenty years.

Europe Between Two Wars: Experiments in National Recovery (1919-1939)

AT THE BEGINNING of the twenty-year period which is the subject of this chapter, a renowned psychologist aptly set forth the spirit of the time:



Old beacon lights have shifted or gone out. Some of the issues we lately thought to be minor have taken on cosmic dimensions. We are all "up against" questions too big for us, so that there is everywhere a sense of insufficiency which is too deep to be fully explored in the narrow field of consciousness. Hence, there is a new discontent with old leaders, standards, criteria, methods, and values, and a demand everywhere for new ones, a realization that mankind must now reorient itself and take its bearings from the eternal stars and sail no longer into the unknown future by the dead reckonings of the past.¹

This psychology prevalent between 1919 and 1939 led to a spirit of experimentation and innovation which reflected itself in all phases of life; it was the inescapable heritage of the war years. So far as government and public affairs were concerned, the current restlessness and dissatisfaction with past accomplishments were the propulsive forces which in every European and Asiatic country—and in the states of the Western Hemisphere also—brought about diverse experiments seeking national recovery.

I. GREAT BRITAIN

In Great Britain the years after 1921 witnessed two primary trends, with many secondary manifestations of each: (1) the movement toward greater state participation in the social and economic affairs of the nation; (2) the development of a wider degree of autonomy

¹ Written by G. Stanley Hall in 1921; quoted by J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, Harper & Brothers, 1921, pp. 212-13.



THE BRITISH ISLES AND DISTANCES WITHIN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH


for the chief units of the British Empire. Each of these trends was based upon precedents in the past, but each was carried to lengths never anticipated by previous generations. Moreover, each developed experimental aspects, the ultimate significance of which is not yet clear.

State participation in national life


Increasing state participation in the social and economic affairs of Great Britain showed itself in a wide variety of reform legislation passed by parliament between 1919 and 1939. Faced by the menace of unemployment on a major scale after the demobilization of the army in 1919-20, the government vastly extended its unemployment-relief program, popularly known as the "dole." Stifling its repugnance of Bolshevism, in March, 1921, parliament approved a trade agreement with Russia. Similarly overcoming its traditional objections to protective tariffs, parliament in 1921 and again in 1925 passed legislation which "safeguarded" key industries. Following an extensive general strike during the first fortnight in May, 1926, the government on July 29, 1927, enacted the Trades Disputes Act, limiting the right to strike and regulating trade unions more closely than heretofore. In 1928 suffrage for all women over twenty-one was granted without reservation.

London


The Population Moves to the Suburbs 1851



1891



1935



Each symbol represents 100,000 population

Innermost circle: City, Finsbury, Holborn

Second circle: County of London

Outer circle: Greater London

(From *Modern Man in the Making* by Otto Neurath, by permission of and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.)

Even bolder experimentation was suggested by other laws. Such was the elaborate slum-clearance and housing program initiated in 1919; during the next two decades more than 3,500,000 government-subsidized houses were erected in Great Britain at a cost in excess of one billion pounds. "Green-belt towns" and "garden cities," such as were imitated by American public-housing authorities in the 1930's, were constructed in various parts of the country. Great public service agencies—similar to those later termed in the United States "alphabetical"—were inaugurated. Of these perhaps the most important were the General Electricity Board, established in 1926; the British Broadcasting Corporation, set up in 1927; and the London Passenger Transport Board, organized in 1933. Each of these represented a genuine effort to bring about a combination of public ownership, public accountability, and business management for public ends. In 1937 parliament passed legislation agreeing to nationalize all the coal mines of Great Britain by July 1, 1942. Taxation pressure increased until by 1939 the British citizen was paying taxes at a rate not hitherto known in peacetime Britain. Partly, of course, this was owing to the huge costs of preparedness.

These social and economic experiments naturally implied much activity in British politics. On the whole, the Labor party was the beneficiary of the political ferment of the postwar period. Twice it won for itself a position of leadership in British affairs: in 1923 and again in 1929. After electoral victories in each of these years, the position of prime minister fell to the head of the Labor party, James Ramsay MacDonald. In neither instance, however, did MacDonald have a clear Labor majority behind him in the house of commons; therefore, each of the so-called Labor governments was actually a coalition whose political life depended upon support from some Conservative and Liberal members of parliament. When this support weakened, the Labor government in each instance gave way to Conservative leadership, headed for most of the period by Stanley Baldwin.² After Baldwin's retirement in 1937, Neville Chamberlain took over the helm as Conservative leader. During the two decades between 1919 and 1939 the once powerful Liberals were by far the weakest of the three major political parties of Great Britain; Lloyd George, their most spectacular figure, however, continued personally to be as active as ever.

The British Labor party led by men like MacDonald, Philip Snowden, Herbert Morrison, and Ernest Bevin, was in no sense a revolutionary organization; it proposed to carry out its admittedly

Public works
and service
agencies

The Labor
party

Its
personnel

² Baldwin was prime minister during the short but dramatic reign of Edward VIII in 1936 and the subsequent coronation of George VI in May, 1937.


socialist objectives by strictly constitutional means.³ Its leaders not only opposed too much collaboration with the older British parties—after MacDonald's coalition with the Conservatives in 1931, he and his immediate followers were themselves expelled from the Labor party they had done so much to create—but also in 1931 they set their faces against incipient Fascism in Great Britain and in 1937 against any united “front” with the Communists. In 1931 Oswald Mosley, a member with Fascist leanings, was expelled from the Labor party; and in 1939 Stafford Cripps, a member with Communist sympathies, suffered the same fate.⁴ This cautious and balanced approach to social reform and party politics gave British labor a unity and stability which were most notable after the renewed outbreak of war in 1939.

The second primary British trend after 1919 was that of granting a larger degree of political autonomy to the major units of the empire. This, also, in some ways was an extension of precedents, but it was carried to a degree not imagined by earlier generations. In 1926 at an “Imperial Conference” of the premiers of Great Britain and all the Dominions, it was agreed that these units of the empire were henceforth to be equal in status with the mother country in all respects, and tied to Great Britain solely by the fact they had a common sovereign in the person of the king. This was at the moment only a declaration of principle, but on December 11, 1931, by the Statute of Westminster, the proposal became law. Thus by parliamentary enactment the British Dominions achieved the position of legally separate states among the nations of the world, able to negotiate treaties and pass their own legislation precisely as though they were any other independent group. This decentralized status was true of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State, and, until 1934, Newfoundland. By 1938, Ireland, under the leadership of its doughty nationalist, Eamon de Valera, had gone further in severing its sentimental ties with Great Britain than any of the other dominions; in that year political, financial, and trade agreements with the government in London recognized this fact.

Toward other portions of the British Empire the same principle of extending autonomy, although less far-reaching, was also attempted. In the case of Egypt, virtually a British possession since Turkey's

³ These aims are clearly set forth in the platform of the Labor party for 1928. See W. C. Langsam, *Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since 1918*, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939, pp. 306-12.

⁴ By a queer turn of fortune's wheel, Cripps was made British minister to Russia in the opening months of the second World War, and in July, 1941, enjoyed the satisfying experience for one of his sympathies of signing an Anglo-Russian military alliance.



THE ELEVEN PROVINCES OF BRITISH INDIA

defeat in the first World War, on August 26, 1936, "virtual independence" was conceded. There were still some strings left, however, tying Cairo to London; for as realists on both sides well understood, in the event of war the approaches to the Suez Canal were vital to British imperial policy. Such, too, had been the situation in connection with Britain's recognition in 1930-32 of the independence of her mandate of Iraq. The rich oil fields of that area made necessary some legal way by which Great Britain could interfere in time of war, and such concessions were granted by Iraq in the treaty recognizing her independence.

India and Palestine were the most troublesome postwar divisions of the British Empire. In India there emerged a formidable agitation for independence headed by a one-time Bombay lawyer named Mohandas K. Gandhi. Styled by its founder as "Satyagraha," or the technique of passive and nonviolent resistance, the Indian indepen-

British policy toward Egypt and Iraq

Toward India

dence movement baffled the British and proved impossible to meet by ordinary means.⁵ Although weak in the 562 native states of India, Gandhi's party, the Indian National Congress, by 1939 controlled nine of the eleven provinces of British India. Despite really enormous study and investigation by British experts, and despite the efforts of several "Round Tables" which led to the inauguration of a new Indian Constitution on April 1, 1937, the situation in India was still tense as Europe went to war again in 1939. So, too, was it in Palestine, where the conflicts arising from Britain's promises to Jews and to Arabs during the years of the first World War were impossible to adjust. Report after report was made in the 1920's and 1930's, and investigation after investigation was conducted, but still there was no reconciliation. A fruitless conference of Arabs, Jews, and Britons held in London in March, 1939, symbolized the deadlock.

Toward
Palestine

"Appease-
ment" in
Europe

Confronted by so many and such diverse difficulties along the pathway of national recovery from the effects of the first World War, it is scarcely surprising that Great Britain and her leaders were almost exclusively occupied with problems of their own household. Toward the increasing tensions in European and world politics, men like Baldwin and Chamberlain adopted the attitude of watchful waiting. As late as February 21, 1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain in addressing the house of commons called for a "general scheme of appeasement in Europe." While some, notably Winston Churchill, repeatedly warned of the danger of absorption in domestic affairs and insisted that Great Britain was asleep in a world of perils, not until 1939 did the average Briton awake to the need of shifting the national mind and muscle from recovery from the last war to rearmament for the next.

II. FRANCE

French
domestic
policies
after 1919

After the end of the first World War France faced problems in part analogous to those of Great Britain. At home there was the same trend toward greater state participation in the social and economic affairs of the nation; abroad there were difficulties in various parts of the empire. But from the beginning of the postwar period, France had two emphases in her national policies that were different from those of Great Britain: (1) the tremendous effort required physically to rehabilitate the ruined and devastated war zone, itself comprising upwards of ten per cent of her entire continental area; and (2) the

⁵ One of the best summaries of Gandhi's movement by an American eyewitness is that of Webb Miller, *I Found No Peace*, Simon and Schuster, 1937, pp. 189-241. Gandhi told Miller that much of his inspiration came from the life and writings of Henry Thoreau, the nineteenth-century American literary non-conformist from Concord, Massachusetts.

determination that France would never again endure a repetition of the invasion experiences of 1914. Because these two emphases were peculiarly French, they will be summarized first, after which general socioeconomic reforms and imperial problems will be reviewed briefly.

The ten northern departments of France were the areas in which the first World War battles had chiefly been fought. In this region population during the war declined fifty per cent; livestock surviving the war was less than ten per cent of normal; eight hundred thousand houses or farm buildings had been wrecked; ten thousand factories and workshops employing ten or more men each had been damaged or completely ruined; many coal mines had been flooded. Yet, notwithstanding this almost incredible destruction and waste, by 1925 virtually all the physical reconstruction alike in agriculture and industry had been completed. This effort cost the French people, already staggering under the burdens of the war itself, a sum equal to four billion dollars in American purchasing power. Justly it has been said that this reconstruction of the devastated areas of France "was the greatest economic achievement of postwar Europe." Actually, when the industrial rebuilding of France had been finished, French factories and mills were relatively better off than they had been in decades; for now their capital equipment and technical processes were all new and for the moment, at least, on an efficiency level with any in the world.

Nevertheless, France paid a great price for her physical recovery. More was involved than the actual expenditures. Not entirely because of the costs of reconstruction, but closely related thereto, the value of the French franc declined from its prewar rating of approximately nineteen cents to less than two cents in July, 1926. So troubled was the situation that French politicians for the time being forgot their rivalries and came together under the leadership of Poincaré, the war president of France. For three years the National Union Ministry of Poincaré wrestled with the problem of monetary stabilization. In 1929 the franc was revalued and stabilized at four cents. While in reality this process involved the repudiation of four-fifths of the internal debt of France, it was hailed as a great triumph of leadership, and Poincaré was given the proud title of "Savior of the Franc."

French determination never again to endure a repetition of the invasion of 1914 was inseparably associated with that desire for security which by many observers is said to have been the master passion of France between 1919 and 1939. The French army, navy, and air forces were maintained at a high degree of efficiency and

Physical
rebuilding

Financial
readjust-
ments

Steps
toward
security

were generally reckoned by all critics before 1939 as the most formidable military establishment belonging to any continental power. In January, 1923, French troops marched into the Ruhr manufacturing area in western Germany, which region they proceeded to occupy for more than a year. Technically justified by the terms of the Versailles treaty, this action was really one of the greatest mistakes French leadership made in the postwar years. Defended by French officials like Poincaré on the plea of French security, in reality it succeeded only in alienating sympathy for France among her former allies and in arousing in Germany a bitterness impossible to overestimate. Convinced, however, that neither ordinary military preparedness nor economic humiliation of France's traditional rival would suffice, in 1929 André Maginot, the Minister of Defense, began the construction of an extensive line of permanent fortresses along the entire eastern border of France from Switzerland to Belgium. For seven years tens of thousands of workmen labored on this intricate system of fortifications. In 1936, at a cost equivalent to five hundred million dollars in American money, the Maginot Line was finished and pronounced impregnable to attack. France breathed more easily after that.

The
Maginot
Line

In the area of socioeconomic reform France undertook considerable experimentation. On July 1, 1930, there went into effect the most elaborate social insurance law which the Third Republic had yet known, a prototype for the American Social Security legislation of 1935. In 1931 France initiated a system of import quotas as a device for regulating her foreign trade, a system which when copied by other countries threw the world's international trade into hopeless confusion. In 1932 the government gave legal recognition to and support of an elaborate system of "family allowances"—fiscal payments to stimulate the birth rate, begun privately as early as 1854. In 1936 the French political parties of the Left—Radical Socialist, Socialist, and Communist—agreed to coalesce in the elections of that spring. Their "Popular-Front" program and candidates prevailed. Under Léon Blum as premier, the new government was organized on June 4 and proceeded with great dispatch and thoroughness to carry into effect its pre-election promises. An array of labor legislation, credit extension, public works, reform of the Bank of France, nationalization of arms manufacture, reorganization of the national railway system, and measures to limit the growth of Fascist groups was speedily put on the statute books of the nation. Complimented by its supporters and criticized by its foes as the "New Deal" of France, this accomplishment of Léon Blum and his Popular Front during the single year that they remained in power was the most

The
"Popular
Front"

far-reaching of its kind in French history. It was, however, almost wholly submerged after 1937 by the rising tide of war excitement and national defense activity, and its effect in French history will long be a matter of debate.

French party politics in the postwar period were at least as intricate as in the years before the war. With the exception of the ministry of Poincaré between 1926 and 1929, no cabinet survived more than a year, and many lasted for much shorter periods. Political parties like the Communists almost always were in opposition to the government. Emergent Fascist groups like the *Croix de Feu*—outlawed by Blum in 1936—were chronic sources of confusion. The labor unions had their legislative program, which they sought to advance by all means in their power. Experienced statesmen like André Tardieu and Gaston Doumergue sought to win support for extensive constitutional revisions in the fundamental law of the country. In 1934 there were bloody riots in Paris over a political and financial scandal known as the “Stavisky affair.” By 1938, as the shadows were deepening over Europe, it became clear that traditional parliamentarianism in France was reaching the point of self-destruction. Almost with relief in that year, the French parliament began the practice of voting extraordinary powers to the prime minister, and authorizing him to carry on the government of France subject only to occasional review by the national legislature. With the coming of 1939, France, like Great Britain, was fully aware of the probable perils ahead, but unlike her sister democracy across the English Channel seemed unable to face them with unanimity and determination.

In the outlying areas of France during the two decades after 1919 there were many difficulties. Most important of these were the outbreak of the Riffian tribesmen in French Morocco in 1925 and the simultaneous rebellion in the French mandate of Syria. In both places suppression of the revolts required severe military measures, costly alike to the French pocketbook and to the French reputation as able and successful colonial administrators. Much closer at home, there was misunderstanding between the government at Paris and the re-annexed provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. In these regions, after the “honeymoon” period of French control was over, many points of religious, economic, linguistic, and governmental friction appeared. With what seemed to the French rank ingratitude for their sacrifices during the first World War, a considerable number of the natives perversely appeared to prefer German to French domination. Finally, in the French north-African colony of Tunisia, there was unrest among the alien Italian population, an unrest which was deliberately fanned by propaganda from Rome. All these difficulties in the out-

Political
unrest

Other
problems

lying portions of France complicated the efforts toward national recovery which at heart most Frenchmen of every political group sincerely desired.

III. GERMANY

The German Republic During the closing days of the war, it will be recalled, Chancellor Prince Max had placed the direction of German affairs in the hands of a provisional government headed by Friedrich Ebert. As soon as the armistice was signed on November 11, this group undertook the creation of a permanent republican organization for their country. After appealing for support in a manifesto to the German nation, they set January 19, 1919, as the election date for a constitutional convention to draw up a new fundamental law for Germany. Surmounting successfully an armed Communist outbreak on January 6 led by Karl Liebnecht and his fellow "Spartacists," the provisional government, following the election, convened its constitutional convention on February 6 in the city of Weimar. Ebert was promptly named the first president of the German Republic.

The Weimar Constitution, a document of 181 articles, went into effect on August 11, 1919. Its extensive clauses provided for a strongly centralized republic; universal suffrage was decreed; broad civil liberties were ordained; the president was given a seven-year term with wide powers, especially in case of national emergency; the new German parliament was to be bicameral; and there were elaborate economic and labor provisions. The government set up under the new constitution was established in Berlin by September, 1919, and immediately set to work as a going concern.

Problems of the republic The new German government faced many difficulties. In the first place, there were recalcitrant elements both radical and reactionary to whom the system originating at Weimar was entirely unsatisfactory; by agitation and various types of violent activity they made themselves a nuisance as long as the republic lasted.⁶ In the second place, there was the aftermath of the first World War to meet. Unemployment, bitterness, financial difficulties, the care of millions whose lives had been blasted by the conflict, the burden of reparation payments

⁶ In the early years of the German Republic there were several armed outbreaks or *putsches*, and numerous assassinations of prominent republican officials. Of the *putsches* the best known were those headed by Wolfgang Kapp and Adolf Hitler, occurring respectively in March, 1920, and in November, 1923. Kapp was the son of a German rebel of '48 who had fled to the United States and had had an eminent military and political career there. Hitler in 1923 was an obscure agitator. Both men received prison sentences from the courts of the German Republic. Kapp died while serving his term, but Hitler whiled away the hours by producing the first volume of one of the best-known works of modern times: *Mein Kampf*.

to the victors, the struggle to rebuild a normal economic and business life—all these and more would have taxed the wisdom of Solomon. And there was no Solomon in the German Republic. In the third place, there was the vital matter of teaching the German people, long accustomed to a monarchical order, how to live by the rules of democracy without favor and without abuse. The history of the German Republic during its fourteen years of existence is the effort of its leaders to surmount these three types of obstacles.

Without going into details, one may make a balance sheet of the achievements and failures of republican Germany from 1919 to 1933. In this period there were three presidential elections, of which the old war hero, Hindenburg, won the last two, those held respectively in April, 1925, and in April, 1932. Also, there were twenty ministerial changes, bringing to the executive department a long list of politicians, of whom only two, Gustav Stresemann and Heinrich Brüning, will long be remembered. Positively, however, the German Republic accomplished four things: (1) thanks largely to Stresemann, it brought about an alleviation of the more oppressive clauses in the treaty of Versailles, such as those relating to reparations, armaments, Allied occupation of the Rhineland, and German relations to the League of Nations; (2) it maintained Germany as a major power in Europe, thus safeguarding that national unity so hardly won in the past; (3) it built up the nation's industrial and commercial strength until German merchandise and transportation were once again visible to all men; (4) finally, it successfully conquered the fantastic monetary inflation of 1923-24—accelerated by the French invasion of the Ruhr—which for a time threatened to throw Germany into chaos, and gave the nation five years of considerable prosperity from 1924 to the beginning of the world depression in 1929.

On the other hand, the German Republic had four significant failures: (1) it was unable to render democracy truly popular with the German people, thus directly leading to its own eventual downfall;⁷ (2) it permitted the German army to remain a free agent within the state, almost entirely unchecked by reichstag control, and winked at the continual German violations of the military restrictions in the treaty of Versailles, by which the republic had pledged itself to abide; (3) it was unable to meet the crushing impact of the great economic depression which broke upon Germany like an avalanche after 1929, and which by 1932 had put upwards of six million work-

A balance sheet of the republic

Accomplish-
ments

Failures

⁷ ". . . Germany after 1918 was a democracy without democrats. . . . In the elections of 1932 . . . no less than three-fourths of the German people voted for antidemocratic parties of the Right or the Left." K. Löwenstein in *Governments of Continental Europe*, Macmillan Co., 1940, p. 403.

ers, many of them young people, on the unemployed list; (4) it so tenaciously maintained its faith in its constitutional bill of rights that it gave free rein to men and movements who had sworn to destroy the republic and who used democratic liberties only as pretexts for undermining democracy itself. Thus the German Republic, despite its many accomplishments, took the pathway which led in 1933 to suicide.

Origins
of the
Nazi
party

On February 25, 1920—when the Republic was less than a year old—at an obscure political rally in Munich a party program was announced which within a few years was destined to become the official platform for Germany.⁸ The National Socialist German Workers' Party—Nazi for short—had been founded in 1919 by a small group of men, including Adolf Hitler as its seventh member. Its first phase as merely one of a number of eccentric political factions ended in seeming collapse with Hitler's incarceration in a fortress following the abortive *putsch* of November, 1923. Its second phase, 1923-30, was devoted to organization and the development of mass propaganda and techniques of mass emotionalism unprecedented in German history. This culminated in a great electoral victory on September 14, 1930, wherein the Nazi party won one hundred and seven reichstag seats as compared with twelve secured in the last election in 1928.

Reasons
for Nazi
success

The third and triumphant phase of the Nazi party's march to power in Germany lasted from its first notable political victory in 1930 to its emergence as the master of Germany by the appointment of Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933. Some of the factors in the Nazi triumph would certainly include the four failures of the German Republic already listed; Hitler's own uncanny skill as an orator and an organizer, and his sense of timing; the devices of showmanship and propaganda so remarkably developed by the Nazi party; the hierarchical and meticulous organization of the party from the leaders at the top down to the last individual member; the dexterity shown by Hitler and the other Nazi heads in cloaking their ambitions in the guise of traditional patriotic German desires and aims; the support of many of Germany's industrial magnates, including Fritz Thyssen, who later estimated that the total contributions of industrial leaders to the Nazi movement aggregated two million marks annually for years before 1933; the Nazi claim that the alleged deadly menace to Germany of Russian Communism could be nullified only by a Nazi regime; and, finally, the appeal made by the Nazi party to youth, for whom it declared that it had all the answers and would fulfill all

⁸ This original 25-point program, as formulated by Gottfried Feder, an intimate of Hitler's, is given in Langsam, *op. cit.*, pp. 667-71.

their hopes. That there was much of the specious in many of these reasons for success cannot be doubted, but that millions of Germans in January, 1933, were free from such doubts is also unquestionable.

When Adolf Hitler received the appointment as German chancellor from the aged and well-nigh senile President Hindenburg,⁹ he was in his forty-fourth year.¹⁰ Unmarried and devoted to nothing but his conception of national recovery and dominance, he prepared at once to remake Germany along lines long contemplated by himself and his advisers. Among these intimate counselors were Hermann Goering, an aviator veteran of the first World War; Alfred Rosenberg, intellectual and writer; Paul Joseph Goebbels, a newspaper man and master of party propaganda; Fritz Todt, a construction engineer; Rudolf Hess, Hitler's companion during his imprisonment in 1923-24; Karl Haushofer, head of the German Academy at Munich and long interested in "geopolitics"; Heinrich Himmler, shrewd chief of the secret police; Franz von Papen, a suave diplomat whose experience extended back to the years of the first World War; and Heinrich Hoffmann, old friend and official party photographer. These were the inner circle who with Hitler were to organize the "Third Reich."

The number and scope of the policies inaugurated by the Nazi leaders in the six years following 1933 were legion. For convenience the more important of them may be classified in four categories: (1) reforms seeking to deal with matters of unemployment, business, and economic production; (2) decrees reordering the governmental structure of Germany; (3) measures designed to give to the Nazi system the undisputed and unchallengeable mastery of Germany; (4) a wide variety of regulations affecting the status of the individual German citizen. Many of these endeavors had more than one purpose. Many, too, involved questions of foreign affairs. Leaving to a subsequent chapter the application of the Nazi measures to international relations, it will suffice here to consider them from the viewpoint of national recovery and domestic reform.

Problems of unemployment, business, and economic production claimed the immediate attention of the new regime. In 1933, as already stated, there were upwards of six million unemployed persons

Hitler and
his chief
lieutenants

Chief Nazi
policies

Economic
reforms

⁹ Hindenburg, born in 1847, had been retired from the German army for old age in 1912. Called from retirement two years later, he was Germany's chief military figure during the first World War. Called again in 1925 at the age of 78, he had, by 1933, served almost eight years as president, and was in his eighty-seventh year. He died on August 2, 1934, and Hitler, under prearranged plans for a union of the offices of president and chancellor, became the sole head of Germany as both Führer and chancellor.

¹⁰ Hitler was the child of a third marriage by his father. At the time of his elevation to leadership in the German state, he had one full sister, one half-sister, and one half-brother.

in Germany. Within five years this had been reduced to fewer than fifty thousand, and there was actually a shortage of labor in many areas. This apparent economic miracle was brought about by several factors. In the first place, Hitler soon began a vast rearmament program which, although concealed for a few months, by March, 1935, came fully into the open with the reintroduction of conscription and the creation of a large standing army. In the second place, the Nazis under the direction of Fritz Todt built huge public works, including the erection of monumental public buildings all over Germany and the construction of four-lane superhighways, the so-called *Autobahnen*, which by 1939 had a total length of more than two thousand miles. In the third place, under the direction of H. G. H. Schacht, Minister of Economy from 1934 to 1938, German foreign trade flourished under an intricate system of barter and state control. Lastly, at the eighth annual Party Congress, held at Nuremberg in September, 1936, Hitler announced a Four-Year Plan for national self-sufficiency under the direction of Hermann Goering. This grandiose scheme called for an expansion of industry, agriculture, and raw material production to make Germany completely able to live on her own resources in the event of any future war and blockade.¹¹ All these activities meant work; work meant employment; Germany hummed with activity. In June, 1935, the need for workers was so great that compulsory labor service for youth of both sexes was decreed. By 1939 the rule was that every physically able boy or girl in his or her nineteenth year must spend six months in a labor camp.

Constitutional
reforms

Reordering the governmental structure of Germany was the second of the basic tasks undertaken by the Nazis. The reichstag, following a mysterious but probably incendiary fire which destroyed its building, on March 23, 1933, by a vote of 441 to 94 endowed the Hitler government with dictatorial power for four years. It has been justly remarked that this "Enabling Act became the legal base for all future political acts of the National Socialists." These powers were later extended to 1943. All authority in the state was thus concentrated in the hands of Hitler as the leader of the nation. There was no new and definite constitution. A so-called cabinet existed entirely

¹¹ The Four-Year Plan required stringent "co-operation" of labor and capital. The old-fashioned working of unions had been abolished as early as January, 1934, when strikes and similar phenomena had been outlawed. In 1938 universal labor conscription was decreed; henceforth every German worked where, when, and how precisely as the government ordered. The "Labor Front," claiming thirty million members, was entirely under Nazi control. No different was the lot of the businessman. He must performe submit to such controls as managed currency, state-credit, price stabilization, rationing of all raw materials, profit limitations, government priorities, and huge state cartels. All this meant state capitalism carried to the *nth* degree.

on Hitler's pleasure and was answerable only to him. The reichstag, itself purely a rubber-stamp body, met but fifteen times during the first seven years of the Nazi regime and invariably by "acclamation" approved Hitler's plans. Thus Germany became a totalitarian state.

Another phase of the same endeavor, and scarcely less significant, was the transformation of Germany from a federal into a centralized, unitary state. By decrees in March, 1933, and in January, 1934, the historic provinces of Germany—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, *et al.*—lost their identity so far as governmental subdivisions were concerned, and for them was substituted a new system of eleven *Länder*, or administrative districts not unlike the departments in France. Heads of the *Länder* were henceforth appointed from Berlin, and local and regional autonomy, always vigorous under the empire and the republic, were sharply curtailed. The upper house of parliament, which had given the states representation, was abolished. When new territories were annexed, they were organized under the same centralized, unitary pattern set up for Germany proper.

If these first two primary objectives of the Hitler government were thus quickly translated from theory to reality, no less speedily brought about was the third one: giving the Nazi system an undisputed and unchallengeable mastery of Germany. In April, 1933, the German Civil Service was "reformed" so that loyal Nazis were thereafter the sole beneficiaries of the government payroll. In June, 1933, the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda was set up under the direction of Paul Joseph Goebbels. This government division had extensive funds placed at its disposal and was given sweeping authority over the activities of the radio, the stage, the moving-picture, the newspapers and magazines, the fine arts, the church, and the schools throughout Germany. Euphemistically, its duties were termed the "co-ordinating" of Germany's cultural life.¹²

Party
reforms

Numerous other reforms followed. On July 14, 1933, there was enacted a law which further established Nazi political primacy by forbidding any other party even to exist in Germany.¹³ In April,

¹² Before 1933 Germany had no fewer than 4,703 newspapers of various kinds. The Goebbels control in six years eliminated more than 2,000 of these. In one week during February, 1939, were abolished three of the most famous papers of Germany: the *Berliner Tageblatt*, once the leading liberal organ of the country; the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, founded by Bismarck in 1848; and that historic newspaper of Austria the 236-year-old *Wiener Zeitung*.

¹³ By that time the Nazi party system comprised six structural groups: (1) the Hitler Youth, composed of young people from six to eighteen inclusive, organized into various age formations; (2) the National Socialist Students' Association; (3) the National Socialist Women's Organization; (4) the National Socialist Motor Corps; (5) the SA—"Storm Troopers"; and (6) the SS—"Elite Guards." Each group had its uniforms, badges, emblems, and other paraphernalia important in the symbolism of the party.

1933, the secret political police, *Gestapo*, was organized, and a year later placed under the supervision of Heinrich Himmler; under its direction were the notorious concentration camps, of which by 1939 there were at least twenty in Germany. In June, 1934, a "blood purge" of the Nazi party, expressly authorized by Hitler himself, removed many persons whose loyalty to the new regime was under suspicion. In September, 1935, the swastika flag was adopted officially as the national emblem of Germany. In 1936 the formidable "People's Court," the highest criminal court in Germany, was permanently constituted as a five-man tribunal, of which three members must be laymen appointed from the Nazi hierarchy. By that action the capstone was placed on the pyramid of Nazi power; henceforth, save for war or revolution, it was unchallengeable.

Social
regimen-
tation

The fourth phase of the Hitler system was a drastic regulation of the lives of individual German citizens. Stemming from the mystical concepts of the infallibility of the Führer and the racial superiority of the German people, the Nazi doctrinaires strove to build a disciplined and orderly state on the twin principles of blood and soil—*Blut und Boden*. In practice, this meant, first of all, a systematic and relentless program of anti-Semitism. The original disqualifications against the Jews were made in April, 1933, when it was ruled that only "Aryans" could hold public office and that any German must be deemed Jewish if one of his four grandparents had been a Jew. Discrimination became steadily more onerous. After January 1, 1936, no Jew was allowed to hold any public office in Germany. After January 1, 1938, no Jew was permitted to hold any position of leadership in any of the liberal and cultural professions. The "Nuremberg Laws" of September, 1935, deprived all Jews of German citizenship and political rights, and made sexual intercourse between Jews and "Aryans" a crime. In November, 1938, came an officially inspired orgy of pillage and massacre at the expense of the Jews, during which seventy thousand helpless people were thrown into concentration camps, and half of the Jewish property in Germany was confiscated by the state. After January 1, 1939, no Jew was permitted to operate any retail or wholesale business in Germany, and Jews were denied access to public relief funds of any sort. By these outrageous measures, the Jewish community in Germany was reduced to the pathetic condition of a medieval ghetto.¹⁴

¹⁴ In 1938 the Nazis issued a list of Jewish musicians whose work was forbidden in Germany: among those so prohibited were the non-Jewish Americans, John Alden Carpenter and Paul Whiteman! Also in 1938 the Nazis ordered that no Jewish names could thereafter be used by "Aryan" Germans: among those interdicted were Daniel, David, Joseph, Paul, Samuel, Abigail, Hannah, Judith, Rachel, Rebecca, and Sarah.

Another aspect of Nazi racialism was the conviction that the German people should produce a maximum number of healthy, "Aryan" children. Accordingly, on July 14, 1933, there was decreed a law to prevent the perpetuation of heritable diseases, by which human sterilization was authorized for nine causes. In August, 1933, the most elaborate system of marriage stimuli ever attempted by a European nation was initiated. Thanks to its results, the German birth rate, which in 1930 had been next to the lowest in Europe, was raised with amazing rapidity. Young people desiring to marry were subsidized by state loans, and the loan was completely remitted if four children were born. Parents of large families were given such favors as income-tax reductions, inheritance-tax exemptions, rent allowances, preference in public employment, special safeguards against discharge when employed, and other incentives for increasing the number of children in the family.

So far as the *Boden* or soil aspect of Nazi regulations was concerned, two principal developments may be noted. In the first place, as early as September 29, 1933, legislation designed to create a privileged, hereditary, farmer aristocracy was enacted. The legal status of the peasant was made superior to that of his city cousin, and a kind of entail system was set up to protect the rural landowner. Further to encourage the supposedly inherent "Aryan" love of the soil and of nature in general, elaborate arrangements were made by the Nazi state to give loyal party members and workers opportunities for travel to the country at minimum rates. This "Strength-Through-Joy" program in 1937 attracted no fewer than six million patrons. A sort of official "youth-hostel" activity, it offered Germans both young and old choices among two hundred and fifty domestic trips and fifteen sea voyages.¹⁵ Finally, there was the compulsory labor service already mentioned as being obligatory for German youth of both sexes, which resembled (in essential purposes and effects) the much more modest CCC program in the United States which, however, was completely voluntary.

By 1939 the Nazi regime had truly wrought a revolution in Germany. Had it been intended only as a national recovery program from the effects of the last war and the depression, some of its accomplishments would have been genuinely remarkable and possibly worthwhile. Unfortunately, as the events of international politics were to show, from 1933 onward the Nazi leaders were anticipating not the continuance of a domestic "New Deal" but the outbreak of the second World War.

"Aryan" decrees

Boden ideas

¹⁵ A fortnight's Norwegian cruise cost a "Strength-Through-Joy" patron \$16 in American money; a trip to the Canary Islands, \$27.

IV. THE LESSER WESTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN STATES

The orderly and peaceful progress of civilization in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, as sketched in a previous chapter, was considerably interrupted by the first World War. While none of these six countries save Belgium was directly involved, all of them suffered under the impact of the conflict. The mercantile marine of the Netherlands and of the Scandinavian states was seriously reduced by the U-boat campaign, and the standard of living in each was pinched by the rigors of the Allied blockade. After 1919, however, in each country there were effective revival and recovery, basically along lines already suggested by prewar developments.

Switzerland Switzerland, as the seat of the League of Nations, and itself virtually a league of races and languages,¹⁶ maintained itself with marked success. Continuing their traditional interest in direct popular government, the Swiss resorted to the device of a national initiative twenty-four times between 1918 and 1938. Despite heavy taxes for armaments rendered necessary by the ominous developments in the powerful states surrounding her, Switzerland passed through the era of the great depression in the early thirties as little affected as any European country. Optimistically, the twenty-two cantons made plans to celebrate the six hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Swiss independence in July, 1941. Justly it has been observed that Switzerland, in a world of confusion and uncertainty, still offered "a practical example of the way in which man may redeem himself from the curse of war, social strife, and racial bigotry."

Belgium Belgium and the Netherlands, particularly the former, felt an increasing anxiety over their future neutrality as the years slipped away. Like France, Belgium made a remarkable economic recovery from the ravages of the war years, and in the mid-twenties seemed as prosperous as it had been before 1914. In 1920 Belgium joined a military alliance with France; but in 1936, made anxious by the rearmament of Nazi Germany, and with the approval of France, it abrogated this agreement and declared that it would remain strictly neutral in any future quarrels among the great powers. The Flemish-Walloon friction persisted as before the war. Somewhat surprisingly, an indigenous Belgian Fascist movement appeared; calling itself "Rexist," it was organized in 1936 under the leadership of Leon de Grelle. Yet the Rexists achieved no real success, and in the general elections of 1939 won only four seats in the national parliament. An

¹⁶ In addition to the historic trilogy of official languages—German, French, and Italian—the Swiss in a national referendum in February, 1938, approved Romansch as a fourth national language.



TERRITORIAL CHANGES 1919 - 1924

- [Light Blue] AREAS CEDED BY GERMANY
- [Yellow] FORMER AREA OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
- [Pink] AREAS CEDED BY BULGARIA
- [White Box] AREAS DEMANDED FROM TURKEY BY TREATY OF SEVRES
BUT REGAINED BY TREATY OF LAUSANNE
- [Hatched] AREA SEIZED BY POLAND FROM LITHUANIA
(1920-1923)
- [Yellow] AREAS LOST BY RUSSIA



The
Netherlands

Scandi-
navian
states

earlier and similar movement in neighboring Holland led by Alfred Mussert had slightly greater success, polling in 1935 about ten per cent of the total national vote. After 1933, Belgium and the Netherlands increased their military expenditures and prepared what they fondly believed were invulnerable defenses against invasion. Officially, however, the governments of both countries, even in the event of war, hoped to maintain their neutrality.

The Scandinavian states continued as pioneers in socialized democracy. The Danes, termed by an admirer "the most mature and urbane people in Europe," built up their co-operatives until they had developed a prosperous foreign trade in dairy and agricultural products; sixty per cent of this business was with Great Britain, and twenty-five per cent with Germany. Believing that it would be hopeless to try to ward off attack by a major power, during the twenties the Danes virtually abandoned any pretense at military strength. Sweden, warned by the experiences of the years between 1914 and 1918, developed her agriculture to the point where she became self-sufficient in breadstuffs. Simultaneously, Swedish industry and manufacturing increased. In July, 1939, Sweden capped her noteworthy experiments in a democratic family and population policy by a law making it illegal to discharge any woman from work because of betrothal, marriage, or maternity. Norway, the heaviest neutral sufferer in the first World War, rebuilt its merchant marine until it was the fourth largest in the world, and revived the ancient trade of whaling to a new level of efficiency and profit. All three Scandinavian countries witnessed a true rise in real wages and a continuance of the influence of organized labor. In 1939 labor majorities in their respective parliaments governed all three countries.

V. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The kingdom of Spain followed a policy of discreet neutrality during the bitter years of the first World War. Although this position saved it from the devastation of actual conflict, nevertheless Spain was seriously affected by the currents of revolution and economic depression set so irresistibly in motion in many lands by the events of the years between 1914 and 1918. For example, the historic aspiration of the province of Catalonia for autonomy was stimulated by the popularity of the "self-determination-of-nations" slogan in the months after the armistice. Moreover, none of the chronic problems which had racked Spain in the years before 1914 had really been remedied. Political processes in the nation were still corrupt and venal. The masses of the people were still distressingly impoverished, and the privileged elements—Church, army, and landlords—in general showed

Unrest
in Spain

neither perception of the facts nor imagination leading toward a solution. The labor movement still manifested violence and irresponsible radicalism. The dreary war in Morocco which had dragged on intermittently for almost twenty years gave no signs of conclusion; indeed, in 1921, at Anual, an entire Spanish army of ten thousand men was massacred by the natives.

This example of the royal government's ineptitude precipitated a general demand for some kind of national housecleaning. Alfonso XIII, for the first time in his kingship actually dubious about monarchy's future in Spain, secretly connived in a scheme which he trusted would solve the difficulties into which Spanish parliamentary government had fallen. Acting according to a prearranged pattern, in September, 1923, a well-known general, Primo de Rivera, executed a military *coup d'état*, suspended the Spanish constitution of 1876, and announced that he would serve as the dictator of Spain, assisted by a cabinet of eight generals and one admiral. Well pleased by this "solution" of the political problem, the king gave Primo his blessing. Yet actually nothing had permanently been straightened out. The new dictator, freed from the restraints of ordinary constitutional government, in 1927 finally completed the "pacification" of Morocco. But despite superficial attempts to remove political, social, and economic abuses at home, Primo found that the net result of all his efforts was a steady growth of republicanism among the Spanish people.

The revolution of 1931
On January 30, 1930, therefore, having made again the old discovery that it is much easier to seize power than to handle it successfully, Primo resigned. His ineffectual successor as Spanish dictator in February, 1931, restored the constitution suspended eight years before, and permitted municipal and local elections to be held on April 12. To the consternation of the monarchists, these resulted almost everywhere in a republican landslide. The advocates of a Spanish republic thereupon openly threatened armed insurrection unless the king abdicated at once. Accordingly on April 14, 1931, Alfonso XIII left Spain, never again to set foot on its soil.¹⁷ The Spanish republican leader, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, now proclaimed a republic with himself as provisional president and announced that in June there would be elections for a constitutional convention to draw up a new fundamental order for Spain.

Spain's new constitution
On July 14 this body met. Composed of 470 delegates, only fourteen of whom had ever had any previous parliamentary experience, the convention represented twenty-five parties. The majority, however, were moderate republicans and socialists similar in views to the members of the British Labor party. Its accomplishment was the

¹⁷Alfonso died in exile in Rome early in 1941.

Spanish republican constitution formally promulgated on December 9, 1931. Based in varying proportions on the constitutions of the United States, Mexico, Germany, and Russia, the Spanish document broke sharply with national tradition. Equal direct suffrage, without distinction of sex, was provided for all persons over twenty-three. There was henceforth to be no state Church, and complete religious freedom was established. War was specifically renounced as an instrument of national policy. Autonomy was granted to such provinces as Catalonia. Free public education for all was declared to be a basic function of the state. Religious orders were made subject to dissolution. Titles of nobility were abolished. Marriage and divorce standards were liberalized. Natural resources and large estates were pronounced liable to nationalization if the state deemed it wise to take this step. An outline of elaborate social security for the working classes was indicated. The status of the army was reduced, and it was specifically decreed that the president might not be an army man, a clergyman, or a member of any royal family.

Scarcely had this advanced constitution been put into effect and Zamora elected as the first president of republican Spain than troubles of all kinds descended upon the new state. The pope strongly denounced the proposed separation of Church and state. In Spain itself, both Right and Left were wholly unreconciled to the republic. To the former, the constitution was outrageously drastic and smacked of Bolshevism. To the latter, both the document and the republican leaders were timid, ineffectual, and incapable of real revolution like that, for example, in Russia. In between, the great mass of the people, cognizant of the disorders and hostilities of both factions, grew more and more puzzled and confused as the years wore on. Many of the steps decreed by the constitution, such as land reform, social security, and public education, obviously would require time to complete, but popular impatience did not make allowance for this fact.

On February 16, 1936, the most crucial elections in the history of the Spanish Republic were held. On this occasion the voters were confronted with two political coalitions: (1) the "Popular Front," containing all those parties who believed in the republic and who desired it to advance on the road of popular democracy and gradual socialization; and (2) the conservative groups who either believed in making haste slowly, or disbelieved in the whole republican ideal. In this election the Popular Front won 258 out of the 473 seats in the national legislature. The new prime minister promptly announced a cabinet which he hoped would placate all parties. It was composed entirely of republicans; not one socialist, Communist, or syndicalist—the really radical elements—was included. Unhappily for Spain,

Difficulties
of the
republic

The
crisis
of 1936

neither political coalition was satisfied either with the outcome of the election or with the personnel of the new cabinet. The election of Manuel Azaña, a Popular Front leader, as president in May failed to calm the troubled waters which were rapidly rising.

Public disorders grew apace. The authorities tried to meet the imminent peril from the increasingly bitter conservatives by arresting hundreds of noisy agitators, by suppressing the Spanish Phalanx—a Fascist-minded organization modeled after the Nazi party in Germany—and by demoting, retiring, or transferring to remote posts all army officers suspected of lukewarmness to the republic. In vain were these steps taken. During June and July an outburst of assassinations on both sides in Madrid further excited public opinion. On the morning of July 17, 1936, an army clique in Spanish Morocco, rising in mutiny, proclaimed open rebellion against the government. Within a few days, the movement had spread to Spain proper. Soon it included most of the high officers in the army; three-fourths of the 120,000 regular soldiers of Spain; an overwhelming majority of the Roman Catholic clergy, the former noblemen, and great landowners; and the Fascist and royalist groups in general. From the beginning, also, the rebels were assisted by men, money, and munitions sent secretly from Germany and Italy, while the forces of the established republican government had to depend largely on their own resources, plus some foreign volunteers and a trickle of help from Russia.¹⁸

Like most civil conflicts, the Spanish struggle which lasted from July, 1936, to the victory of the rebels in April, 1939, was a savage one.¹⁹ The rebels found their chief leader in one of the mutinous generals, Francisco Franco. The republican government had a succession of politicians and military men at the helm, of whom perhaps the most talented were Dr. Juan Negrín and General José Miaja. Thanks to their overwhelming superiority of material supplies, in the end the rebel forces led by Franco prevailed. In January, 1939, Barcelona, the most important industrial center of the republic, fell into Franco's hands; a few weeks later, partly by treachery, Madrid was likewise conquered; and in February most of the remaining

Outbreak
of civil
war

Ferocity
of the
struggle

¹⁸ The chief international aspects of the Spanish Civil War will be treated in the next chapter. Here it may be noted that everywhere people took sides violently. In the United States, the most passionate sympathies for each side were aroused, and American volunteers hastened to Spain. See R. L. Buell, "United States Neutrality in the Spanish Conflict," *Foreign Policy Report* November 15, 1937.

¹⁹ Both sides were guilty of many cruel and heartless deeds; perhaps the rebels had the worse record in this respect. Both used atrocity propaganda to arouse hatred for the other. Both used spies and secret agents to undermine the other's forces. In fact, the famous expression, "Fifth Column," meaning traitors, arose out of an event during the Spanish Civil War.

governmental forces fled into France.²⁰ Behind them they left a country whose national spirit and body had received grievous wounds. Estimates have placed Spanish dead on both sides during the civil war at over seven hundred thousand; figures on wounded and civilian casualties are not even calculable. Much of the Spanish transportation system was in ruins; twenty per cent of Spain's industry was a shambles; thousands of dwellings and public buildings were utterly destroyed. Worst of all, hatreds, bitter and consuming, tormented the enfeebled nation's spirit. It would take generations before the fury of the passions aroused by the frightful conflict would be submerged.

Costs of
the war

Franco set himself up as *El Caudillo*, or chief, in the new Spanish regime, and proceeded thoroughly to undo the republican constitution of 1931. The privileges of the Catholic Church were restored; the primacy of the army in national affairs was once more assured; and fears on the part of the baronial masters of the land that their estates would be expropriated were allayed. Catering to the policies of Hitler and Mussolini in foreign relations, Franco perhaps would have placed Spain at their side in the second World War. But the utter exhaustion of his country compelled him to hesitate. Meantime, he strove to create a one-party state by seeking to amalgamate the two basic reactionary forces of the nation: the Spanish Phalanx, which was nationalist, imperialist, racial, anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, and anti-liberal in character; and the Carlists, who wanted an absolute king dominated not by a totalitarian party, but by the Church.

The Franco
regime

Portugal, like her larger sister in the Iberian peninsula, was the scene of unrest and confusion in the years immediately following the first World War. Assassinations were frequent; there were hundreds of bomb outrages; political activity was disorderly and bewildering. On May 27, 1926, a triumvirate of army officers led a movement which without firing a shot and in less than a week—what a contrast with Spain!—completely overthrew the corrupt republican regime and ostensibly inaugurated a temporary military dictatorship. In the spring of 1928 they placed in the Finance Ministry a professor of economics in one of Portugal's universities, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar proved unexpectedly adept at administration and fertile in devising new ways to stimulate the nation's economic life. In 1932 he became head of the Portuguese state, and in 1933 carried through a constitutional revision which led to a

Portugal

²⁰ Over 350,000 Spanish refugees huddled in French confinement camps after this precipitate mass exodus. These unhappy people were another addition to the great tide of human exile and misery which the policies of various countries in Europe produced during the years from 1914-1939. The refugee tragedy in its worldwide aspects, but including the specific Spanish situation, is discussed by Sir J. H. Simpson, *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey*, London, 1939.

modified form of Fascism in Portugal. By a curious compromise between the institutions of democracy and the techniques of a totalitarian state, Salazar brought a kind of order and prosperity to his country, which he was always scrupulously careful, however, to call the Portuguese Republic. Himself an honorable and able man without imperial and warlike ambitions, Salazar, at least for a time, gave Portugal a government satisfactory to the majority of its people.

VI. ITALY

The kingdom of Italy emerged from the first World War and the Peace of Paris with its people generally moody and restless. The war had cost Italy far more in life and in property than its enthusiastic advocates in 1915 had ever contemplated, and it had brought far less in the way of territorial gains than had been expected. Owing largely to President Wilson's insistence that the peace should be made on the basis of the Fourteen Points rather than on the premises of the secret diplomatic agreements of the Allies earlier in the war, Italy did not achieve its expansionist ambitions in Albania, in Dalmatia, in the Near East, or in Africa. Despite the bizarre episode in September, 1919, of the Italian poet, d'Annunzio, and his "attack" on the city of Fiume—assigned tentatively to Yugoslavia by the Peace Conference—there was little that Italy could do but accept the behest of the Paris peacemakers and try to make the best of the modest territorial gains, chiefly along the old Austrian frontier of 1914, which had been given to it.

The national resentment over this treatment of Italian imperial ambitions was not soothed by the precarious internal situation which developed in Italy during the postwar years. As in all other countries, the effort to return to normal conditions was extremely difficult, involving many complex readjustments. Italian domestic problems included:

A discredited parliament which had not willed the war, which for fear of dangerous controversy had seldom met during its course, and which, during its aftermath, devised no constructive policies, supported no reliable government, but overthrew five almost equally weak cabinets in the space of four years; fluctuating and unsuccessful foreign policies, which disappointed the hopes of the victorious Italian people and lessened the prestige of their country abroad; feeble financial policies which in spite of increasing taxation, led to excessive indebtedness and to monetary inflation; a disillusioned, disgruntled, revolted people, who displayed their contempt for all authority, occupying factories and multiplying strikes even in the essential public services.²¹

²¹ W. E. Rappard, *The Crisis of Democracy*, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. 136.

Italian restlessness after 1919

Domestic difficulties

Small wonder that thousands of businessmen, intellectuals, ex-soldiers, ambitious young people, and property owners longed for economic stability, social equilibrium, and political calm.

This unhappy situation, similar to that which developed in Germany a few years later, was met by an Italian movement which anticipated the Nazi party. What Adolf Hitler later became to the German movement, Benito Mussolini was to its Italian counterpart. Like Hitler, Mussolini was an ex-soldier;²² like him, too, he was a remarkably successful popular orator. His career in the years before the war has been touched upon in a previous chapter. Since November 15, 1914, he had been the publisher of a newspaper in Milan, *Popolo d'Italia*—subsidized in the beginning by French funds to stimulate Italian belligerency in the first World War. On March 23, 1919, Mussolini founded what soon became the Italian Fascist party and provided for it an ambitious program bristling with praise of the war and announcing a series of radical social, political, and economic demands.²³ Later that year he supported d'Annunzio's movement in Fiume, drawing from it the black shirt, the salute, and the hymn which later became inseparably associated with Fascism.

Completely defeated in the elections of 1919, however, Mussolini decided to tone down his platform. Eliminating the radical aspects of his demands, and now posing as an anti-Communist champion, Mussolini's Fascist organization in the elections of May, 1921, won 35 seats in the national chamber of deputies. He himself was one of the new legislators, but his faction was still only an intransigent minority among the 535 members in the lower house of parliament. Consequently, he made additional revisions in his party platform and organization. Abandoning his former adherence to republicanism, he now pledged his allegiance to the monarchical form of government and to the royal house of Savoy.²⁴ Taking advantage of a cabinet crisis in the autumn of 1922 and greatly overworking the Communist bugaboo, Mussolini and his advisers—including many officers in the regular army and numerous business men—on October 30 staged a *coup d'état*, the so-called "March on Rome."²⁵ King Victor Em-

Origins
of Fascism

The coup
of October
30, 1922

²² Mussolini's undistinguished war record is amusingly summarized by George Seldes, *Sawdust Caesar*, London, 1936, pp. 52-59.

²³ It is an interesting fact that while Mussolini's party was in its infancy it almost chose for itself the name National Socialist. V. Poliakoff, *Europe in the Fourth Dimension*, London, 1939, p. 29.

²⁴ The organization of the Fascist party as set up in November, 1921, is given by Langsam, *op. cit.*, pp. 502-7.

²⁵ Mussolini, legend to the contrary, arrived in Rome on the morning of October 30, not at the head of an army, but in a sleeping car on the night train from Milan. He proceeded decorously by automobile to his interview with the king.

manuel perforce accepted the situation and appointed Mussolini the premier of Italy. Thereafter the Fascist leader's career was that of gradual accretions of power until he emerged as the full-fledged head—Il Duce—of a totalitarian state.

Mussolini's
technique

Mussolini began his regime with caution, but soon struck out more boldly. His first cabinet consisted of fourteen men, of whom only four were members of the Fascist party. On November 16, 1922, however, he demanded a free hand from the chamber of deputies for carrying out his rather vague program. Obediently his wishes were granted by a vote of 306 to 116. This was the legal basis, the "blank check," for all Mussolini's subsequent actions. There followed the rapid eclipse of liberal democracy in Italy. Steadily all non-Fascists were eliminated from the Civil Service and from any other positions of power. In the spring of 1924 a fearless Socialist deputy in the Italian parliament, Giacomo Matteoti, was brutally murdered; his Fascist assailants, though apprehended, were given only a farcical trial in 1926 and released. In 1926 a final effort on the part of Italian liberals took place in Milan, the so-called Convention for Democratic Control, presided over by Count Carlo Sforza, a former Italian foreign minister. It terminated when Sforza was assaulted on the street by a group of Fascist party members, and many members of the convention were thrown into prison.

After 1926 the Fascists were the only legal party in Italy. The parliament became little more than a sounding board for Mussolini. After various modifications in its structure, designed to weaken its power, the chamber of deputies on December 14, 1938, gracefully voted itself out of existence. The senate likewise proved docile. Since it was always an appointive body, it was soon packed by Mussolini with his supporters. A new body composed exclusively of party members and known as the Fascist Grand Council was organized on December 9, 1928, and rapidly superseded the national cabinet. A unitary state was created and all outward political opposition disappeared from the Italian scene.

The Fascist
ideology

In many ways, Italian Fascism was only a vast echo of Mussolini's own unstable and bellicose temperament. Il Duce never tired of expressing his fondness for violence, danger, force, and war. Probably much of this was rhetoric, but it was given official sanction by the actions of the state. In foreign affairs, as will be made more explicit in the next chapter, Mussolini consistently behaved with what might well be called the "Bad-Neighbor" policy. Greece, Albania, Ethiopia, France, and Spain were all to know the implications of this attitude. At home, by methods savoring of hooliganism and gang warfare, an extensive police network kept Italy docile, while exorbitant

taxes fed the war machine. "Believe, obey, fight," became the trilogy of Fascist virtues. In 1934, deliberately imitating Nazi Germany, Mussolini created a Ministry for Press and Propaganda, and placed it under the direction of his son-in-law, Count Nobile G. Ciano. In July, 1938, Mussolini inaugurated an anti-Semitic campaign against the tiny Jewish minority in Italy.

On the constructive side, three accomplishments of Italian Fascism may be mentioned: (1) socioeconomic legislation; (2) the Lateran Accord with the papacy; and (3) physical reconstruction.

Fascist socioeconomic legislation was extensive. In 1925 an organization entitled *Dopolavoro*, designed to encourage leisure-time activity, was created. The next year an elaborate program of marriage stimulants and bonuses for children was outlined. In 1926, likewise, a far-reaching youth organization was made effective, touching every Italian boy or girl from eight to eighteen. Schools were brought into line, and teachers and texts "co-ordinated" with the Fascist system. In 1926 and in 1927 the whole field of labor relations was covered by ambitious statutes, the upshot of which was that strikes and unions were outlawed, and "co-operation" between employer and employee was required. Old-age, disability, and sickness insurance were made even more comprehensive than heretofore. Finally, in 1934 a complex system of economic "corporations," twenty-two in all, was devised, which was henceforth to be the basis for the business life of Italy. These corporations, organized in every major field of economic activity, were given large powers in advising the government; arbitrating labor disputes; and planning and regulating production, distribution, and prices.²⁶

Socio-economic legislation

On February 11, 1929, after more than two years of preliminary negotiations, the papacy and the kingdom of Italy signed the Lateran Accord. It consisted of three documents: a political treaty, a concordat, and a financial convention. By the first, the pope officially recognized the kingdom of Italy with its capital in Rome, while the kingdom of Italy officially recognized the complete temporal and spiritual authority of the pope in his own state of Vatican City.²⁷

Relations with the papacy

²⁶ The laws establishing this "corporative" system, often called the greatest single accomplishment of Italian Fascism, are given by Langsam, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-34. The whole system is ridiculed by Gaetano Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, Viking Press, 1936, pp. 116-42. Salvemini is an Italian exile from Fascism. A slightly more favorable analysis is that by C. T. Schmidt, *The Corporate State in Action*, Oxford University Press, 1939.

²⁷ The smallest state in the world, Vatican City consists of slightly over 100 acres with perhaps 1,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, the pope is absolute monarch of this area. He issues his own passports, stamps, and coins. He has his own police force, his own radio broadcasting station, and his own daily newspaper, *Osservatore Romano*.

The concordat defined the future relations of the papacy and Italy. The Roman Catholic faith was established as the sole religion of the state. The state agreed to pay all clerical salaries, but the clerics must swear loyalty to the state so far as temporal affairs were concerned. Religious instruction was made compulsory in the schools, and the state agreed to modify some of its laws regarding marriage and divorce. By the financial agreement Italy promised to pay the papacy about ninety-two million dollars in full settlement for all damages caused by the destruction of the old papal temporal system in 1870-71. Thus terminated one of the historic controversies of modern Europe, and the popes henceforth felt free at last to emerge from their self-decreed seclusion in the Vatican. Nevertheless, the papacy and Italy were to have many differences of opinion after 1929, and the age-old friction between state and Church was not entirely eliminated.²⁸

Physical reconstruction

In matters of physical reconstruction within the country, Fascism accomplished a great deal. The cultivation of wheat, the basic grain of Italy, was stimulated by every device of agronomy and propaganda. Beginning in 1925, this effort continued until, in 1933, Italy for the first time in modern history was virtually self-sufficient in bread-stuffs. The effort then turned to oats, rice, and corn. Elaborate land-reclamation projects, particularly in the Pontine Marshes, were carried out and reforestation endeavors begun. A special resources-survey led to the discovery of new areas of mineral wealth. Transportation was improved by the building of new railroads and the repair of old ones. New motor highways were constructed, and airplane traffic encouraged. In the chief cities of the nation, notably in Rome, great public building projects were carried out, partly to glorify the Fascist regime directly, partly to extol it indirectly by the rebuilding of certain famous structures of antiquity. Much money was poured into colonial development, particularly after the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. Not to be wondered at, in view of all these expenditures, was a revision of Italian monetary values, somewhat similar to that undertaken in France. By decisions in 1927 the lira, which in 1914 had been worth about twenty cents, was reduced in value to a little more than five cents. Thus seventy-five per cent of Italy's internal debt was neatly wiped out.

Superficially, Italy seemed in 1939 stronger and more powerful than it had been when Fascism began twenty years before. Actually,

²⁸ For example, one of the last acts of Pius XI before his death in February, 1939, was a vigorous protest against the anti-Semitic policies of Fascism inaugurated in 1938. But, in the final week of December, 1939, Pius XII and the Italian monarch, Victor Emmanuel, mutually paid formal calls on each other, the first instance of such courtesies in the history of modern Italy.



THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE, 1935

Italy was a tired nation, poorly fitted for the ambitious role in international power politics which Il Duce desired it to play. Had Fascism been content with peaceful development, its future might have been promising. Otherwise, it was highly uncertain.

VII. THE DANUBIAN AND BALKAN STATES

In scarcely any portion of Europe was it more difficult to restore normal conditions than in the extensive area of the Danube river valley and the Balkan peninsula to the south. Several factors were responsible. In the first place, this was caused by the breakup of the old free-trade part of the Habsburg Monarchy which had bound fifty million people into some sort of economic unity. With the passing of that organism had come several antagonistic states, each with its own tariff system and nationalist policies. In the second place,

Danubian perplexities

throughout southeastern Europe there were minority disputes which proved absolutely insoluble. In the third place, the whole area seethed with violent controversies regarding the necessity or lack of necessity of treaty revision. The defeated powers, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, were eager to alter the territorial settlement of 1919; the victors, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the other Balkan countries were determined to keep what they had won. Finally, all the little states of southern and eastern Europe frequently found themselves pawns in the hands of the great powers, and the moves and gambits into which they were often forced were frequently not of their own choosing.

Austria in difficulties Austria, shrunken into territorial insignificance as a result of the treaty of Saint Germain, all through the 1920's desired union—*Anschluss*—with the German Republic. Much of its German-speaking population yearned for such an event; but this example of the much touted principle of "self-determination" was stubbornly denied by the former allies. During the first years after the war, Austria suffered from actual famine and from economic and financial dislocation. Like Germany, in 1923-24 Austria underwent a fantastic currency inflation that completely destroyed monetary values. Private philanthropy, notably that of the American Friends, helped to alleviate the conditions, and between 1922 and 1926 loans from the League of Nations totaling more than one hundred million dollars greatly assisted in the financial rehabilitation of the country. Nevertheless, unrest continued.

Austrian politics Three main parties developed, and extreme elements in each soon had their own special techniques of violence. These parties were the Christian Socialists, a mildly liberal group; the Social Democrats, or Marxian labor party; and the National Socialists, or Austrian Nazi party. In general the Christian Socialists were strongest in the rural areas and usually won the national elections. But the Social Democrats were all-powerful in the city of Vienna and made that place a laboratory for advanced experiments in public ownership. The Austrian Nazis were a hopeless minority until after Hitler's triumph in Germany in 1933.

Preliminary to Anschluss Following that event, however, the situation changed. While the Nazis clamored loudly for *Anschluss*, many other Austrians lost their interest in the idea. In February, 1934, the Christian Socialist chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss—"Millimetternich," his admirers called him—determined to crush the Marxian and the Nazi organizations in Austria. Hoping thereby to preserve his country's independence, by armed force Dollfuss sought to eradicate both rival parties as political entities. He succeeded, so far as the Social Democrats were

concerned. But the Austrian Nazis, supported from Berlin, resisted. In July, 1934, in an abortive Nazi *putsch*, Dollfuss was killed.²⁹ To avenge his murder, the government of his friend and successor as chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, arrested and executed a number of Austrian Nazis. For the moment Hitler did not interfere, for Mussolini gave evidence of approving the Schuschnigg position. Indeed, on July 11, 1936, Hitler gave Schuschnigg a written pledge of Austrian independence. But in February, 1938, the international weather vane pointed to Italo-German collaboration, and Hitler had his belated opportunity to make up for the failure of 1934.

Summoning Schuschnigg to his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden, Hitler informed him that Austria must accept Nazi principles and co-ordinate itself with Germany, or else the latter would annex her without further ado. Schuschnigg, who sincerely desired to maintain Austrian independence, wavered for a few weeks between compliance and refusal. Early in March he announced what apparently he hoped might be a middle way out of his dilemma: a national plebiscite for Sunday, March 13, at which time all voters past twenty-four might cast ballots on the question of whether they desired *Anschluss*. Hitler, doubting the outcome of the vote, two days before the scheduled plebiscite ordered the German army to occupy Austria and to arrest Schuschnigg. Favored by an exceptional "break" in the international situation, Hitler was successful in his plan. No power interfered; the occupation of the little Austrian republic was completed in one day; Hitler, who himself had been born in Austria, came to Vienna on March 13 and was wildly cheered by some elements in the population. On that same day Austria was legally absorbed into Germany, and on April 10, 1938, a Nazi-supervised plebiscite gave a 99.7 per cent vote in favor of the union with Germany. Henceforth, the history of Austria was that only of a province of the Third Reich.

Hungary during the first twelve months after the end of the war passed through a kaleidoscopic series of political changes. Between November, 1918, and March, 1919, a mildly liberal, provisional republican government led by Count Michael Károlyi was in power. After Károlyi's resignation, a Hungarian variant of Bolshevism under an ex-journalist named Béla Kun dominated the scene until August. Following indescribable confusion a counterrevolutionary movement led by monarchists and former aristocrats in February, 1920, resulted in the elevation of Nicholas Horthy, a former vice-admiral in the Austro-Hungarian navy, as "regent." Since the Allies forbade any restoration of the Habsburgs to the Hungarian throne and since appar-

Events of
March, 1938

Hungary
after 1919

²⁹ The official Austrian account of the death of Dollfuss is given in Langsam, *op. cit.*, pp. 705-13.

ently most of the Hungarians desired such an event, Horthy continued in his "regency" for more than twenty years. Under him Premier Stephen Bethlen held office from April, 1921, to August, 1931, until then the most prolonged premiership of any individual in postwar Europe.

Economic reconstruction

Hungarian problems after 1920 were basically two. First was the necessity for economic reconstruction. Like Austria, Hungary between 1924 and 1926 secured extensive financial help from the League of Nations in the form of loans aggregating more than fifty million dollars.³⁰ Owing to these aids, Hungarian finances were put in order, and the national budget temporarily was balanced. Little success, however, was achieved in the effort to bring agrarian reform to Hungary. The concentration of land ownership continued; in 1930 fewer than fifteen hundred persons owned a third of the arable lands of Hungary, while a third of the population owned no land at all. Any adjustment of this perennial problem, however, awaited extensive financial support from the government. Effective expropriations would require compensation, and penniless peasants needed working capital to cultivate any land which might have been given them. The exigencies of the world depression in the 1930's effectually prevented a realization of either of these prerequisites to land reform.

Treaty revision

The other basic problem of postwar Hungary was that of Habsburg restoration and treaty revision. Both of these were different facets of the same problem and resulted entirely from Hungarian defeat in the war. While talk of the return of a Habsburg monarch was chronic, actually after 1921 no serious attempts were made in this direction. Far different was the matter of treaty revision. Worldwide propaganda for a reconsideration of the terms of the treaty of Trianon was launched as early as 1921, and its intensity increased with every passing year. Hungarians maintained that justice would never prevail until they could recover areas taken from them in 1919 and given to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This determined national conviction inevitably led to a strengthening of ties with countries like Italy and Germany, which also had grievances against the settlement of 1919. Eventually it would place Hungary on the side of the Axis in the second World War.

Friendly relations with Germany

In 1927 an Italo-Hungarian treaty of friendship was signed, and one with Germany quickly followed. In the spring of 1938 Hungary, playing second fiddle to Nazi Germany, announced her repudiation of the disarmament provisions of the treaty of Trianon. A year later she followed German example further by enacting drastic anti-Semitic

³⁰ The popular and successful administrator of these loans was Jeremiah Smith Jr., a well-known American banker from Boston, Massachusetts.

legislation.³¹ With the award to Hungary of a portion of Czechoslovakia after the Munich affair in the autumn of 1938, Hungarian friendliness toward Germany increased.

Seemingly the strongest state that emerged from the debris of the former Austria-Hungary was Czechoslovakia, a republic made up of the five districts of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Ruthenia, and Slovakia. The work of its famous patriots, Masaryk and Benes, between 1914 and 1918 has already been described. Masaryk served the new republic as president until 1935,³² after which Benes took over that office. Befriended by the great Allied powers, possessing an excellently balanced industrial and agricultural economy, and backed by an intelligent and industrious populace, Czechoslovakia seemed the most fortunate of any of the postwar states of central Europe.

Aparances, however, were deceiving. The weakness that eventually destroyed the Czechoslovakian republic was the German minority along the southern, western, and northern frontiers of the state; other minorities existed also, but none of these would have proved serious had the German problem been solved. The Sudetes Germans—so-called because they lived principally on the slopes of the mountain range named Sudetes—in the end were incorrigible. Despite some appearance of co-operation with the government of President Masaryk in the late 1920's, the effects of the world economic depression and the rise of Hitler after 1933 nullified any halting steps toward good will that had been made. Looking more and more to Berlin and less and less to Prague for sympathy and support, the Sudetes Germans soon became a serious problem. In 1933 the Czechoslovak government dissolved some of the dissident German political parties, but in May, 1935, a new organization—the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*—led by a native Nazi named Konrad Henlein polled more votes than any other single party in Czechoslovakia. Control of the government, however, was retained by a coalition composed of all parties in the state except the Nazis.

In 1938 the crisis came to a head. Emboldened by the German success in destroying the independence of Austria during March, in

³¹ In the Hungarian parliament, during the debate ". . . a satirical three-clause amendment was moved by one of the Social Democrat deputies. The first clause prohibited Jews from betting unless they could prove from documents that their ancestors had done some betting before 1867. The second obliged every Jewish winner in a state lottery to give up his prize to a Christian whose number followed his. The third obliged any Jew playing cards with a non-Jew to deliver up his trumps to his opponent. The Vice-President chided the deputy for wasting the time of the House with such nonsense. 'This is no more nonsense,' was the reply, 'than the bill itself.' " Abram Sachar, *Sufferance Is the Badge*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1939, p. 263.

³² He died in his eighty-eighth year on September 14, 1937.

Czechoslovakia

Its strength

Its weakness

The crises
of 1938

April the Henlein party presented what virtually amounted to an ultimatum to the government at Prague, demanding complete autonomy for the Sudetes Germans. The Czechs rejected the demands, and a period of tension followed. On September 15, Henlein pulled the curtains for the final act by publicly insisting, for the first time, that Czechoslovakia permit the Sudetes Germans to be annexed to Germany. This would be equivalent to national suicide, and many Czechs desired to fight rather than see such an event transpire. Hitler threatened to go to war unless Henlein's requirements were met by October 1. In scenes of excitement and anxiety unparalleled since 1914, representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy met in Munich on September 29 and counseled President Beneš to yield to Hitler's and Henlein's demands.

Collapse of
Czechoslovakia

With bitterness of spirit, the men at Prague followed this advice. Without firing a shot, between October 1 and October 7 Hitler took over the Sudetenland. Amid great enthusiasm on the part of Henlein's supporters, Hitler visited the new accessions and proclaimed them an integral part of Nazi Germany. They embraced almost twelve thousand square miles of the richest industrial areas of Czechoslovakia, including valuable mines and the great manufacturing center of Pilsen. German exultation was matched by Czech gloom. Having lost such important regions to Germany, almost indifferently the Czechs handed over additional border areas to Poland and Hungary. The government at Prague was reorganized after the resignation of President Beneš on October 5. Men sympathetic with the Nazis, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist in outlook, assumed the reins of power. A wide degree of autonomy was granted to the Slovak sections of the shattered republic. At best, it was but a wraith of the state it had been only a few years before. Even this much was not suffered long to remain. Despite his asseverations the previous autumn that he had no further territorial ambitions in connection with his Czechoslovak neighbor, on March 15, 1939, following his Austrian precedent of a year before, Hitler ordered the army to take over the rump state. With Prague in German hands, another independent nation had disappeared from the map of Europe.

Romania
after 1919

Romania emerged from the war the major Balkan state. Its territory was doubled by accessions from the defunct empires of the Habsburgs and the tsars—Transylvania from Austria-Hungary, Bessarabia from Russia—and its population had tripled. Its resources covered three of the basic needs of modern life: extensive oil fields, great lumber reserves, and fertile wheat lands. Yet Romania was still ". . . the Mexico of the Balkans, a beautiful country . . . torn asunder by revolt and reaction." Much of its arable land still re-

mained in the hands of the *boyars*, and no effort to dislodge them was completely successful in the years after 1919. Public affairs, including the personal life of the monarch, King Carol, after his return to power in 1930, were shamelessly corrupt. Minority problems were chronically vexing and totally unsolved. In 1928, Dr. Julius Maniu took office as premier in a government from which much in the way of liberalism and reform was hoped. But the impact of the world depression in the following years, and the rise of a local variant of Nazism, the so-called Iron Guard, nullified these expectations. Anti-Semitism was revived in Romanian politics in the 1930's, and assassination and violence grew ever more common in public life.

In March, 1938, King Carol strove to cut the Gordian knot entangling the successive ministries which governed the country by making himself an avowed dictator and suppressing any and all groups that disagreed with him. This temporarily put the lid on the fire, but underneath the embers still burned. As Germany became stronger and the significance of the fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia more obvious, Romania drifted steadily into the Nazi orbit. In April, 1939, it signed a trade treaty with Germany that in effect rendered Romania an economic dependency of the Third Reich.

Closer relations with Germany

No less difficult than Romania's were the postwar problems of Bulgaria. Like its defeated allies in the first World War, Bulgaria had to seek financial assistance from the League of Nations between 1928 and 1930. Like them, too, Bulgaria craved revision of the territorial terms of the peace treaties, particularly those clauses which denied Bulgaria access to the Aegean Sea. Despite some promising agrarian reforms carried through by a peasants' party headed by Alexander Stambulisky shortly after the war, public life in Bulgaria was anything but stable. The king, Boris III, was popular, and most of the people industrious and orderly.³³ But the temper of the time and the examples of other and supposedly more "civilized" states could not be ignored. Assassinations often took the place of elections, and bombs replaced ballots on more than one occasion.

Bulgaria

The world economic depression bore heavily on Bulgaria and proved to be Germany's opportunity. Contracting to take all available surplus exports of tobacco, wheat, and dairy produce, by 1936 Germany controlled over sixty per cent of Bulgaria's export trade. This interlocking of the destinies of the two countries was paralleled by the development of the familiar mechanism of the totalitarian state

Drift toward Germany

³³ Boris belonged to the Wettin family, of which two other members were King Leopold III of Belgium and King George VI of Great Britain. A tabulation made in 1941 showed that there were then living 903 persons of royal blood in Europe. Of these the Wettin family furnished 97 members.

in Bulgaria. Political parties were largely abolished; the parliament rarely met; and a military clique under the direction of Boris governed the country. While the king nominally strove to avoid entangling foreign alliances, yet Bulgaria in the years just before 1939 witnessed the formation of native Nazi and Communist movements which had their ramifications in the propaganda offices of Berlin and Moscow.

Yugoslavia, the second largest of the Danubian states organized in 1919, had little peace or prosperity in the two following decades. An ill-assorted combination of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and various non-Slavic minority groups, Yugoslavia from the beginning was wracked by serious disputes regarding the nature of its political structure and the significance of its ethnic subdivisions. Speaking generally, the Serbs desired to make the new country a unitary state centering in the old Serbian capital at Belgrade; while the Slovenes and Croats strongly urged a loosely organized federal union with large autonomy for each constituent racial and geographical portion. Religious differences among Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Moslem complicated the situation. It was the recurrent problem of the reconciliation of "self-determination" with united action. Party politics from the start were less ideological than personal; and sectionalism was more real than class or economic differentiation.

Its political immaturity

The welter of confusion which was Yugoslavian public life—a confusion punctuated by riots, murders, assassinations—came to a head in the murder of dictatorial King Alexander I on October 9, 1934, while he was on a visit to Marseilles. Definitely involved in the regicide plot were Croat terrorists who desired autonomy at any price. The result was the introduction of a still greater degree of authoritarian government under a regency headed by the late king's cousin, Prince Paul. German economic influence increased until in 1938 Germany was taking almost fifty per cent of Yugoslavia's exports. Despite heavy debts and financial problems, Yugoslavia maintained the largest and most effective army of any Balkan power. On the whole, notwithstanding all their difficulties, Yugoslavs were convinced that their country was prepared to follow an independent course in the event of international complications.

Albania

The smallest of the Balkan states was Albania, which had known little but trouble since achieving its independence after the second Balkan War in 1913. In 1926 Italy signed the treaty of Tirana with Albania, making this petty Balkan country a thinly veiled protectorate. On September 1, 1928, a young Moslem chieftain named Ahmed Zogu, with the approval of the Italians, had himself proclaimed as King Zog I. In April, 1939, tiring of this puppet and imitating Hitler's

destruction of Czechoslovak independence, Mussolini ordered Italian troops into Albania and took the country over as an integral part of the Italian Empire.

In many respects Greece had approximately the same kind of development during the postwar years as that in her neighbor *Greece* states. A unique phase of Greek affairs came in connection with the settlement with Turkey in 1923 by which Greece had to surrender all her holdings on the Asiatic mainland and a portion of Thrace. As a part of the treaty *Greece* perforce agreed to a compulsory exchange of populations; all Greeks resident in Turkey had to leave that country; and all Turks resident in *Greece* were forced to do likewise. As a result of this unprecedented transaction, *Greece* lost almost half a million persons, but received in exchange twice as many. The lot of the refugees, violently uprooted from their homes, was wretched and called forth worldwide sympathy and help.

King George II, who had acceded to the throne in September, 1922, was deposed by the Greek parliament in March, 1924. A republic was proclaimed.³⁴ But in November, 1935, King George, who had never abdicated, was recalled to the Greek throne and the monarchy was officially restored. The following spring, General John Metaxas became the dominant figure in the Greek government. Despite the fact that he had only seven supporters among the three hundred members of parliament, on August 4, 1936, he induced King George to dissolve parliament and suspend the constitution. Shortly afterward, Metaxas reorganized his cabinet, taking the six most important posts for himself, abolished all political parties, abrogated civil liberties, created a secret police and concentration camps, and set up a rigorous censorship. Warning that Communism was a dire menace, he announced that parliamentary government was adjourned indefinitely. This neat *coup d'état* smacked in about equal proportions of Salazar in Portugal, Hitler in Germany, and Mussolini in Italy. In August, 1938, Metaxas, justifying his action by the merited claim that he "got things done," declared that he would serve as Greek premier for the rest of his life.³⁵ Soon after, he entered upon close trade relations with Germany and Italy as well as with his Balkan neighbors.

*Regime of
Metaxas*

After the two treaties, respectively of Sèvres in 1920 and Lausanne in 1923, Turkey retained only a foothold in Europe. Henceforth primarily an Asiatic state, Turkey still held, however, the vital water-

*Turkish
renaissance*

³⁴ This was largely the work of the most celebrated Greek politician of the twentieth century, Eleutherios Venizelos. A man ever to be reckoned with, Venizelos was always a power behind the scenes until his death early in 1936.

³⁵ Metaxas made good this declaration. He died in office in January, 1941.

Kemal and Inonü ways of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. This necessarily made its activities and policies of concern to its European neighbors. Accordingly its development between 1919 and 1939 may briefly be mentioned. Under the long presidency of Kemal Pasha,³⁶ the one-time "sick man of Europe" had a remarkable convalescence. Its indefatigable president pushed through a sweeping program of westernization and industrialization analogous to that undertaken in Japan fifty years before. The most drastic economic, sociological, legal, religious, political, and educational changes were put into effect, and the people had to like them. Notwithstanding the apparent precipitancy of their promulgation, these changes seemingly found rootage in the public mind, and certainly brought about a genuine improvement in the status of the ordinary person. In foreign affairs, as well as in domestic, Kemal Pasha was successful. In 1936 he persuaded the powers to permit Turkish fortification of the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and secured their approval for the termination of all foreign judicial rights in Turkey. His death in November, 1938, was followed by the accession to the presidency of Ismet Inonü, a devoted lieutenant who pledged a continuance of his great predecessor's policies.

VIII. RUSSIA AND THE BALTIc STATES

Bolshevik Russia On no European state did the postwar era bear more heavily than on the huge, former empire of the tsars. Following the separate peace with Germany, made at Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, Russia passed through three years of turmoil unparalleled even in its turbulent annals. Domestic dissension was combined with foreign war until at times it seemed questionable if anything save anarchy could result. Seeking to introduce at once a completely communistic system in every aspect of Russian life, the Bolshevik leaders ruthlessly "liquidated"—*i.e.*, killed—every opponent or critic upon whom their secret police organization could lay hands. Fully as efficient as its tsaristic predecessors, this sinister body, first known from its initials in Russian as the CHEKA, was replaced in 1922 by the OGPU; but regardless of its name, in the first years of the revolution it kept the "Red" cause from internal collapse. So far as foreign conflicts were concerned, Bolshevik forces, which early in 1919 were fighting on no fewer than fourteen fronts, were equally successful. Having repudiated all foreign

³⁶ Kemal Pasha, better known as Ataturk—the "Father of the Turks"—was a first World War general who had been chosen head of the Turkish Nationalist party in 1920. In the next three years he drove out the sultan, abolished the caliphate, fought and won a war with Greece, forced the Allies to approve the Lausanne revision of the first World War settlement with Turkey, wrote a republican constitution, and had himself elected as the first president of the new state.

debts and beaten back alien armies, by 1921 the Communists had prevailed and secured the mastery of Russia.

It was a strange philosophy and framework of government which had emerged from the bitter months of struggle since the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of November, 1917:

Philosophy
and
leaders

Among the many varieties of socialism, Marxian communism stands pre-eminent as an extraordinary fusion of German philosophy, French revolutionism, and British economics with social pathology, glorification of the proletariat, and a naive faith in human destiny. . . . It is an extraordinary combination of theory and practice, faith and works, by no means pure unbiased science, but rather an ideology or pseudoscience. It might even be called a religion, whereof the proletariat is its god, capitalism its devil, Marx and Engels its prophets, their writings its sacred books, the social revolution the end of the present world, and classless society the final millennium or heaven on earth.³⁷

Among the leaders both in the philosophical and political aspects of Russian Communism—a term synonymous with Bolshevism—were Lenin and Trotsky, already mentioned; Chicherin, the son of an old aristocratic family; Rykov, Lenin's secretary; Stalin, long-time agitator and editor; Zinoviev, an all-round expert at machine politics and "direct action"; and Bukharin, Lunacharsky, and Kamenev, intellectuals and doctrinaires. All these men without exception had won their spurs in the bitter school of exile and prison, and, once in the saddle, most of them rode without mercy or toleration.

Lenin, the chief among them, was perhaps the most balanced and cautious of all. As long as he lived—he died on January 21, 1924—³⁸ he was virtually a dictator in Russia, and his influence, particularly between 1921 and 1924, was in the direction of moderation. He was responsible for the so-called New Economic Policy, promulgated in March, 1921. Therein, Lenin admitted that the original surge of militant Communism had gone too far, and that for the national welfare there must now be a strategic retreat. Consequently there was inaugurated an era of state capitalism and a return to a limited amount of private ownership, especially in the cases of the peasants and small businessmen. Notwithstanding an extreme currency inflation, by the time of Lenin's death in 1924, the industrial life of Russia had almost attained the level of 1914. Also, the revolutionary political

Lenin and
the N.E.P.

³⁷ J. E. LeRossignol, *From Marx to Stalin: A Critique of Communism*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1940, pp. vii-viii.

³⁸ Lenin's body was embalmed and placed in a public mausoleum in "Red Square" at the heart of Moscow. In subsequent years it became a Communist shrine and was visited by millions of persons who gazed with varying emotions at the countenance of the dead leader.

reorganization of Russia was completed under the supervision of Lenin and his rising lieutenant, Stalin; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—the U.S.S.R.—was proclaimed on July 6, 1923.

This political system was a peculiar type of federal union embracing the entire area of European and Asiatic Russia. The basic unit of the U.S.S.R. was that institution called the "soviet," or council already mentioned. There was organized a hierarchy of these councils, some seventy thousand in all, including local soviets, township soviets, regional soviets, "national" soviets, and, capping the pyramid, the Congress of the Supreme Council of Soviets. Reorganized in minor ways at various times, especially by the new constitution for the U.S.S.R. promulgated on December 5, 1936, the Supreme Council of Soviets after this date was a bicameral legislature composed of the Council of Union with 569 deputies, and the Council of Nationalities with 574 deputies. All candidates for membership in these soviets were picked by the Communist party—the sole legal party in the U.S.S.R.

The Congress of the Supreme Council of Soviets met eleven times between 1923 and 1939.³⁹ Its function was that of discussing and criticizing specific governmental acts, but never policy as laid down by the Communist party. Its executive committee of 27 members, the so-called Presidium, was, in theory, the highest executive organ of the state. But all legislation approved by the Presidium and "passed" by the Supreme Council must first be drawn up and endorsed by the Communist party before ever being submitted to the representatives of the people.⁴⁰ Hence, they who controlled the party automatically dominated Russia.

After Lenin's death in 1924 a bitter struggle for party control broke out. Personal aspirations for power combined with theoretical differences to produce cleavages and intraparty rivalries which for the following fifteen years were passionate and divisive. Trotsky desired to abandon the New Economic Policy and return to the attempted complete communism of 1918 to 1921; Rykov wished to continue Lenin's system. Stalin, agreeing partially with Trotsky's ultimate aim,

³⁹ Of the 1,143 members of the Supreme Council in its session in May, 1939, 13 were under 20; 284 were under 30; 831 were under 40; and only 7 were over 60. There were 330 peasants; 465 workmen; 65 soldiers; 187 women. Out of the total, 870 were Communist party members; the others, having been selected by the Communist groups at home, were presumably "safe" delegates.

⁴⁰ As in all totalitarian states, membership in the master party was a high privilege. At no time in Communist-dominated Russia, a country of more than 170,000,000 people, did the Communist party itself number more than 3,000,000. In May, 1939, there were approximately 1,700,000 members, of whom the majority were under 40 years of age. This closely knit minority, organized in 130,000 "cells," was the sole group possessing real political power in the U.S.S.R.

theroughly disapproved of the latter's immediate program. After some years of desperate behind-the-scenes politics, Trotsky and Rykov were outmaneuvered. In December, 1927, Trotsky was expelled from the Communist party and in the next month exiled forever from the U.S.S.R.; Rykov was "promoted" into an innocuous office; and Joseph Stalin, as the secretary-general of the Communist party, emerged as the new strong man of Russia. Nevertheless, recriminations between "Stalinists" and "Trotskyites" continued without cessation until Trotsky's assassination in Mexico in the summer of 1940.

The evidence of Stalin's mastery of the U.S.S.R. came in the inauguration of the "Five-Year Plan," announced early in 1928, and placed in operation on October 1 of that year. It was an organized effort to bring back the communistic social order of the period before the New Economic Plan. According to its terms the State Planning Commission, the *Gosplan*, worked out estimates of the annual needs of Russia for the ensuing five years, and proposed to organize agriculture, industry, and transportation to meet those needs. On December 1, 1932, after slightly more than four years had passed, it was stated that the quotas and expectations had been met so satisfactorily that a new Five-Year Plan was in order. This second program, therefore, began on January 1, 1933, and in turn was succeeded by the third Five-Year Plan on January 1, 1938. Because it happened that the inauguration of this ambitious planned economy occurred at almost the same time as the great depression in the rest of the world, the Russian schemes had a tremendous appeal to perplexed and inquiring minds in other countries. Enthusiastic American and European visitors to Russia during the opening years of the planning programs came away convinced that the U.S.S.R. had begun something which must be widely imitated elsewhere.⁴¹

The
"Five-Year
plans"

Four results of these three Five-Year plans as they unfolded between 1928 and 1939 may be mentioned. In the first place, the better to render the U.S.S.R. self-sufficient in peace and in war, there was a large amount of new capital construction and rebuilding of industry. The Russians proved to be fond of bigness, and many huge enterprises, each touted as "the largest in the world," were launched. These included all varieties of heavy industry, power plants, mines, and the like. In 1938 it was reported that seventy-five per cent of Russian industrial production was coming from plants built or renovated since 1928. In the second place, there was a great increase in the number of trained Russian engineers made available for the

Their
results

⁴¹ Actually, the Russian planners drew heavily on American examples and precedents, particularly the industrial mobilization plans developed in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War in Washington in 1921.

needs of the U.S.S.R. During the opening years of the plans, most of the experts came from the United States or from western Europe. In 1933, for example, there were only six thousand graduates from technical schools in all Russia. But by 1938 the number of such graduates exceeded twenty-five thousand. In the third place, there was a general and real rise in productive output as compared with 1928. In some cases the increases were phenomenal; the production of that key material for modern war and peace needs, aluminum, rose from less than ten million pounds in 1928 to more than one hundred and ten million pounds a decade later.⁴²


In the fourth place, and perhaps as significant as any of the accomplishments, under the planning program a far-reaching geographical redistribution of industry was carried through. The object was the decentralization of Russian manufacturing and the shifting of the nation's industrial center of gravity far to the eastward, away from potential wars and invasions in the western part of the country. Stalin, ever interested in the affairs of Asiatic Russia, personally directed this phase of Soviet planning. Extensive new industrial establishments were located in the Urals, the chain of low mountains which marks the boundary between European and Asiatic Russia; among these were the Magnitogorsk iron and steel works, the Cheliabinsk tractor factory, the Berezniki chemical plant, and the Sverdlovsk farm-machinery factory. By 1939 Russian official figures showed that thirty-three per cent of the coal, power, and iron production and eighty per cent of the copper output in the U.S.S.R. were coming from points in or east of the Urals. Another striking evidence of this Russian decentralizing effort was the coal production of the Don Basin, located in the Ukraine. In 1928 this region produced forty million tons of coal, seventy-seven per cent of Russia's output for that year; a decade later, in 1938, its production of more than one hundred and thirty-two million tons was only sixty per cent of the national total.⁴³

Destruction
of the
kulaks

Bitter altercations about the efficiency of some phases of the three Five-Year plans and the continuance of the Stalin-Trotsky feud led to ruthless punishments of those who disagreed with the economic high command in Moscow. The peasants proved especially hard to convince. Delighted with the actual ownership of their farms, which

⁴² In the same year Germany produced about 500,000,000 pounds, leading the world, while the United States, the second largest producer, made more than 300,000,000 pounds.

⁴³ Significant as these figures are, it should be noted that when war broke out between Germany and Russia in 1941, seventy-five per cent of Russian man power, two-thirds of her heavy industry, and most of her oil production were still west of the Volga River.



INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

to them was the one real gain of the revolution, many of them—particularly the *kulaks* or more prosperous peasants—violently objected to the program of collective farms announced in 1930 as an integral part of the Five-Year Plan. Their opposition was overcome by drastic methods involving the outright execution of thousands of recalcitrants, and the methodical starvation of millions more, chiefly in the Ukraine during 1932-33. In 1938 some two hundred and forty-five thousand collective farms, owned by the state and farmed by hired hands, were producing more than ninety-five per cent of the Russian supply of grains and other foodstuffs. A stubborn individualist minority of perhaps two million peasant households was circumscribed by all

manner of regulations, and their lot was made as irksome as possible.

Parallel to the harsh treatment of the farmers who did not acknowledge the desirability of state planning, was the equally severe handling of military leaders and intellectuals in general who dared to differ with the policy. Between 1934 and 1938 there was a succession of "blood purges" and "treason trials," followed by executions or long prison terms, which astounded the outside world and severely shocked Russian public opinion. In three main trials in 1937 and 1938 no fewer than twenty-five of the highest leaders of the state were charged with treason; men like Bukharin and Rykov, who had been outstanding in the Communist party ever since the revolution in 1917, were included in the list of accused. All pleaded guilty, and eighteen were sentenced to be shot. Besides these famous personalities, thousands of lesser officials were reputedly "liquidated." The army as well as the civil service dwelt under the shadow of a reign of terror, and none, save Stalin, knew where the axe would strike next. Not until after the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938, when the specter of a general European war which might threaten Russia raised its head, did the purges cease.⁴⁴

A summary of the accomplishments of the Five-Year plans must be considered in the light of the entire system of Communist economy. Declaring that they wanted a "dictatorship of the proletariat," i.e., the working classes, the leaders decisively altered the traditional economic order in three respects. In the first place, the Russian state owned all the principal means of production. The national budget financed all new capital construction; the "profits" of industry went exclusively to the state. By an intricate technique of redistributing these "profits" among different plants—a kind of governmental subsidy—it was possible to maintain industrial establishments which from the orthodox point of view of business were invariably "in the red." In the second place, the Russian state monopolized all foreign trade, thereby preventing completely any influence of world prices upon internal prices. The basic monetary unit of the U.S.S.R., the ruble, was neither quoted on foreign exchanges, nor could it be exported or imported. In the third place, the Russian state planning authorities fixed the price of almost every economic good. If the fixed prices exceeded the cost of production, the excess went to the state; if not, the state made up the difference. The crucial matters of price fixation and distribution of profits were monopolized by the official

⁴⁴ One of the first tasks that the "purged" personnel of the civil service and the army undertook late in 1938 was the acceleration of construction on the so-called Stalin Line, a general defensive position long projected from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Black Sea.

oligarchy; they, therefore, automatically became the new privileged class of the Soviet state.

Such was the domestic economics of the great Communist experiment in national recovery. But from the beginning, the party leadership held tenaciously to the view that eventually the Communist movement by the logic of history must spread over the entire world; in the meantime, since this great event was signally slow in coming, historical inevitability must be assisted by a worldwide system of agitation and propaganda. In 1919, therefore, the Communist or "Third" International was formed. Purporting to be the lineal descendant of those earlier international associations of workingmen formed in 1864 and in 1889, the Third International claimed membership among radical-minded persons in all countries of the world—albeit an insignificant minority in most of them. Ostensibly an organization separate and distinct from the Soviet state itself—although the same individuals were often officers of each—the Third International held biennial congresses at Moscow, to which faithful Communists came from every quarter of the earth. At these gatherings funds were apportioned for propaganda and agitation in certain areas, and policies which all Communists were expected to follow, the so-called party line, were formulated.

During the years from 1921 to 1928, when the New Economic Policy was the vogue in Russia, the propaganda work of the Third International varied in its intensity. But between 1928 and 1935—incidentally, the worst years of the world depression—the Third International, by the promotion of civil strife wherever possible, sought to hasten the "inevitable" Communist world revolution. The one lasting consequence of this revolutionary effort was a marked increase in the rise of Fascism, which always posed as the sole alternative to revolutionary Communism. Alarmed by such a result, the Congress of the Third International in 1935 endorsed the so-called Popular-Front policy. This meant that world revolutionary aspirations were temporarily shelved to permit Communists in all countries to unite with liberal and mildly progressive groups seeking to stem the onrush of Fascism. This phase of the "party line" endured until the Russo-German alliance of August, 1939, required another *volte-face*.

Certain interesting parallels to techniques already described in Germany and Italy appeared in the totalitarian experiment of the U.S.S.R. The youth of Russia were reared strictly in the new faith, and by every device of organization, education, and propaganda assured that theirs was the perfect political and social system. The theory of the complete relativity of knowledge became manifest

Propaganda
for world
revolution

The shifting
"party line"

Totalitarian
techniques

by the insistence that only "Soviet" physics, mathematics, history, and the like could be taught in Russia; free thought and action were not achieved any more than in Fascist dictatorships. The nine thousand newspapers of the U.S.S.R. were strictly "co-ordinated" by an all-powerful censorship. The name of the newspaper with the largest circulation in Russia, *Pravda* in Moscow, meant "Truth," but the outside world often wondered if the choice of title had been fortunate.

Social conditions in the U.S.S.R. Marxian theory to the contrary, as Communism developed, the state did not "wither away," permitting society to become an orderly, anarchistic utopia. Actually, the Soviet state mechanism by 1939 was perhaps "the most elaborate and the most extensively proliferated of any on earth." Civil liberties, as in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, existed in Russia in theory only; and, as in those countries, exiles who could get free of their native land had a sorry tale to tell. The army was favored by the best food, the best living conditions, and the most satisfactory pay of any group in Russia. A compulsory-service law of August 15, 1930, made all Russian citizens, men and women alike, subject to military duty. Despite all protestations of abhorrence of capitalist industrial methods, the "speed-up" system was introduced into industry in 1935 by the so-called Stakhonov movement. Social service legislation brought many excellent reforms in medicine, hygiene, and public welfare, but few discriminating observers believed that the Russian accomplishment was superior to similar techniques in the non-Communist world. The U.S.S.R. maintained a contemptuous attitude toward all organized religion, grudgingly tolerating certain ecclesiastical services, but making clear the Communist party's own atheistic disdain for such activity. Some observers, however, as early as 1935 professed to see a weakening of this attitude and signs of a religious revival among the Russian masses.

The Baltic states Five Baltic states, carved wholly or in part from former territory of the Russian monarchy, appeared as new entities after 1919. Supported by the Allies, who regarded them as a "cordon sanitaire" against the presumed social and political infection of Communist Russia, they were from north to south: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Finland had a population of about four million people, and was a non-Slavic ethnic and linguistic group. Estonia, closely related by blood and language to Finland, had a population of slightly more than a million; Latvia and Lithuania, both Slavic nations, numbered approximately two million people each. Poland, by far the largest state of the five, had about twenty-two million persons in 1919. In all countries the great majority of the people were peasants, and to them the one abiding gain which inde-

pendence brought was the opportunity as free men to own their own land.

Finland, which had declared its independence in December, 1917, really established itself with a republican constitution proclaimed on July 17, 1919. Finnish development of all types of co-operatives, literacy, athletics, and modern industrial techniques, by 1939 had made that country a peer of the Scandinavian states in a high level of welfare for the average man. The three little republics south of the Gulf of Bothnia, on the other hand, did not enjoy any such rapid progress. They faced many vexing problems: agrarian reform; difficulties with minorities, particularly the Jews; matters of church and state; development of trade relations with the outside world; proximity to the U.S.S.R. and Bolshevik propaganda; and the establishment of a sound fiscal basis for their national existence. The effect of the world depression of the 1930's was too much for their infant democratic institutions, set up in the first flush of enthusiasm for democracy following the war. After 1934 the national parliaments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were frequently suspended, and for most of the years thereafter until 1939 the executive departments in all three countries were virtual dictatorships.

Finland

Estonia,
Latvia,
Lithuania

The Poles began their life as a restored nation determined to recover at least the boundaries the state had possessed in 1772 before the First Partition of Poland. So far as the Polish frontier toward Germany was concerned, this was relatively easy, for that country had perforce to submit to the dictates of the victors in the first World War. Considerable areas of eastern Germany were annexed outright or by plebiscites held under authority of the treaty of Versailles. By the same document there was provided for Poland a special outlet to the sea along the valley of the Vistula River with a port at the "Free City of Danzig." This naturally cut Germany into two pieces, East Prussia being separated from Germany proper. Along with the annexations, it was the source of unending friction between the two countries, friction which on September 1, 1939, precipitated the opening phase of the second World War. On its eastern borders Poland unsuccessfully sought to annex territory from the U.S.S.R. in 1920, but in the same year managed to seize the ancient city of Vilna from helpless Lithuania. The boundaries of Poland were not finally fixed until March, 1923, when the Conference of Ambassadors, representing five western powers, approved them as they then stood. Lithuania, however, believing itself defrauded by this action, continued to protest.

Poland

Polish public affairs never attained the stability which the peacemakers at Paris had fondly expected. The great pianist, Ignace Paderewski, served as the first premier of Poland; but he was temperamen-

The
Pilsudski
dictatorship

tally unsuited for the post and resigned in December, 1919.⁴⁵ Joseph Pilsudski acted as "chief of state" until 1922, when a nominally republican constitution modeled after that of France was put into effect. This document, in turn, was radically revised in the spring of 1935. Parties multiplied, as in France, and between 1922 and 1935 the Polish government had twenty-two ministries. The vacillations and hesitations of parliamentary democracy, so-called, angered Pilsudski, and in May, 1926, he staged a military *coup d'état*.⁴⁶ For nine years either as premier or minister of war, he held Poland in the hollow of his hand; at no time, however, technically did he abolish the framework of parliamentary government. Following his death in 1935 until Poland's destruction in 1939, trusted lieutenants continued the system of *quasi* dictatorship which he had devised.

Efforts at
economic
reform

On the economic side, there were many efforts to repair the terrible devastations of the first World War, whose eastern front had been largely located in Polish territory. But these most necessary endeavors were handicapped by the reluctance of the landed gentry—the *pans* and *szlachta*—to surrender their baronial privileges; by the huge annual military expenditures deemed essential for the defense of Poland's vulnerable boundaries; by the incessant friction between the Poles and their numerous subject peoples—Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians; and especially after February, 1937, by an official policy of anti-Semitism which struck directly at three million of the most industrious and economically productive people in Poland. Nevertheless, foreign loans and financial advice from abroad aided economic stabilization. Some industrial and transportation development took place. In particular, a new Polish seaport named Gdynia was built across the river from the Free City of Danzig, which until 1939 remained under the joint jurisdiction of the League of Nations and Poland.

Note

One of the interesting aspects of European history in the years from 1919 to 1939 was the number of its prominent people who had had previous personal contacts in the United States. The American experiences of the Irish DeValera, the French Clemenceau, the German Kapp, the

⁴⁵ Paderewski died in exile in the United States during the second World War, in July, 1941.

⁴⁶ Pilsudski, a life-long advocate of Polish independence, had always believed in "direct action." Arrested in 1887 for complicity in a plot to murder Tsar Alexander III of Russia—the same conspiracy for which Lenin's elder brother had been executed—Pilsudski was sent to Siberia for five years. In 1933, to show his personal esteem and to facilitate better Soviet-Polish relations, Joseph Stalin presented Pilsudski with the historic file of documents assembled by the secret police of imperial Russia in connection with this affair.

Czech Masaryk, the Russian Trotsky, have already been cited. The similar contacts of such major figures as Churchill of Great Britain—whose mother was an American—, Paderewski of Poland, and Nansen of Norway are obvious. Lesser-known examples of the same sort of intellectual cross-fertilization between Europe and the United States may briefly be mentioned.

Rudyard Kipling, whose death in 1936 closed the career of a man widely regarded as one of the great literary figures of British history, had lived near Brattleboro, Vermont, between 1892 and 1896, where he wrote some of his most popular works, the *Jungle Books* and *Captains Courageous*. In the late 1890's another British poet, John Masefield, spent two years in a carpet mill at Yonkers, New York. The well-loved King Albert of Belgium, who died in a mountain-climbing accident in 1934, thirty-five years earlier had learned railroading in the United States under the direction of that famous American "Empire Builder," James J. Hill. Ivar Kreuger, the Swedish financial magnate of the 1920's, often called the "match king," had lived in the United States at the turn of the century. Thomas Bata of Bohemia, in whose family shoemaking had been a craft for ten generations, came to Lynn, Massachusetts, in 1904 to study American methods of shoe manufacture. Back at home, especially after the creation of independent Czechoslovakia, he made the family industry at Zlin the largest shoe factory in Europe. Ramsay MacDonald's son, later a British cabinet minister in his own right, lived at Jane Addams' Hull House in Chicago for some time, studying American social service methods and ideals.

Karlis Ulmanis, a graduate of the University of Nebraska in the class of 1909, became the first prime minister of independent Latvia, and later its president and practical dictator. André Citroen, the "Henry Ford of France," studied the American automotive industry at first hand in 1912 and returned to introduce similar techniques in France. Gustav Stresemann visited the United States, also in 1912, and became acquainted with many Americans prominent in business and finance. Jean Sibelius, Finland's foremost musician, taught at the New England Conservatory in Boston, during 1914.

Significantly, most of these men with the experience of travel and observation of American society and culture were persons who strove sincerely for the establishment of peace and prosperity in Europe after 1919. They were additional evidence that if western civilization henceforth were to be successful in a true sense, it must be regarded as an interdependent entity rather than as a collection of mutually antagonistic states.

The Sword or the Spirit: International Relations (1919-1939)

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND ITS RELATED AGENCIES

JUST AS THE TWO DECADES following 1919 in the internal history of European states comprised a period of more or less painful attempts at domestic recovery, so also were international relations during the same years experimental in character. The chief laboratory for feeling out novel techniques and for trying new concepts in the relation of nations to each other was undoubtedly the League of Nations, with its headquarters at Geneva, Switzerland, and its affiliated agencies. These latter included numerous auxiliary and advisory committees created as part of the league machinery itself, and two major organizations which were largely independent of the league proper: the Permanent Court of International Justice, located at The Hague in the Netherlands; and the International Labor Organization, with headquarters at Geneva.

Establish-
ment of the
League of
Nations

In the discussion of the Peace of Paris the preparation of the Covenant of the League of Nations was set forth. It was shown that its composition was primarily the result of President Woodrow Wilson's insistence that the organization of some kind of international association of states was a *sine qua non* of Allied victory in the first World War. It was further explained how, again at Wilson's demand, the twenty-six articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations were made the first section of each one of the five treaties comprising the Peace of Paris. As soon as the Versailles treaty went into effect, the actual organization of the League of Nations began. The first meeting of the League Council took place in Paris on January 16, 1920,

and the original meeting of the Assembly occurred on November 15 of the same year in Geneva.¹

The structure of the League of Nations as it was developed after 1920 defies easy classification. Certainly it was no superstate, for nations joined voluntarily and withdrew from membership entirely on their own volition. Moreover, the League had little coercive power over its members, and what it did have in theory was whittled down in practice almost to the vanishing point. Likewise, the League had not an iota of territorial jurisdiction, always being the guest of the Swiss Confederation, and not until 1938 was it able to move into its own permanent quarters. Summarily speaking, one might say that the League was a worldwide association of national states for certain general purposes, chief among which, as stated in the Preamble to the Covenant itself, were: (1) the promotion of international co-operation; (2) the maintenance of international peace and security; and (3) the establishment of law and justice as the actual rule of international conduct. The seeds of these concepts had long been growing through such media as the Concert of Europe, the Hague Conferences, international arbitration, and American experiments like the "cooling-off" treaties negotiated by the United States in 1913.²

In order to promote its broad objectives, the Covenant provided three major instrumentalities: an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat. The Assembly was an annual conference of League members, in which no national delegation could have more than three representatives, and in which each member state had one vote. It controlled League finances,³ elected the majority of the Council, and afforded an annual opportunity for public discussion of League activities. The annual meeting of the Assembly in September was the high point of the League year. Before its sessions during the first fifteen years of League history appeared almost all the chief states-

Its
structure
and purpose

Its
organization:

Assembly

¹ The complete text of the Covenant of the League of Nations, with amendments, is given by W. C. Langsam, *Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since 1918*, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939, pp. 54-66.

² Perhaps the most satisfactory account of the genesis of the League of Nations is that by W. E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace Since the World War*, Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 6-60. Despite the refusal of the United States to join the League, a refusal which was a major factor in its eventual collapse, a large segment of American public opinion always remained deeply interested in it. Examples of this attitude are succinctly set forth in 33 documents, the first dated September 5, 1901, and the last March 13, 1941, assembled in *International Conciliation*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941, No. 371.

³ The finances of the League were prorated on the basis of the wealth of the individual member state. The total budget in 1937, including appropriations for the World Court and the I.L.O. was about \$10,000,000. The League buildings at Geneva, completed in 1938, cost \$6,000,000, of which one-third was donated by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

Council

men of Europe, among them MacDonald and Chamberlain of England, Briand of France, Stresemann of Germany, Litvinov of Russia.

The Council was an executive committee consisting of delegates from eight to fourteen member states—some “permanent,” others “non-permanent”—which met in regular session every four months, and in extra session at the call of the chairman.

Secretariat

The Secretariat was a permanent staff, a kind of international civil service, which at its maximum comprised about seven hundred workers of more than fifty nationalities. Divided into functional sections and internal services, its chief duties were research, the registering of treaties, secretarial assistance for all sessions of the League, follow-up and liaison work after meetings of the Assembly and Council, and public relations, including communiques, articles, pamphlets, films, lantern slides, and broadcasts from the League's own radio station at Geneva. The head of the Secretariat was the Secretary-General, the most important officer of the League; from 1920 to 1930 this official was Sir Eric Drummond, an Englishman; following him, until the eclipse of the League in 1940, was Joseph Avenol of France.

**Evolution
of League**

The League of Nations evolved noticeably during its few years of institutional vigor. Never intended as a rigid mechanism, but rather designed to be a flexible instrument for world co-operation, the League knew different emphases at different times. Included in the functions assigned to it by the Peace of Paris were certain tasks which it discharged well; included, also, were others, such as those suggested by Article 19 of the Covenant concerning the revision of the peace treaties, in which it unhappily failed. Although Germany was admitted to the League in 1926 and Russia in 1934, the victorious Allies of 1918, notably Great Britain and France, continued to dominate League affairs. This natural but unfortunate condition proved a serious detriment to the Geneva institution, especially in the 1930's.

**Major
accomplish-
ments**

Among the successful accomplishments of the League of Nations in its vital years were: (1) the post-1919 refugee work directed by Fridtjof Nansen; (2) an effective program of international health and control of epidemic disease; (3) efforts made to stamp out traffic in women and children, slavery, and the limitation of the manufacture of opium and other narcotic drugs; (4) financial assistance to such economically weakened states as Austria and Hungary; (5) the supervision of the “A,” “B,” and “C” mandates, former territories of the German and Turkish empires which had been taken from them after 1919, assigned by the Allies, and confirmed by the league, to various of its members as trustees; (6) the administration of such key points on the map of Europe as the Free City of Danzig and the Saar Valley, and the peaceful conduct in

the case of the Saar of a plebiscite in January, 1935, under which the natives voted to return to Germany; (7) the convocation of the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932; (8) the registry and publication of the texts of more than 4,100 international agreements; (9) supervision of the so-called minorities treaties already described; and (10) the settling of approximately thirty international controversies in several of which war was threatened. Among these last were the Italo-Greek clash over Corfu in 1923; the Greco-Bulgarian border dispute of 1925; the Colombia-Peru boundary clash of 1933; the Yugoslav-Hungarian tension at the time of King Alexander's murder in 1934; and the Franco-Turkish friction over the district of Alexandretta in 1938.

The Permanent Court of International Justice came into existence in September, 1921. Its organic statute was the work of a committee of ten international jurists, including Elihu Root of the United States. Drawing its financial support from the League, and securing its own members by joint action of the Assembly and Council, the World Court—to give it its popular name—was yet independent of the League in its work and jurisdiction. At the beginning of 1939 forty-nine nations had adhered to the World Court statute. Its headquarters was in the old "Peace Palace" at The Hague built before 1914 by Andrew Carnegie.

The
Permanent
Court of
International
Justice

The Permanent Court of International Justice consisted of fifteen full-time judges, elected for simultaneous terms of nine years each. Meeting in regular annual sessions, its jurisdiction covered only cases submitted by governments. These might be either matters of voluntary choice or those specifically provided for in some international treaty or convention. The court would give either a judgment or an advisory opinion, as the litigant might desire. During the years of its existence prior to the renewal of general warfare in 1939, the court rendered twenty-seven judgments and precisely the same number of advisory opinions. Approximately half of each of these, as in many cases passed upon by the United States Supreme Court, were "split decisions." This dissent, though scarcely surprising, was often cited by unfriendly critics as proof of the court's futility.⁴

Its
structure
and work

⁴ Between 1921 and 1939 four Americans sat on the bench of the Permanent Court of International Justice: John Bassett Moore, 1922-28; Charles Evans Hughes, 1928-30; Frank B. Kellogg, 1930-35; Manley O. Hudson, 1936-39. Despite the privilege of always having an American member on the Court, regardless of the acceptance by all nations which adhered to the Court's statute of a number of "reservations" desired by Americans, and notwithstanding the unanimous approval of every American President and Secretary of State after 1921, the United States Senate on January 29, 1935, by a vote seven short of the required two-thirds majority, rejected American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice.

**The
International
Labor
Organization**

The International Labor Organization was one of the most nearly original creations of the League of Nations system. Designed to recognize the growing importance of labor in the modern world and the need of a greater degree of social justice in human affairs, the International Labor Organization—better known as the I.L.O.—was created by a special committee at the Paris Peace Conference headed by Samuel Gompers, the veteran American labor leader. The results of this committee's endeavors became the so-called Charter of Labor. Like the Covenant of the League of Nations, this constitution for an international labor organization was incorporated bodily into the various peace treaties. Membership in the League of Nations automatically meant membership in the I.L.O., but nations not League members could also belong. Under this provision, although still refusing to participate in the work of the League of Nations proper or in the World Court, the United States joined the I.L.O. on August 20, 1934.

**Structure
and
leaders**

The I.L.O. had sixty-one members in 1939. Its structure, independent of that of the League of Nations, was similar to it. As its deliberative organ, there was an annual General Conference, at which each member state was functionally represented by four delegates: two from the government itself, one from organized labor in that country, and one from the organized employers. All delegates voted as individuals, thus giving each state four votes. As its executive committee, the I.L.O. had a Governing Body of thirty-two members, meeting usually four times a year. As its civil service and permanent administrative organization, the I.L.O. had the International Labor Office headed by a Director appointed by the Governing Body. From the time it began functioning at its first meeting in Washington in October, 1919, to the outbreak of war in 1939, the I.L.O. had three directors: a Frenchman, Albert Thomas, until his death in 1932; an Englishman, Harold Butler, until his resignation in 1939; and an American, John G. Winant.⁵

**Purposes
and
accomplish-
ments**

Generally speaking, the I.L.O. had two basic purposes: (1) research and information; (2) the raising of labor standards by international agreement. To bring about the former, the I.L.O. established branch offices in Great Britain, France, the United States, China, Japan, and India, with national correspondents in eighteen other countries. To achieve the latter, the I.L.O. sought to win general acceptance of its nine basic principles⁶ through the ratification

⁵ Following the outbreak of war in 1939, Winant moved the headquarters of the I.L.O. to Montreal, where he continued to direct its affairs until his appointment as American ambassador to Great Britain in February, 1941.

⁶ Langsam, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

of international conventions by its constituent states. These covered a broad range of labor problems and were received by the member states with varying degrees of approval. By the end of 1940 there had been adopted by the Geneva Conference sixty-seven labor conventions, with a total of eight hundred and seventy-nine national ratifications, or approximately thirteen per convention. On the whole, this record was not so good as the enthusiasts for the I.L.O. had hoped, but neither was it entirely a record of failure.

The League of Nations system as sketched in the preceding paragraphs was a remarkable result of the Peace of Paris. That it was unable to prevent the outbreak of a new world conflict in the late 1930's must not be deemed proof of its uselessness. Boldly striking out into relatively untraveled areas of international relations, it perhaps sought to do too much too quickly. But like so many other experiments in human history, it taught lessons both negative and positive from which subsequent generations could derive profit. The secrets of its successes as well as the causes of its failures are now known to all students and need not be learned anew by the painful methods of trial and error. The successes of the League and its related instrumentalities have already been summarized. Viewed with the wisdom of hindsight, the reasons for its collapse were well set forth by the American acting-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in an address on July 22, 1941:

Why the
League
failed

The League of Nations . . . failed in part because of the blind selfishness of men here in the United States, as well as in other parts of the world; it failed because of its utilization by certain powers primarily to advance their own political and commercial ambitions; but it failed chiefly because it was forced to operate, by those who dominated its councils, as a means of maintaining the *status quo*. It was never enabled to operate as its chief spokesman had intended as an elastic and impartial instrument in bringing about peaceful and equitable adjustments between nations as time and circumstances proved necessary.

II. OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY AND MILITARY SECURITY

It was generally recognized by the leaders of the postwar world that one of the essential requirements for genuine peace was the speedy creation of economic stability. Involved in this necessary but intricate matter were three elements: (1) German reparations, (2) inter-Allied war debts, and (3) the restoration of international trade on as broad a basis as possible. In each of these three areas prerequisite for world economic stability there were promising initial moves during

the 1920's. The impact of the great economic depression of the 1930's, however, stultified most of them and turned what had once seemed to be a real advance toward a saner international order into a retreat to chaos and war.

It has already been suggested that under the terms of the Versailles treaty Germany was forced to promise full restitution for the civilian and pension costs of the first World War. Pending a complete requisition, the Germans were ordered to pay twenty billion marks. Not until May 5, 1921, did the Reparations Commission, composed of one representative each of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, present its final bill to the German Republic. It totaled the gigantic sum of one hundred and thirty-two billion marks or approximately thirty-three billion dollars. Contemplating this astronomic figure with anticipatory pleasure, the Allies had previously arranged to "cut the melon" along precise lines: France, for example, was to have fifty-two per cent of all German payments, while Great Britain was entitled only to twenty-two per cent. But no adequate consideration had been given to the matter of German capacity to pay or to methods by which such large sums as were demanded could be transferred across international boundaries.

Economically speaking, the result was inevitable. Early in 1922, claiming that it was impossible to meet the requirements, Germany requested a temporary moratorium on reparations payments; in the summer an extension on the moratorium was asked. Tempers on the Reparations Commission, already frayed by German unwillingness or inability to pay, snapped. By a vote of three to one—the British delegate dissenting—Germany was declared in voluntary default of her reparations account, and on January 10, 1923, French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany to secure satisfaction at the point of the bayonet. The sole results were passive German resistance on a major scale and a German inflation unprecedented in modern Europe.⁷ Eventually Germany suggested that a committee of international experts be appointed to study the entire reparations problem, and shortly afterwards France grudgingly yielded to this proposal. In January, 1924, the Dawes Committee—named for its chairman, Charles G. Dawes of the United States—composed of two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, began its work.

In September, 1924, its recommendations were put into effect and

⁷ In 1925 Germany "redeemed" its worthless paper money at the ratio of one trillion paper marks for one gold mark. This ratio of redemption may be compared with that in the U.S.S.R. just a year earlier of fifty billion paper rubles for one gold ruble.

for the five following years seemed to work well. Germany was required to pay about four hundred million dollars a year, but much of the payment could be in goods. Moreover, the Allies agreed to aid in the transfer of cash payments into their own currencies. Actually, during the life of the Dawes Plan the Germans borrowed more money from the outside world than they paid back as reparations. Of this outside borrowing upwards of fifty-five per cent came from American investors, who thus unwittingly were a major source of German payments to the Reparations Commission. In recognition of some of these defects, a supplementary program to the Dawes Plan was adopted in 1929. It had been prepared by another committee of experts, headed by Owen D. Young, also an American. The Young Plan fixed the terminal date for German reparation payments as 1988; it reduced the principal amount still due the Allies to eight billion dollars; it changed the reparations system so that payments in German goods were superseded entirely by money payments; and it created a "Bank for International Settlements" at Basel to facilitate the transfer of payments across international boundaries.

The "Dawes Plan"

Adopted in good faith, the Young Plan soon ran afoul of the problems created by the world economic depression. Just two years after its acceptance, the economic situation in Europe, particularly of overburdened Germany, had become so precarious that President Herbert Hoover of the United States suggested a one-year general moratorium on all intergovernmental debts. His suggestion was adopted by the powers, and at the end of June, 1931, reparations and war-debt payments ceased. Shortly before the expiration of the Hoover moratorium, a conference held at Lausanne to all intents and purposes brought the long reparations controversy to a practical conclusion. In April, 1930, the reparations burdens of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were also revised.

The "Young Plan"

Under the Lausanne agreement the reparations moratorium was to continue for three years. At the end of that period Germany was supposed to deposit in the Bank for International Settlements a bond issue of three billion marks. The scheme, however, was made conditional upon a reduction by the United States in its-war-debt demands. Since the American government refused even to consider this suggestion, at the end of the three-year extension of the moratorium the Young Plan technically went back into effect. It was a pure technicality, however, and on January 30, 1937, Chancellor Hitler announced that Germany would never issue the three billion marks of reparations bonds. Thus a unilateral declaration of the Nazi chief of state presumably ended the vexing reparations aftermath of the Peace of Paris. From 1919 to 1937 Germany paid perhaps five billion dollars.

The "Hoover moratorium"

The end of reparations

**Extent of
inter-Allied
war debts**

The inter-Allied debt problem was no less perplexing than that of reparations. According to official American statistics, on November 15, 1922, seventeen European countries owed the treasury of the United States over ten billion dollars, with interest to date in excess of one and one-half billion dollars. Thus the Allied obligations to the United States amounted to a grand total at that time of more than eleven and one-half billion dollars. Of this sum Great Britain owed approximately four billion dollars; France owed more than three billion dollars; and Italy owed upwards of one and one-half billion dollars. In addition to these enormous sums payable to the United States, many European countries were also heavily in debt to Great Britain, which, so far as Europe was concerned, was a net creditor power to the amount of seven and one-half billion dollars.

**American
insistence
upon full
payment**

On August 1, 1922, Great Britain offered to cancel all war debts and reparations owed to the British if the United States would likewise cancel the inter-Allied war debts owed to the American treasury. This suggestion the United States flatly refused, insisting that the American government expected full payment of its war loans. During subsequent years through a series of "funding agreements" the United States agreed to generous reductions in the interest rates on the debt,⁸ but at no time in 1922 or thereafter did the American government waive any part of the principal. Following the expiration of the Hoover moratorium in 1932, there was almost universal default among the European governmental debtors to the United States; Finland, the sole exception, although making no reduction in the principal sums due, continued to meet promptly its annual interest payments. In 1934, therefore, an irate American Congress passed the Johnson Act, forbidding further American loans to any nation in default on payments of previously contracted debts.⁹

**World trade
in the
doldrums**

If the problems of reparations and war debts after 1919 proved to be a definite brake on general economic recovery, so likewise did the tangled condition of world trade. Although the third of Wilson's Fourteen Points had definitely promised the removal "so far as possible, of all economic barriers and establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations . . ." this endeavor never attained anything like the success which its great protagonist had desired. The

⁸ Some of these reduced interest rates were: Great Britain, three and three-tenths per cent; France, one and six-tenths per cent; and Italy, four-tenths per cent.

⁹ This act, however, it should be noted, did not apply to loans made by a "public corporation created by or pursuant to special authorization of Congress, or a corporation in which the Government of the United States has or exercises a controlling interest . . ." Hence the Lend-Lease Act of March, 1941, did not require repeal of the earlier statute, since under its terms all loans to foreign states were made directly by the American government.

United States, in many respects a key nation, during the first years after the war made retrograde moves in the matter of ending trade restrictions. In 1922 and again in 1930 the Congress passed the highest tariffs in American history. Not until the adoption of the reciprocal trade-agreements program in the summer of 1934 did any official action of the United States recognize the vital relationship between international trade and world peace.

Even less success in encouraging world trade was attained by the European states. True, the League of Nations attempted with some effectiveness to maintain the "Open-Door" policy toward international trade with the "B" mandates—the former German-African colonies, except Southwest Africa. But in the great colonial empires proper, the opposite situation prevailed. Colonial trade was largely in the hands of the mother country. To many persons, and not alone Germans, this was a demonstration of the artificial nature of world trade, by which the "Haves" were favored over the "Have-Nots."¹⁰ A World Economic Conference, composed of delegates from sixty-seven nations assembled in London in June, 1933. In vain it wrestled with this particular problem, as it did with all others on its agenda. Late in July it adjourned, largely a failure. Similarly, several other efforts to facilitate international trade either amounted to little or were complete fiascoes. Among these were the abortive Austro-German customs union plan of 1931; economic ententes of the Danubian and Baltic states; the monetary agreement of September 25, 1936, among France, Great Britain, and the United States; and the report rendered by former premier of Belgium Paul van Zeeland in January, 1938. Meantime, the doctrines of economic nationalism and self-sufficiency, as expressed in the Five-Year plans of Bolshevik Russia and the Four-Year Plan of Germany, in themselves and by imitation were becoming the master pattern for European economy.

It is clear in retrospect that economic stability proved to be a will-of-the-wisp after 1919. Likewise elusive was military security. The 1920's opened with high hopes for general disarmament, or at least for effective international limitation of armaments. The military power of imperial Germany lay in ruins, and everywhere men of good will argued that this was a reason for others to reduce the burden of their own military costs. The first tangible steps were taken

Deadlock
between
"Haves"
and
"Have-nots"

Search for
military
security

¹⁰ This phraseology as applied to international relations was popularized by one of the American delegates to the Paris Conference, Edward M. House, in an article in *Liberty Magazine* for September 14, 1935. Referring to the uneven distribution of colonies among the great powers, House wrote: "Chaos and catastrophe will be upon us unless those that have among the Powers are willing to share in some way with those that have not."

Washington
Naval
Conference,
1921-22

by the United States. On November 11, 1921, there convened in Washington a naval disarmament conference whose conclusions were accepted by the five chief naval powers of the world: Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. It was agreed that all capital ships in the five navies—*i.e.*, vessels in excess of ten thousand tons—should be limited in total weight and in number according to the ratio of 5, 5, 3, 1.67, 1.67. The agreement was to remain in effect for fifteen years.

In 1927 at Geneva and in 1930 at London later naval conferences, called primarily to seek accord in limiting other than capital ships, were less successful. At the time it seemed to observers that a result of these three naval armaments-limitation gatherings was the prevention of a ruinous naval race between Great Britain and the United States, and the establishment of a better feeling between the naval officers of both countries. In 1934 the authorities in Tokyo gave notice that at the end of the fifteen-year period agreed upon by the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Japanese government would no longer consider itself bound by the limitations in that document. This necessitated another naval conference at London in 1935-36 which proved to be the epilogue in the postwar drama of naval limitations. By the summer of 1938 the situation was quite reversed, and the chief naval powers openly declared their intentions of building unlimited numbers of ships of a tonnage and gun power never hitherto approached. Less pretentious than the great international agreements cited was an Anglo-German naval-limitation treaty signed by the two countries in the spring of 1935. Four years later, however, Hitler denounced this document, and gave the signal for a new Anglo-German naval race.

Equally unhappy was the outcome of the efforts made by the League of Nations after 1925 for a comprehensive consideration of the general problem of disarmament. These efforts were required of the league by Article 8 of the Covenant. Involved in this endeavor were not merely matters of naval armament, but every other phase of the vast and complex question of national security. In December, 1925, the league set up a Preparatory Commission to study the whole problem of disarmament and work out the agenda for a world conference on the matter. Although not league members, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were represented in the personnel of the Preparatory Commission. After five years of laborious investigation, the group made its report, and a general disarmament conference was called to meet in Geneva early in 1932. As a token gesture of sympathy for the aims of the forthcoming conference, approximately fifty nations had agreed the previous November to an

League
efforts for
general
disarmament

armaments truce for one year. This pledge, itself a dead letter within twelve months, was destined to be the sole concrete result of the entire disarmament conference.

Opening in February, 1932, amid an atmosphere of great hope, representatives of sixty-one states being present, the conference soon bogged down into endless discussions on more than three hundred proposals which were submitted by the delegates. The basic trouble was Germany's claim to "equality" in armament. Since the other powers would not descend to her theoretically disarmed status, the Nazi leaders demanded the right to arm up to the level of their national peers. Unwilling to endure the tedious debates over this vital point, on October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from any further participation in the conference. Early in 1934 the gathering broke up; it did not officially adjourn, and in theory could still be called into session. Actually, it never convened again. Save for the preliminary truce, the exchange of views, and the perception of the almost insoluble difficulties involved in the matter, nothing had been accomplished. Thenceforth, rearmament was everywhere the watchword."¹¹

The fiasco
of the
World
Disarmament
Conference,
1932-34

Other developments in the struggle for peace and security from which much was expected but little actually achieved may be summarized briefly. In 1934 the American Senate and in 1935 the British parliament each independently undertook extensive investigations into the possible relationship between the private manufacture of arms and international war. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the findings were largely academic in their effect. In the United States, on the other hand, the results of the Senatorial investigation had some influence in the passage of the first American neutrality law of 1937. Another striking episode from which the friends of security drew hope was a special British ballot conducted by the British League of Nations Union in 1935. This unofficial organization succeeded in polling more than six million votes of Englishmen, the vast majority of whom expressed themselves as being heartily in favor of the League and its principles.

Munitions'
investiga-
tions

The traditional European dependence upon international alliances as a means to win security—a technique supposedly rendered unnecessary by the League of Nations—actually continued to be manifest throughout the post-1919 era. As the years went by, though, many

Alliances
among the
lesser
powers

¹¹ As evidences of this trend, consider the following: in May, 1935, Hitler announced general rearmament in Germany; in March, 1936, Germany occupied the neutralized zone along the Rhine; in February, 1937, Prime Minister Chamberlain initiated a seven and a half billion dollar armament program for Great Britain; in the same year Germany began her "West Wall," a rival to the Maginot Line; and in 1939 Great Britain took the unprecedented step of ordering national conscription in time of peace.

of the smaller states realized that unless their alliances included connections with a major power they were frail reeds upon which to lean. Thus the "Little Entente"—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania—which had been organized in 1920-21, lost its cohesiveness in the late 1930's. The same fate befell the "Balkan Entente," which in its heyday between 1930 and 1935 included five of the Balkan states. The countries of the Baltic area, and Scandinavia, were loosely organized as a neutral group, but none of them was optimistic about the future of this region in case of a major war. Belgium, which in 1920 had joined in a secret military alliance with France, in 1936, abandoned this scheme and returned to a policy of strict neutrality; the next spring Great Britain and France reluctantly gave their approval to Belgium's new status.

So far as the great powers were concerned, the situation with regard to security agreements was somewhat different. In the years after 1919 French statesmen wove an elaborate network of alliances with the states of eastern Europe.¹² On April 28, 1938, these were supplemented by a comprehensive military, naval, and air agreement with

France Great Britain. The latter country in 1937 and 1938 had sought to draw closer to Italy. But this effort was not fruitful enough. Following the German aggressions against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, Great Britain, traditionally aloof from formal relations with the nations of eastern Europe, sharply altered its policy. On March 31, 1939, the British pledged full support for Polish independence in any future contingency and on August 25 of that year signed with Poland a formal treaty to this effect. On April 13, 1939, identical Anglo-French declarations similar to the pledge to Poland were given to Greece and Romania. On May 12, the same procedure was followed with Turkey.

Great Britain In January, 1934, Nazi Germany entered into a ten-year-friendship agreement with Poland. In accordance with an "escape clause" in its text, however, Hitler repudiated this treaty in April, 1939. In July, 1936, came the signature of a German-Italian accord which later developed into the "Rome-Berlin Axis."¹³ On May 22, 1939, this ripened into a full-fledged military alliance. Late in 1936, Germany and Japan signed the "anti-Comintern" agreement, directed primarily against Russia; to this understanding Italy and Hungary

¹² In addition to the Belgian treaty already mentioned, among these French alliances were the Franco-Polish agreement of 1921, the Franco-Czechoslovak agreement of 1924, the Franco-Romanian treaty of 1926, the Franco-Yugoslav understanding of 1927, and the Franco-Russian treaty of 1935.

¹³ The phrase originated in a speech of Mussolini's on November 1, 1936: "This Rome-Berlin protocol is not a barrier. It is rather an axis around which all European states animated by a desire for peace may collaborate on troubles."

adhered before the outbreak of war in 1939. Toward Russia, despite successful Russo-German agreements signed by the German Republic and the U.S.S.R. in 1922, 1926, and 1929, the Nazi state was officially hostile until the summer of 1939. Then, in the final diplomatic maneuvers prior to the outbreak of the second World War, the Nazi leaders amazed the world by signing with the Russians on August 23 a ten-year treaty of friendship and economic collaboration.

With such an array of alliances and counteralliances, it is not surprising that by 1939 security, the object ostensibly sought by all these agreements, was farther away than ever; and peace, the goal for which every treaty was supposedly drafted, was scarcely more than a dream.

III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLEDGES AND PRIVATE PACIFISM

The accomplishments of the League-of-Nations system and the endeavors for general economic stability and military security which have been reviewed in the preceding pages were not the whole story of international relations after 1919. There were also a number of intergovernmental pledges which may best be described as promises for international good behavior. These were usually not implemented with any machinery, either that of the League of Nations or otherwise, for their enforcement. In retrospect, some of these high-sounding promises of the post-1919 era, soon to be torn to tatters by the passions of war, may seem almost pathetically idealistic. Nevertheless, like New Year's resolutions in an individual's life, they show truly the aspirations of the generation which made them. That they were not all attained is scarcely surprising; that they were made at all is, however, worthy of notice.

First of these great intergovernmental pledges were two treaties resulting from the Washington Naval Limitations Conference of 1921-22. Signed at that time was a four-power agreement by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan promising to respect the status quo with regard to all insular possessions in the western Pacific. Signed also at the same time was the "Nine-Power Treaty," participated in by all the major nations interested in China. This document made binding on all the signatories pledges to observe the principle of the Open Door in China; to respect Chinese administrative and territorial integrity; and not to seek any special imperial or economic privilege from the Chinese government. These two treaties of 1922 constituted not only an idealistic profession of good faith in future relations between the powers and China; they also marked the formal termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and the annulment of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement between the United States and Japan made in 1917.

The security
pledges of
1922

Locarno
Pact, 1925

The second in the series of international pledges of good behavior came in 1925, in the so-called Locarno Pact. Under the leadership of Austen Chamberlain of Great Britain, Aristide Briand of France, and Gustav Stresemann of Germany, solemn promises were mutually exchanged among the major states of Western Europe. There were three chief phases. To begin with, Germany signed arbitration conventions with four of her neighbors: Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Next, there was accepted a mutual guarantee of the Franco-German-Belgian frontier by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Any country which violated this promise understood that by the pledge the other four signatories were automatically bound to come to the aid of the victim of aggression. Finally, Germany was promised admission to the League of Nations. The good will generated by the "spirit of Locarno" lasted for several years and was at the time considered a milestone in the search for peace. But on March 7, 1936, Hitler renounced German obligations under its terms, and Locarno became only another aspiration that failed to be realized.

The
outlawry-
of-war
movement

The third of the great international pledges of the 1920's, and by far the most inclusive of all, was the agreement to "outlaw" war made in the "Treaty for the Renunciation of War," signed in Paris on August 27, 1928. The outlawry-of-war movement had originated in the mind of an American lawyer from Chicago, Salmon O. Levinson. In 1927, Levinson's trail crossed those of several other Americans, notably Nicholas Murray Butler and James T. Shotwell of Columbia University, and Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, who had been moving in the same direction. By private correspondence and personal friendships with various Europeans, particularly Briand of France, the somewhat vague notion of the outlawry of war was crystallized into a practical proposal. On April 6, 1927—the tenth anniversary of American entrance into the war—and again on June 27, the French government proposed to the United States that the two countries sign an agreement of perpetual friendship in which they would condemn recourse to war and renounce it forever as an instrument of their national policies toward each other.¹⁴

The
Kellogg-
Briand
treaty, 1928

Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg in replying to the proposal suggested to the French government that the treaty become multi-lateral instead of bilateral. Some months of negotiation followed, during which there was long discussion over the problem of "defen-

¹⁴ The success of the American aviator, Charles A. Lindbergh, in flying from New York to Paris in May, 1927, developed a wave of emotional good will between the two countries which greatly aided the negotiations for the outlawry-of-war treaty.

sive" as distinguished from aggressive wars. No power was willing to pledge itself to abstain from the former. In consequence, the final document—popularly called the Kellogg-Briand treaty—as agreed to at Paris in August, 1928, and signed at that time by representatives of fifteen states, was not really an instrument to outlaw all war. It was merely a pledge, perpetual in nature, not to use war as an instrument of national policy. The phrasing and meaning of the title were drawn from the famous volume by von Clausewitz, written almost a century earlier, entitled *Vom Kriege*. From the beginning this renunciation of force as a means of carrying on international relations was heavily qualified by the signatories' interpretations and reservations. Probably because of this flexibility in meaning, within a few years sixty-two countries had adhered to the treaty.

Despite the high hopes of its original protagonists, however, it soon became clear that the obligations a nation assumed under the treaty for the Renunciation of War could readily be side-stepped. In the first place, a nation could fight by not declaring war at all, but by merely insisting that it was embarking upon police or punitive measures to suppress disorder—a method observed in the Japanese argument in China in 1931, in the Italian contention in Ethiopia in 1935, and in the German aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1938. In the second place, even if a nation admittedly went to war, it could always cloak its aggression under the pretext of fighting in "self-defense," as was done in the Russian attack on Finland in 1939 and in the German war against Russia in 1941.¹⁵

In the years immediately following the treaty for the renunciation of war, which was at least a gesture toward the ideal of international peace and conciliation, there were several significant consequences. For one thing, in 1928 the League Assembly undertook to draft model treaties of arbitration which pairs or groups of states could adopt. By 1930 more than one hundred new bilateral and arbitration conventions had been registered at the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Geneva; approximately half of these were American bilateral arbitration or "cooling-off" treaties. Again, in 1929, the major states of Europe under the combined influence of the "spirit of Locarno" and the Kellogg-Briand treaty pledged themselves

Loopholes
in the
treaty

Hopeful
aftermath
of 1928

¹⁵ The problem of legally defining aggressive warfare thus raised by the Pact of 1928 had exercised men's minds ever since the Peace of Paris in 1919. In 1923 the "Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance" and in 1924 the "Geneva Protocol," both abortive efforts of the League of Nations, tried to define aggression. In 1933 the U.S.S.R. signed treaties with several of its neighbors which contained a five-point definition of an aggressor nation that has seemed generally acceptable to most students. For the text of these 1933 treaties, see A. B. Keith, ed., *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs, 1918-1937*, London, 1938, I, pp. 280-82.

never to use poison gas in any future military operations and a few years later accepted similarly drastic restrictions with regard to the illegal employment of submarines. Finally, in 1929, the time seemed propitious for the proposal of a scheme which French Foreign Minister Briand had long had in the back of his head: a United States of Europe. Supported by many intellectuals in various countries, in September, 1929, Briand secured permission from the Assembly of the League of Nations to sound out the European governments on their reactions to the plan. The investigation was made in the spring of 1930 and a preliminary report rendered to the Assembly that autumn. But the scheme was premature, and was finally shelved.¹⁶

The fourth of the great international pledges of good behavior in the postwar period, and on the whole the most successful of them, was the "Good-Neighbor" policy of the United States proclaimed by the incoming American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1933.¹⁷ At first deemed merely a felicitous phrase, the idea ripened into reality at the Seventh Inter-American Conference held at Montevideo in December, 1933. At this gathering over a hundred resolutions and recommendations were adopted. Among these the most significant were the pledge by all the twenty-one member republics never to resort to war as an instrument of international policy against each other,¹⁸ and the parallel pledge never to intervene in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The United States made genuine efforts to abide by these pledges and to convince the Latin-American states of its own sincerity. In 1934 the American marines long stationed in Haiti were withdrawn and in the same year the Platt Amendment concerning Cuba was abrogated. In 1936 a new treaty was negotiated with Panama which soothed that country's chronic irritation with the United States. In 1936 at the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, the Monroe Doctrine was partially "Pan-Americanized," and in 1938 at the Eighth Inter-American Conference at Lima, Peru, these principles were further elaborated and co-ordinated. When the second World War broke out a year later, the Western Hemisphere under the Good-Neighbor

¹⁶ Nevertheless, despite this failure of European *political union*, more than four hundred *scientific or intellectual* congresses were held or announced between 1930 and 1939. Linden A. Mander, *Foundations of Modern World Society*, Stanford University Press, 1941, pp. 535-40.

¹⁷ In the same year, as another gesture toward international amity, the Roosevelt administration formally accorded diplomatic recognition to the government of the U.S.S.R. After a lapse in such relations of more than sixteen years, on November 16, 1933, they were resumed.

¹⁸ These pledges were violated in the "Leticia dispute" between Peru and Colombia, not settled until 1934; the Paraguay-Bolivia conflict over the Gran Chaco, not terminated until 1938; and the Ecuador-Peru ouberak of 1941.

U. S. "Good-
Neighbor"
policy

aegis was politically more nearly united and co-operative than at any previous time in its history.

Such were some of the more important intergovernmental pledges of peace and good international behavior made during the two decades between 1919 and 1939. No less interesting during the same period were the efforts of private pacifism and the unofficial peace movement. Much of this endeavor as it existed before 1914 has already been summarized. In the postwar period it continued with even greater emphasis. Every one of its phases—international sports, world expositions, civic and technical group actions, intellectual co-operation, peace societies, business and labor organizations, international foundations and awards—flourished in the postwar years.

Among all these nongovernmental activities seeking a better and more stabilized world, however, perhaps the one which was relatively most vital was organized Christianity. Theologians like Nicholas Berdyaev of Russia, Karl Barth of Germany, Jacques Maritain of France, and Reinhold Niebuhr of the United States acquired international influence with their various emphases of the Christian ethic. Pope Pius XI (1922-39) issued thirty encyclicals on a wide range of subjects, of which international peace was one of the most frequently stressed. Catholic peace organizations were approved by the Church in all countries. Protestantism was equally active. In 1925 delegates from Christian churches in thirty-seven countries met in Stockholm, Sweden—the first worldwide Christian conference in almost sixteen hundred years. In 1937 great ecumenical conferences embracing every creed of Protestant faith were held in Oxford and Edinburgh, and in 1938 at Madras, India, and at Utrecht, Holland. All this effort was not wasted. When war came again in 1939, there were more people in all lands able and anxious seriously to ponder its causes and consequences than ever before.

Private pacifism

The influence of organized religion

IV. THE SWORD PREVAILS

September, 1929, was in many respects the “golden month” of the twenty years between the Peace of Paris and the outbreak of the second World War. The prestige of the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand treaties was untarnished. Germany was a loyal member of the League of Nations, and its Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, was a warm friend of the French leader, Aristide Briand. In September, 1929, the Young Plan for reparations payments went into effect, with general approval. In that same month, the new Prime Minister of Great Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, prepared to make a special trip to the United States to confer with the incoming American President,

The situation in 1929

Herbert Hoover, on matters of further naval disarmament and the implementation of the Kellogg-Briand treaty. It was in September, 1929, also, that Briand's proposal for the United States of Europe was made to a cheering Assembly session of the League of Nations. To many an optimist it seemed that the spirit of peace had at last come to rest among men and that the sword of war had been permanently sheathed.

Yet hardly had certain persons come to this hopeful conclusion than the atmosphere of international affairs began a subtle but increasingly rapid change which within precisely one decade was to bring the whole of European civilization to the catastrophe of a new World War. Two causes for this unhappy phenomenon may be mentioned. In the first place, some of the men most fitted to lead the world along peaceful lines, after 1929 rather suddenly passed from the scene, leaving their duties to less tractable and more aggressively nationalistic personalities. Stresemann died in October, 1929; Austen Chamberlain in Great Britain left office that same year; and Briand, retiring from his public duties in September, 1931, died the following March.

In the second place, and probably of greater significance, was the economic collapse which, beginning in the United States in October, 1929, shortly spread over all the economic activities of western civilization. The foliations of this depression, the worst of its kind in modern times, were intricate beyond brief summary. A few facts may be noted. The American adoption of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 caused thirty-three other countries to protest and take countermeasures of their own. Systems of quotas, licenses, exchange controls, and similar trade barriers became the regular policy of almost every state. By the end of 1931, nineteen nations, including Great Britain, were off the gold standard; three years later fifteen more had followed suit. Meantime, as already indicated, every effort to revive world trade proved futile; and even Great Britain abandoned its historic free-trade policy. With each such manifestation of economic nationalism, the possibility of a return to power politics became more real.

The first actual emergence of the sword came in the Far East. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese army without warning began to invade the three northeastern Chinese provinces collectively known as Manchuria; after slight resistance by Chinese forces, within three months the whole area of 382,000 square miles was in the hands of the Japanese. The culmination of a long series of frictions between the Japanese imperial government and the leadership of the Chinese

Republic, Japan's invasion of Manchuria was a direct repudiation of its pledges under the League-of-Nations system, the Nine-Power treaty of 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. In December, 1931, the League of Nations appointed a committee of five, under the chairmanship of the British Lord Lytton, to go to Manchuria and collect firsthand information on the points of view and contentions of both the Chinese and the Japanese governments. The Lytton Commission did not reach Tokyo until the end of February, 1932, by which time Japan had completed her conquest of Manchuria. In February, also, as a warning to China to accept the loss of Manchuria, Japan attacked the great central-seacoast city of Shanghai.

The United States did not wait for the completion of the Lytton Commission's work. On January 7, 1932, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson announced that the United States would not recognize any "situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris." This was the origin of the new American doctrine of "nonrecognition," a policy followed by the United States government toward the results of all international aggression thereafter. The Lytton Commission reported to the League Assembly in September, 1932, but its moral condemnation of Japan's action was only a tap on the wrist. No member state of the League, although fully admitting China's excellent legal case, cared to undertake either economic or military sanctions against the aggressive Japanese. Without such action Japan could not be forced into relinquishing its gains. In March, 1933, to show its contempt for the verdict of the Lytton Commission, Japan's delegates marched out of the Assembly hall, and Japan announced its secession from the League. Simultaneously the Japanese set up a puppet government in Manchuria under the leadership of Henry Pu-Yi, a pliable member of the former imperial Manchu family of China, and in September, 1932, "recognized" Pu-Yi's government as the "independent" state of Manchukuo.

The League had obviously failed in a clear-cut test of the very purpose of its existence; and the cause which it represented, collective security, received a blow from which it never subsequently recovered. Other ambitious and aggressive states were quick to draw deductions from the Manchurian affair. In January, 1933, as already indicated, Adolf Hitler took office as Chancellor of Germany, and Mussolini began the second decade of his power in Italy. The forthcoming collapse of the peace structure of Europe and of the world, caused almost entirely by the dictators' revival of power politics, was directly related to Japan's success in the seizure of Manchuria. That event

A rebuked
Japan
ignores
the League

Results of
League
failure

and the equivocal attitude of the other powers were the reagents which precipitated a vast reaction in the laboratory of international affairs. Ostensibly concluding that the League-of-Nations system, all international efforts at economic stability and disarmament, and the intergovernmental pledges of the nations were shams and frauds, Hitler and Mussolini—first separately, later jointly—determined to destroy every vestige of the status quo organized by the Peace of Paris. They hoped also to overturn the prevailing balance of power in Europe, humble France and Great Britain, and set up a new continental system of Italo-German hegemony which they believed was the proper “destiny” for their peoples.


Mussolini struck first. As early as 1933 he secretly ordered preparations for an attack on Ethiopia, if such a step were necessary for his proposed addition of that independent country to the Italian colonial empire. Despite the fact that Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations, and despite the signature in 1928 of an Italo-Ethiopian treaty of friendship and nonaggression, the Fascist government decided to seize this last but one of the independent native states of Africa.¹⁹ In December, 1934, a pretext was found in a border clash. After months of preparation, on October 3, 1935, a direct Italian attack on Ethiopia began. Sensing what was coming, the league powers during the preceding summer had made earnest efforts to induce Italy to withhold its aggressive moves. France, however, in the person of the Foreign Minister, Pierre Laval, was acutely fearful that, if the League pressed Italy too hard, it would drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler—a result which actually did occur a year later. Hence the French government throughout the Ethiopian affair played an equivocal role.

Nevertheless, the league acted at first with apparent decisiveness. On October 7, the Council affirmed that Italy was the aggressor and asked all league members to co-operate in economic sanctions against Mussolini's government. These sanctions included (1) an arms embargo; (2) refusal to extend any financial aid to Italy; (3) prohibition of all imports from Italy; (4) prohibition on the export of certain raw materials—not including oil—to Italy. For the first and only time in its history, acting under Article 16 of the Covenant, the League endeavored to put teeth into its disapprobation of aggressors. But appearances were deceptive. French acquiescence in sanctions was never more than halfhearted, and the British soon lost their enthusiasm for the penalty measures. In December certain members of the British

Fascist
attack on
Ethiopia

League
“sanctions”

¹⁹ The tiny negro republic of Liberia on the west coast of Africa, traditionally a ward of the United States, was the only other independent native state in the entire continent.



ETHIOPIA: ITALY'S OBJECTIVE IN 1935

(From Research Report, Foreign Policy Assn., September, 1935.)

and French governments secretly offered Mussolini, if he would call off his war against Ethiopia, approximately two-thirds of that unfortunate country whose entire integrity the League of Nations was vainly endeavoring to uphold.²⁰

When the news of this tentative "Hoare-Laval" plan prematurely leaked out, there was much popular indignation, especially in Great Britain, over the obvious hypocrisy of the arrangement. Although never put into effect, the harm done by its negotiation was irrevocable. Mussolini, more convinced than ever that collective security was a myth, ignored the offer and spurred his armies to the conquest of the whole of Ethiopia by the end of May, 1936. Before the Italian victory was complete, the helpless Ethiopian monarch, Haile Selassie, fled to Europe, and on May 9 the Italian king assumed the title of "Emperor of Ethiopia." In vain Haile Selassie went before the League

Italian
defiance
of League

²⁰ The text of this proposal is given by A. J. Toynbee, ed., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1935, London, 1936, II, pp. 295-96.

Assembly at Geneva to plead the cause of his country.²¹ Late in July, 1936, the League voted to abandon the effort at sanctions. A little over a year later, triumphant Italy showed its scorn of the League by following the precedent of Japan and Germany and resigning from membership therein.

But months before Italy's departure from the League, the peace structure of Europe had received other and irreparable shocks. On March 7, 1936, in the midst of the Ethiopian War, German armies moved into the demilitarized Rhine Valley zone. This area of some ninety-five hundred square miles in western Germany had been set aside by Articles 42-44 of the Versailles treaty as a permanently unfortified section where neither German armed forces nor defense works of any sort could be maintained. Germany's Versailles promise had been reaffirmed in the Locarno Pact of 1925. Not only were these pledges now nullified, but a few weeks later Hitler raised the term of German military service to two years; and in September, 1936, as already indicated, he announced the introduction of the "Four-Year Plan." The German chancellor's cynical assumption that the Manchurian and Ethiopian precedents would be followed by the powers in this instance, too, was justified by the events which followed. After expressing regret at the German action and viewing the future with alarm, the League and the powers individually accepted with reluctance another dictatorial *fait accompli*.

The possibilities in this technique of aggression seemed endless. It was worked with ever increasing frequency in the next few years. In July, 1936, as already described, the Spanish Civil War broke out. Flatly denying until it was all over that they rendered any official assistance to the forces of General Franco, the governments of Italy and Germany from the beginning sent the rebel leader immense quantities of war materials and many units of soldiers and aviators.²² France and Great Britain temporized during the whole course of the struggle. Reluctant to see the Spanish government forces win because of their collaboration with the U.S.S.R., and reluctant to see Franco win because of his admitted sympathies with the German and Italian dictators, the leaders in London and Paris pursued an extraordinary "fence-sitting" policy which was called "nonintervention." By this

²¹ Five years later, in May, 1941, as a result of Italian defeats in the second World War, Haile Selassie returned to his capital city of Addis Ababa, and assumed again his rule of Ethiopia.

²² In June, 1939, after the Spanish War was over, for the first time it was officially admitted in Rome and in Berlin that regular units of the armed forces of those countries had been participants in the Spanish struggle. The Spanish government had proved their participation years before; see *League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 165*, Geneva, 1937.

they meant that they would abstain from furnishing any help to either side in the Spanish war if other European powers would agree to do likewise. Berlin and Rome were profuse in their promises to this effect, but in practice paid not the slightest attention to their obligations. No wonder that the last premier of the Spanish Republic later wrote of the Nonintervention Agreement that it was a "monstrous and deliberate farce." After three years of ferocious struggle, as previously indicated, Franco won the war. He and his fellow dictators once again could laugh at the theory of collective security.

Encouraged by these evidences of international helplessness, in the summer of 1937 Japan made a renewed assault upon China. This long-distracted country had been passing through a genuine political and military renaissance under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, a young brother-in-law of the original protagonist of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen.²³ After years of study, the final draft constitution for the Republic of China was published on May 5, 1936. The Japanese became alarmed lest Chiang Kai-shek achieve a powerful national unity in China which might threaten Japanese predominance in eastern Asia. With calculating ruthlessness they determined to crush China before it was too late. Morally supported by the terms of the "anti-Comintern" pact of 1936 with Hitler, the Japanese military leaders on July 7, 1937, suddenly moved against the Chinese armies around Peking, and a few weeks later again attacked the great city of Shanghai.

This time it was no skirmish or short-run affair. On both sides it was realized that one side or the other must be decisively beaten. The Japanese scored tactical successes against the Chinese forces everywhere along the seacoast, and by the end of 1937 had driven the armies of Chiang Kai-shek far into the interior. But they could not deal a knockout blow. After two years of sanguinary and destructive warfare, the Japanese controlled most of coastal China. But the undaunted Chinese government established itself in the remote upper valley of the Yangtze, with its new capital at Chungking. Here, far beyond the reach of Japanese attack except through the air, Chiang Kai-shek prepared to maintain Chinese national life until the attrition of war and time should force the enemy to retreat to Japan. When the second World War began in September, 1939, it appeared that the Fabian tactics of the Chinese had for the first time since the unhappy

New Japanese assault on China

The indecisive Sino-Japanese War

²³ Chiang and Sun Yat-sen had married sisters. After Sun's death in 1925, leadership in his party, the Kuomintang, descended to his brother-in-law. In addition to Mme. Chiang and Mme. Sun, a third sister was Mme. H. H. Kung. Her husband, educated at Yale University, worked with the Harvard-trained T. V. Soong, a brother of the three sisters, to modernize China's money and banking.

resurgence of international violence in 1931 blunted the sword of an aggressor nation.

Nazi
aggression,
1938-39

But this miscarriage of dictatorial technique in Asia did not discourage its European exponents from further strokes. In March, 1938, as already stated, by threats of violence Hitler took over Austria and six months later did likewise with the Sudetes area of Czechoslovakia. In March and April, 1939, the Nazi power absorbed respectively the remnants of the Czech state and the Memel area of East Prussia which as a consequence of the peace settlement had come into the possession of Lithuania. In April, 1939, also, Mussolini annexed outright his vassal state of Albania. The sword of power politics was swinging more freely now, and the spirit of friendly international relations seemed more than ever a phantom. The remaining independent countries of Europe frantically sought to find protection in the accelerated armament programs and in the new political and military alliances previously summarized. In August, 1939, Hitler prepared to strike again. This time Poland was to be the victim. Demanding of that state that it immediately make sweeping concessions to Germany regarding the "Polish Corridor" and the Free City of Danzig, Hitler presumably was of the opinion that once more a bold German initiative would be followed by the familiar pattern of perfunctory protest and abject submission.

The Polish
crisis of
1939

Belatedly, however, the leaders of France and Great Britain had perceived the import of what had been happening in international relations since 1931. Gone now was the spirit of "appeasement"—the word made famous by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in a speech early in 1938.²⁴ Gone was the indifference to world affairs as a whole which had characterized British and French reactions to the Manchurian episode of 1931, the Ethiopian affair of 1935, and the Spanish Civil War. Gone was that state of mind in London and Paris which had tacitly condoned the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the forced *Anschluss* with Austria, and the Munich settlement. Gone even was the reluctant willingness to acquiesce in forcible changes of the map of Europe such as those executed by Hitler and Mussolini in the spring of 1939. Gone now was the one-time conviction widely held in high Anglo-French quarters that Nazi Germany with all its faults was preferable to Communist Russia. Gone was the theory that by yielding just once more Hitler could permanently be bought off. In the case of German designs on Poland, the British and French were resolved, if necessary, to oppose aggression by force.

²⁴ In justice to Chamberlain, it should be remembered that an influential and highly vocal section of the British public before 1939 thoroughly agreed with his views towards Germany.

On September 1, 1939, not getting any satisfaction from the Polish government in connection with his demands on that country, Hitler ordered the German army into action. Two days later, in pursuance of their newly adopted policy of actually carrying out a program of collective security in the face of international defiance of that principle, Great Britain and France declared themselves to be in a state of war with Germany.

After twenty years of uncertainty the sword had vanquished the ^{General war again} spirit.

The Second World War (1939-1941)

Nature of
the war

THE WAR which burst with unparalleled fury upon Europe on Friday, September 1, 1939, and which eventually engulfed large portions of the six continents and the seven seas may best be described by one all-inclusive adjective: total. In one sense it would be true to say, as Prime Minister Churchill told the house of commons on August 21, 1940: "This war is, in fact, only a continuation of the last." But in another sense it was a new kind of war, quantitatively and qualitatively, a struggle in which no element of the fighting populations could carry on "business as usual" and in which no sector of the belligerent nations was guaranteed freedom from attack. The most elaborately reported conflict in human history, the second World War had many ramifications and developments. In the present chapter, these will be considered from four perspectives: (1) the general characteristics of totalitarian warfare; (2) the first phase of the war in which Germany was uniformly victorious; (3) the second phase in which, despite victories on each side, the war was a deadlock; and (4) the third phase, initiated by American and Japanese entry into the world conflict and the events related thereto.

I. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TOTALITARIAN WARFARE

Totalitarian warfare threw out its foliations in four main areas: combat techniques, economic adjustments, social changes, and mass psychology. All these areas had been tentatively explored by the combatants of 1914-1918, but the difference between the developments of the earlier struggle and the analogous phenomena of the second World War was like the difference between a Model-T Ford and a streamlined automobile of the 1940's.

Combat techniques included enormous increases in the numbers and tactics of such machines as tanks and airplanes; an intensification

and refinement of the thrust and parry of submarine warfare; and the development of entirely new devices, such as parachute troops, magnetic mines, synthetic vitamins in army rations, dive bombers, torpedo planes, and the large-scale utilization of artificial rubber and gasoline. Those formidable machines called tanks which in the first World War had been employed in formations seldom numbering more than a few scores now were maneuvered in whole fleets of thousands at a time. The Germans, especially, had prepared their tank divisions on a scale and with a thoroughness unimagined in 1918. During the great campaign against France in the spring of 1940 the Nazi generals used forty-six thousand armored vehicles which, just previous to the break-through, had been echeloned to a depth of one hundred and twenty-five miles.

Similar was the expansion of air power. Germany began the conflict with a huge numerical plane superiority over any other enemy state or combination of enemy states, but slowly, as the war progressed, her rivals drew abreast. Airplanes were employed with ruthless energy by both belligerent camps, and the resulting destruction and losses in the rival air armies were enormous. In the first two years of the war there were approximately ten thousand German raids on British targets and six thousand British raids over Germany. Civilian casualties ran into the thousands in every belligerent country, and property damage from air attack in all the fighting nations to the beginning of 1942 was estimated at more than twenty billion dollars.¹ Elaborate antiaircraft defenses were worked out by each belligerent, and civilian air-raid precautions, such as nightly blackouts, became routine occurrences everywhere in Europe.

On the sea Germany began the conflict with a considerable number of submarines. Just as the efficiency of these craft had been improved since 1918, so had the detective devices by which they were apprehended. Although many U-boats were destroyed, it is probable that new construction in German shipyards filled the gaps so that after two years of sea war the German U-boat fleet was perhaps as large as ever. No nation's ships were spared. Great Britain took the heaviest punishment,² but neutral Sweden to the beginning of 1942 had lost more than one hundred ships, and even the United States, prior to its entrance into the war and despite stringent neutrality laws, had

New combat techniques:

Tanks

Air power

Sea warfare

¹ In a few hours during the Nazi attack of May, 1940, on Rotterdam, the chief seaport of Holland, that city had 30,000 civilian deaths, and lost 10,000 business structures along with 26,000 private houses.

² British losses were largely compensated for by new building and by the additions of the bulk of the mercantile fleets of such countries as Holland and Norway, which merged their ships with Britain's after the German attacks on those countries.

reported a loss of eleven vessels. As the war went on, other states than Germany developed effective underwater flotillas; for example, the British submarine fleet in 1941 in the Mediterranean alone was credited with the destruction of more than two hundred Italian ships. Apart from submarines, each side also had heavy losses in other types of war vessels: in the first thirty months of the war the Germans lost almost half their known fighting ships, including the pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* and the super dreadnought *Bismarck*, while the British lost more than fifty destroyers, three airplane carriers, and several capital ships, including the *Royal Oak*, the *Hood*, the *Prince of Wales*, and the *Repulse*.

Economically, totalitarian warfare made gigantic demands on the industrial structure of every nation. In Great Britain, a special cabinet division, entitled the Ministry of Economic Warfare, was created. In Germany, a similar governmental organization was the Economic Command. Both organizations strove to make their countries blockade-proof; to develop new sources of supply for vital raw materials; to encourage the production of synthetic materials; to overcome problems of wages, labor supply, and food supply; and to arrange an orderly system for allocations and priorities for the economic life of their nations. Convinced that the continent of Europe was not adequate to furnish all the materials for a prolonged war, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare endeavored by the use of sea power to prevent supplies from reaching Germany. The Germans, convinced that a well-ordered harnessing of the industrial and technical resources of Europe, together with the synthetic achievements of modern science, could create autarkie, strove to integrate the manufacturing and productive facilities of every conquered country with those of Germany.

Alike in Great Britain and Germany by the summer of 1941 approximately fifty per cent of the total production of the countries and half the national income were being devoted entirely to war purposes. In both countries taxation reached an unprecedented height. In Britain, with the highest income tax rate at 97½ per cent, it was impossible for even the richest individual to retain as a personal income more than twenty thousand dollars a year. Despite the weight of taxation, however, in Great Britain and in Germany alike more than half the cost of the war had to be met by borrowing. The British had the inestimable advantage of access to American productivity and wealth, limited only by the problem of getting the goods across the ocean. The Germans in their turn had certain advantages. Available to them were most of Europe's economic resources to confiscate and use as they pleased, together with the labor services of

millions of conquered peoples and of other millions of prisoners of war.³

If the combat and economic phases of totalitarian war were impressive, no less so was the sweep of social change which accompanied it. Characteristic of every belligerent country, these changes may be glimpsed by a brief review of their evolution in Great Britain and Germany. In the former it was apparent after two years of war that the social changes forced upon the country by the exigencies of the conflict indicated a real democratization of the national life. Drastic price controls, plus food, fuel, and clothes rationing, rendered impossible prewar differences in the standard of living.⁴ A tremendous increase in the employment of women for every kind of task made it appear that economic as well as political equality for women might prevail in wartime Britain. By the end of 1941 it was calculated that no fewer than 7,500,000 British women were directly engaged in the war effort, in industry, in agriculture, and in at least ten auxiliaries to the fighting services. In these auxiliary forces unmarried women between the ages of twenty and thirty were liable for compulsory service. Despite the temporary abandonment of certain hard-won trade-union rights—for example, the freedom of labor to choose its own job—the breaking down of class lines and the recognition of labor went steadily forward.

Other developments indicated the same trend. The critical need of food required the cultivation of land hitherto sacred to the privileges of the British upper classes—golf courses, private parks, and great estates. By 1942 it was truly being observed that privilege was no longer something to be proud of but something to be apologized for. The destruction of many urban areas by bombs and fire caused a remarkable increase in the development of governmental welfare services of all kinds, in community planning, in a more effective kind of governmental administration, and in public health. Notwithstanding the almost dictatorial powers of the government, the traditional British respect for minority rights continued to

Wartime
social
change
in Britain

³ Late in 1941 International Red Cross figures showed that Germany had in her prison camps available for all types of labor more than 2,500,000 war prisoners, *exclusive* of an unverified number of captured Russians. At the same time, the Germans were utilizing the services of perhaps 2,000,000 drafted foreign laborers who under duress of their own governments—as in Spain, Italy, and France—or by sheer necessity for survival—as in Belgium, Holland, and Denmark—were working in German industry and agriculture.

⁴ Shortly after war began, British food rationing commenced, and in June, 1941, clothes rationing was introduced. The latter provided 66 coupons annually for each adult. Typical allocation of coupons required for clothes' purchases were: a woman's wool suit, 18 coupons; a wool dress, 11; a pair of shoes, 5; a man's suit, 26; an overcoat, 20. In June, 1942, the number of coupons was reduced to 51.

prevail, as was evident in the generous treatment given more than fifty thousand conscientious objectors.

Akin to these endeavors in many ways was the German effort. Five days before the war began, the Nazi government decreed a preliminary system of food and clothes rations. These two varieties of rationing were soon made permanent. Many types of consumer-goods were early taken out of production, and price controls were stringent and effective. German women were organized for work in field and factory and as auxiliaries to the fighting services under the direction of an energetic Nazi, Frau Gertrud Scholtz-klink, often termed "the lady *führer*." By 1941 half of German womanhood was at work directly in the war effort. Although Air Marshal Goering on August 9, 1939, had publicly declared that no enemy bombing raids could ever penetrate Germany's air defenses, the effective British air attack after 1941 necessitated in Germany the same kind of welfare work and other social adjustments that prevailed in Great Britain:

One aspect of social change, however, characteristic of wartime Germany much more than of Britain, was the reordering of German life to conform to Nazi conquests. Tens of thousands of people were moved bodily from one region to another, and great industrial areas in western Germany, like the Ruhr, were systematically depopulated in favor of newly developed metropolitan centers in the conquered areas of Poland far to the east and south, away from the easy range of British bombers. A tremendous national effort, moreover, was put into motion to save every possible material. The use of substitutes was required of all; for example, much of the industrial alcohol used in Germany after 1940 came from the distillation of millions of gallons of French wine seized in that year.

The psychological efforts of totalitarian war required an intensification of every known device for propaganda and censorship and the development of some new techniques. In the second World War as in the first, the basic aims were the stimulus of home morale, the breaking of enemy morale, and the winning of friends and allies. The radio, the moving-picture, the newspaper, and every other device of modern communications were seized upon by all belligerents and directed toward the threefold purpose just mentioned. The British, after much preliminary experimentation, late in 1941 centralized their entire propaganda effort in a bureau known as the Political Warfare Executive, a triumvirate of the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Information, and the Minister of Economic Warfare. Their principal publication for American consumption was an ably edited weekly magazine, printed in New York, entitled *Bulletins from Britain*. Similar publications were regularly issued by the official American

bureaus of six other Allied countries. From the beginning of the war the Germans used all the resources of the Goebbels propaganda ministry to counter the Allied effort everywhere and at all levels. So far as the United States was concerned, their efforts came to an abrupt stop after June, 1941, when the American government forbade any further official German propaganda activities in the United States and deported all the representatives of Goebbels' office.

Particularly noteworthy in the second World War was the use of radio as an instrument of propaganda. Powerful stations of the British Broadcasting Corporation daily poured out programs in more than thirty languages, directed primarily at the peoples of the Moslem world and those in the Nazi-conquered nations. Axis short-wave stations were equally active. According to the listening-posts of the two major American radio networks and of the United States government's Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, Axis radio propaganda to Latin American countries in the third year of the war occupied eighteen out of every twenty-four hours. American stations were equally busy, especially after the Nazi victories of 1940. All the commercial networks supported international short-wave broadcasting, and certain individual stations like WRUL in Boston specialized in programs "beamed" at the conquered peoples of Europe. After the entry of Japan into the war, the Japanese radio at home and in such conquered cities as Shanghai joined in the battle of the air waves and broadcast lurid accounts of Japanese successes and of alleged Allied despondency. Early in 1942 the United States government began short-wave broadcasting to the Japanese. Because of all these efforts, the war-mindedness of the chief belligerent nations was still strong as the third year of the great conflict began. It was weaker in Italy and doubtful in such Axis satellites as Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Throughout the British Empire, on the other hand, it was high save for three exceptions: from the beginning of the war, although always a minority, there had been a strong peace party in the Union of South Africa; Ireland had insisted stubbornly on a policy of strict neutrality; and India had refused to engage in conflict.

The crucial area of the propaganda war was undoubtedly the conquered states of Europe: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. In these countries, after the initial shock of defeat had passed, there was ever latent a potential of revolt which was obvious alike to the Allies and to the Germans. Sabotage, passive resistance, and periodic demonstrations against Nazi control were tactics by which to keep alive an independent public opinion in those lands. In such endeavors the conquered peoples were continually encouraged by Allied propaganda.

The radio

Morale
on both
sides

Morale in
the Nazi-
conquered
states

The well-known "V-for-Victory" campaign with its "…—" symbolism was one such device which flourished in 1941. After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the underground tactics of Communist sympathizers throughout conquered Europe was another. The Allied promises of foodstuffs to be sent to the conquered peoples the moment the Germans were ejected was a third. Mercilessly the Nazi secret police, the dreaded *Gestapo*, endeavored to counter the Allied strategy. Imprisonment and even death were meted out to any citizen of a vanquished state who was apprehended listening to a foreign radio station. German newspapers appeared in all the occupied lands, seeking by editorial blandishments mingled with threats to win favor for the conqueror. In cases where actual sabotage and physical violence on the part of subject peoples were involved, the Nazis instituted a system of reprisal executions whereby unknown numbers of innocent "hostages" were summarily executed.

In the matter of war aims and peace objectives the second World War evolved numerous formulas. Two principal types may be distinguished: unofficial and official. In the first category many individuals and groups had suggestions to offer. Particularly was this true of leaders of the Christian Church. Annually at the Christmas season, beginning in 1939, Pope Pius XII made a fervent plea for peace, setting forth the prerequisites thereto as he envisaged them. In Great Britain churchmen of all persuasions drew more closely together in thought and deed than ever before. In the United States the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, like many similar clerical and lay groups, appointed a special commission to study the necessary objectives for an enduring peace. Other groups in all the democratic countries were similarly active and fertile in suggestions. Among the ideas proposed were such schemes as "Union Now" between the United States and Great Britain; a worldwide program of free trade; a permanent international police force largely supported by the United States; and a loose federalized union of Europe with tariff discriminations abolished and the Third Reich broken up into a group of small states similar to the pattern which had prevailed in Germany before the days of the Hohenzollern Empire.

Officially, the belligerent governments were somewhat more restrained in formulating their war objectives. Indeed, as many public men on both sides said, the one real war aim was victory. Nevertheless, as the war lengthened, it became apparent that public opinion increasingly demanded some official statement on peace aims. One of the first striking efforts of this kind, among the nations allied with or friendly to Great Britain, was that of President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941, wherein he called for the

War aims
and peace
objectives:


Unofficial

Official

BATTLEGROUNDS OF EUROPE

- R.R. Network Centers and Significant R.R.
- ▲ Fortifications
- ★ French Naval Bases
- ◆ Italian Naval Bases
- Major Industrial Areas

Scale
0 50 100 200 500 mi.





TIME Map by R.M. Chapin,Jr.

establishment of "Four Freedoms" throughout the world: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. On August 14, at the conclusion of a several days' conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill jointly issued what soon came to be known as the Atlantic Charter, an eight-point declaration of fundamental principles for an enduring peace. Similar in many respects to President Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918, the Atlantic Charter read as follows:

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First: Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second: They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third: They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth: They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth: They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth: After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh: Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth: They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Six weeks later, representatives of eleven Allied governments assembled in London formally to approve the declarations in the Atlantic

The Allied
"Atlantic
Charter"

The Axis
"New
Order"

Charter. Similarly, on January 2, 1942, in Washington identical pledges were reaffirmed by representatives of twenty-six nations, including eleven republics of the western hemisphere, then at war with the Axis.⁵

So far as the Axis powers were concerned, the basic war and peace aims were the creation of a new world order in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Their scheme was ridiculed by democratic spokesmen as being neither new nor an order, but it was incessantly proclaimed in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Implicit in the Axis "New Order" were the reorganization of Europe under German leadership, the destruction of the British Empire, the overthrow of Russian Bolshevism, the expulsion of the white man from eastern Asia, and a sweeping readjustment of colonial power in Africa. These objectives were so enormous that their attainment would be equivalent to world revolution. The anti-Axis leaders were not slow to pick up the challenge. As the bitterness spread, on both sides the conflict was increasingly accepted as a struggle to the death. The second World War by the end of 1941 was no struggle merely for boundaries, economic perquisites, colonial spoil, or dynastic considerations. It was a total war between concepts of life apparently irreconcilable, with the single alternative total defeat or total victory. For all participants, in short, it had become "we or they."

II. THE WAR'S FIRST PHASE: GERMAN VICTORIES, SEPTEMBER, 1939, TO AUGUST, 1940

The first ten months of the war witnessed an uninterrupted series of German military successes. Hitler and his aides had so perfectly prepared Germany for war that its actual coming found them ready in every sense. While the Nazi opponents hastily improvised and distractedly sought to make up for lost time, the Third Reich struck with prodigious power and co-ordination. Whenever strategy suggested a new attack against a new enemy, the Nazi military machine was immediately put into motion. Truly was it remarked that Hitler may take a unique place among history's dictators because he realized better than any predecessor that ". . . the timing between oratory and action must be like the interval between the flash and the crash of a gun." Sometimes the Germans had a case for their actions, a case rooted in history or economics, which from their point of view made

⁵ Late in October, 1941, the delegations sent by the exiled governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece to the International Labor Organization conference in New York signed a joint declaration affirming that as one of their countries' war aims the four states in question proposed to act as the nucleus of a future confederation of nations from the Baltic to the Aegean.

their conduct logical. Yet invariably, whether this case was partly reasonable, or wholly unreasonable, it was never left for debate on its merits. Always argument was superseded by force. While such tactics made inevitable initial German military success, they blackened Germany's reputation in world public opinion and steadily increased anti-Nazi sentiment everywhere.

On August 26, 1939, only three days after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression treaty, the American military attaché to France, General Horace Fuller, confidentially cabled Washington that the German army was poised for an attack on Poland and that war would surely come within the next five days. This information, however, was not then available to the man on the street, who was following with tense interest the frantic efforts of European diplomats to avert an impending war. Into these diplomatic maneuverings it is not necessary to go; they were all destined for failure except upon the highly improbable contingency that Poland would submit to German desires regarding Danzig and large portions of the Polish Corridor. Such a submission, in view of its treaties with Great Britain and France, Poland was in no mood to make. In consequence, early on the morning of September 1, with no declaration of war, the military might of Nazi Germany by land, sea, and air fell upon the Polish state.

The German tank and armored divisions—the *Panzerdivisionen* or “panzers,” as the American newspapers dubbed them—startled all observers by their speed and destructive efficiency. Supported by overwhelming air superiority, the German forces, commanded by General Walther von Brauchitsch, crushed Polish resistance in the short interval of twenty-seven days. In their unprecedented triumph over courageous but outclassed foes, the Germans were assisted by the entry of Russia into the war on September 17. The Soviet forces, moving into Poland from the east, completed the destruction of that unhappy country. On September 28, the two victorious powers arranged a new partition of the Polish state. Its western areas were handed over to Germany; its eastern portion was annexed to Russia. A remnant of the Polish forces and a few officials fled to western Europe to set up a refugee government to continue the struggle.

The consequences of this unexpectedly speedy defeat of Poland were of widespread significance. So far as Germany was concerned, the Nazi victory eliminated for the time the prospect of a “two-front war” which had loomed as a possibility following the entry of Great Britain and France into the conflict on September 3. Having furnished no effective aid to Poland prior to her collapse, the western powers were now committed to a long period of defensive

Invasion
of Poland

Partition of
conquered
country


Results for
Nazis

warfare along the Franco-German boundary, to intermittent air activity, and to a naval blockade. Germany, however, freed from any immediate military threat either to the east or to the west, had ample leisure during the cold winter months of 1939-40 to mature far-reaching plans for the projected spring campaign. Thus there ensued a considerable interval of almost total military inactivity, often referred to at the time as a "phony war" or as a "sitzkrieg."

So far as Russia was concerned, the annexation of eastern Poland stimulated a restoration of Russian influence throughout the entire Baltic area. Within two weeks of the partition of Poland, Soviet representatives signed "mutual-assistance" treaties with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Ostensibly agreements between equals, these pacts were one-sided arrangements which gave Russia desirable naval bases, military depots, and airdromes in each of the three Baltic republics. So obviously important was the maintenance of these privileges that in June, 1940, the Russian government annexed the three tiny states and incorporated them as integral parts of the U.S.S.R. Previously, by arrangement with the Nazis, the Russians had permitted the removal of all German "racial comrades" from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. More than eighty thousand such persons left the Baltic republics and were given new homes in Germany proper or in the conquered regions of Poland. From the latter areas the Nazis forcibly expelled tens of thousands of native Poles and Jews, who were sent to concentration centers, detention camps, or ghettos.

Russo-Finnish war

The Russian program of extension, however, was partially thwarted by Finland. This republic proved less amenable to Soviet pressure than had its three southern neighbors. Finland refused to make any treaty with the U.S.S.R. which would in Finnish opinion infringe upon her independence. On November 30, 1939, therefore, the military forces of the U.S.S.R. attacked their tiny neighbor and



began a winter war against the Finnish state. Despite the startling disparity in numbers—one hundred eighty million people against four million—the Finns put up an amazingly good fight. Not until March 12, 1940, were they forced to capitulate before overwhelming odds. The terms of the settlement were severe, giving Russia extensive military and economic rights in Finland. An uneasy peace followed, with Russia from time to time making additional demands upon the Finns. It was apparent that the latter would renew the struggle with their Soviet enemy whenever a favorable opportunity should offer itself. Meantime, on December 14, 1939, the U.S.S.R. had been formally expelled from the League of Nations as being unworthy of membership.

On October 6, 1939, in an address to the Reichstag Hitler had declared that the war might properly cease. Poland, the alleged cause of all the trouble, had been crushed and from the German viewpoint there was no further need to continue the conflict. Great Britain and France immediately rebuffed this suggestion and clearly stated that they proposed to see the war through to victory. Shortly after, the two western powers agreed upon joint military, air, and naval commands: the French general, Marie Gustave Gamelin, was placed in charge of all Anglo-French armies; and British officers were appointed to direct Allied air and naval forces. In November an Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee was created to handle all wartime economic activities of and between the two countries. On March 28, 1940, Great Britain and France mutually pledged that neither power would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace without the approval of the other. Meantime Turkey had been persuaded to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Great Britain and France, which, it was believed, would strengthen the Allied position in the Near East and Middle East.

Despite rumors of forthcoming German aggression against Holland and Belgium which twice during the winter rose to a fever pitch, the war in western Europe continued in an almost dormant stage until April, 1940. The air attacks by the rival powers were limited largely to military objectives or to the dropping of propaganda pamphlets behind the enemy lines. At sea the German campaign against Allied shipping claimed numerous victims like the *Athenia*, sunk on the first day of the war. There were, also, certain spectacular encounters between surface craft of the opposing navies. Of these the most dramatic was the naval battle off the coast of Uruguay in December, 1939, between the German pocket battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* and a British cruiser squadron. After an inconclusive encounter and a brief interlude while the Nazi warship went into Montevideo for repairs,

Anglo-French
co-operation

Early
naval
encounters

the Germans scuttled their ship rather than go out to sea and fight the reinforced British squadron. The American republics protested both to Great Britain and to Germany that western-hemisphere coastal waters were not a proper place for naval engagements.

A companion ship to the *Admiral Graf Spee*, named the *Altmark*, had accompanied the battleship on its raiding expedition and had served as a prison for seamen taken off vessels sunk by the warship. In February, 1940, the *Altmark* was sighted by a British destroyer as it was passing through Norwegian coastal waters en route to Germany. The German craft was admittedly but illegally within the three-mile limit, and the British destroyer boldly closed in and rescued the prisoners. Although the Norwegian government protested this infringement of its neutral rights, the problem which the incident raised grew steadily more serious. It was apparent to all that the Germans were using the long stretch of Norway's coastal waters as an ideal route for their ships seeking ingress and exit from the North Sea without directly running the Anglo-French blockade. Moreover, important shipments of Swedish iron ore from the Norwegian port of Narvik were coming south in safety, since they remained within the three-mile limit. A growing Allied determination to stop this traffic was apparent after the *Altmark* case; on April 8 it was announced that Allied mine fields had been laid in Norwegian territorial waters. The government at Oslo immediately protested this action, but before either London or Paris could answer, the protest had become academic.

It is not clear whether the Allies thought the Germans would passively accept this challenge to their supply routes in the North or whether they underestimated the Nazi power in striking back. In either event, it is apparent that in April, 1940, the Allies were suffering from overconfidence. The new premier of France, Paul Reynaud, who had succeeded Daladier in March, exuded optimism about the future. So did Prime Minister Chamberlain of Great Britain who declared: "One thing is certain; Hitler has missed the bus." In the same vein General Ironside, one of the highest officers in the British army, told newsmen: "Frankly, we would welcome an attack by Hitler." Within a few hours it came, with a fury and a tempo that gave evidence of months of preparation and a violence that caught the Allies completely off their guard.

On the night of April 8-9 German troops took over the entire country of Denmark and at some half dozen points began the pre-arranged invasion of Norway. Both these Scandinavian countries were thus innocent victims of the expanding outreach of the war. Denmark succumbed without resistance, but Norway attempted to

Problem of
Norway's
coastal
waters

Allied over-
confidence

German
victories in
Scandinavia

fight back. Aided, however, by overwhelming land and air power, and assisted further by surprise and treason in certain Norwegian circles, the Germans soon overcame all opposition. A small Anglo-French expeditionary force which had been hastily landed on the Norwegian coast above Trondheim was forced to evacuate early in May. A month later, on June 9, organized Norwegian resistance ceased; the national leaders, led by King Haakon, fled to London to set up a government in exile. Presided over by a native Nazi named Vidkun Quisling—whose name soon became an English term of opprobrium—a puppet government was organized in Oslo which slavishly co-operated with Berlin. In Denmark the Germans maintained the existing regime of King Christian X, which was dominated, however, by a pro-Nazi Dane named Eric Scavenius.⁶

The consequences of these Nazi victories in Scandinavia were of considerable import. The Germans counted numerous gains. Their right flank facing Great Britain was now relatively secure from attack, while new bases for air and submarine attacks on the Allies had been secured. Their food and raw material prospects were at least temporarily improved by the loot of Denmark and Norway. Sweden, more isolated than ever, was necessarily drawn more closely into the Nazi orbit, and Swedish industrial and agricultural resources were made more accessible to the Germans. The captured gold reserves of Denmark and Norway strengthened the German monetary system. On the other hand, the Norwegian merchant marine, the fourth largest in the world, was henceforth largely at the disposal of the Allies; and Iceland became a useful junction point for the British on the convoy routes across the North Atlantic.

Most important of all, the Allied ineffectiveness in Norway was the cause of a major cabinet “shake-up” in Great Britain. Bitter parliamentary critics, led by David Lloyd George who had dominated the British war effort between 1915-1918, openly charged that Prime Minister Chamberlain’s motto seemed to be “too little and too late” and declared that until Great Britain secured a more dynamic leadership trouble would continue. On May 10 the prime minister resigned. On the next day Winston Churchill took the post. The new leader organized a coalition cabinet including a number of prominent members of the Labor party, such as Ernest Bevin, Clement Attlee, and Herbert Morrison. Churchill’s eloquence and his ability to grasp the entirety of a complex situation soon brought about a new enthusiasm

Results of
Scandinavian
campaign

Political
changes in
England

⁶ The important island of Iceland, united with Denmark since 1918 only through the person of the common king, was promptly occupied by British forces. In July, 1941, these were reinforced by American troops. In August of that year Iceland formally renounced all ties with the Danish monarch.

for and devotion to the war effort at home and won the admiration of the outside world. His blunt realism was unforgettable expressed in his opening address to parliament when he declared that he could offer England nothing but "blood and toil and tears and sweat."

Even as Churchill replaced Chamberlain the Nazi war machine struck again. At dawn on May 10, 1940, the Germans invaded Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Belgium, simultaneously bombing heavily the principal Allied air bases in northeastern France. Using every technique of totalitarian warfare, and aided once more by surprise, treason in the invaded countries, and perfect preparations, the Nazis overran helpless Luxemburg in one day and forced a courageous but outmatched Netherlands to capitulate on the evening of the fifth day of the campaign. Queen Wilhelmina and many of the government officials escaped to London, but the whole of the busy and prosperous Netherlands lay in German hands.⁷ Without pause the victors swept on through Belgium and on May 15 burst into France at the keypoint of Sedan. This city was near the northern end of the Maginot Line, where it had been confidently expected by Allied strategists that Belgian resistance would give ample time for French reinforcements to come into position.

Actually, it was a false security. Belgian forces were brushed aside and no French reserves were available at the right time and place. Moving with great speed, the German armies were soon pouring into the heart of France through a sixty-mile gap. On May 22, only twelve days after the campaign opened, they were farther on the road to the English Channel than they had been in 1918 after four years of fighting. On that day the advance forces of the Nazi armies reached Abbéville on the Channel coast, thus sundering completely the Allied armies in western Europe. The Belgians, British, and several French divisions were north of the German wedge, while the bulk of the French troops were south and southeast. In growing desperation the Allies dismissed Gamelin as commander-in-chief and put in his place General Maxime Weygand. Simultaneously, Marshal Henri Pétain, the old hero of Verdun in 1916, was made vice-premier of France. While these administrative changes were occurring, the Germans were seeking to push the entrapped Allies in western Belgium and in northeastern France into the sea.

By May 25 the Allied situation had become well-nigh hopeless. Ten panzer divisions were battering at the pocket, five from the front and five from the rear. Against these heavily armored German

German
attack in the
West

German
break-
through

Allied
defeat

⁷ At Doorn, Holland, the German conquerors found their former Kaiser William II. Although paid high respect by the Nazis, the old man lived quietly on in his adopted Dutch home until his death in June, 1941.

units the Allies had almost no antitank guns and nothing comparable in tank equipment. All British air bases on the continent had been put out of service by May 20, and Allied losses in planes and other material were huge. Therefore, General Gort ordered the British army to be evacuated to England as speedily as possible. Aware of the British decision, and aware too of Weygand's pessimism about any effective relief coming from the south, on May 28 King Leopold of Belgium unconditionally surrendered his army to the Germans. Many of his government officials, however, repudiated his action, and, like their Dutch colleagues before them, fled to London, there to continue the fight against the Nazis. It should be remembered that both the Netherlands and Belgium had large colonial empires wholly untouched by the invaders and that the resources of these colonies were ample to sustain continued resistance.

Between May 29 and June 4 the survivors of the Allied forces were successfully evacuated to England through the last remaining French port of Dunkirk. Upwards of three hundred thousand men succeeded in escaping the German net being drawn about them. The valiant deeds of British air and naval personnel and a few Frenchmen at Calais which alone made possible the evacuation will be retold as long as history is written. Yet it must be noted that little was brought back to England save the men themselves. Allied equipment, reserve supplies, and war materials of all kinds were necessarily left behind to be captured by the Germans as spoils of war. Not stopping even to count their plunder, the Nazi forces on June 5 turned on the French armies to the south. In huge masses of men and machines they were soon relentlessly rolling forward. By June 9 they had captured Rouen to the west of Paris and had reached the Marne less than forty miles from the capital.

Evacuation
at Dunkirk

The events of the next two weeks were cyclonic. On June 10 General Weygand pleaded with his troops to remain steadfast; his general order closed with the words: "This is the last quarter-hour. Hold fast!" But on that same day the French government left Paris and designated it as an "open city" to avoid destruction from the air; during the ensuing days first Tours, then Bordeaux, was the provisional capital of the Third Republic. On June 10, also, Italy declared war on France, thus threatening the tottering state from a new direction. On June 12 the army leaders advised the civil government that France must ask for an immediate armistice. Premier Reynaud frantically besought military help from Great Britain and the United States, appealing for "clouds of airplanes," but none was available. On June 13 the two Allied premiers, Reynaud and Churchill, had a crucial conference at Tours. To

The defeat
of France

the Frenchman's plea for release from the promise not to make a separate armistice or peace with the Germans, Churchill returned a negative answer save on the condition that France would immediately deliver its fleet into British hands. This pledge Reynaud felt unable to give. On June 14 the Germans entered Paris and continued their sweep to the south, far behind the formidable Maginot Line. On June 16 the British, eager to keep France in the war, made the astonishing proposal that the two states by a solemn act of union should immediately reorganize as one and maintain the struggle against Germany. Replete with possibilities as this suggestion was, it came too late to be of any effect. On that same day, June 16, Reynaud resigned and was succeeded by Pétain. On June 17 France formally asked for an armistice.

With an eye to the dramatic, Hitler insisted that the Franco-German negotiations take place in the same railway car in the forest of Compiègne where the armistice of 1918 had been signed. On June 22 the French delegates accepted the German armistice terms and two days later similarly acceded to the Italian demands. At 12:35 A.M. on June 25, therefore, firing ceased. At that moment the entire Maginot Line was in German hands; Nazi armies were in actual occupation of more than half of France; and almost two million French prisoners of war crowded the prison camps of Germany. Faced by such bitter realities, the Pétain government in the armistice agreed to severe terms. Some of these were: (1) permission to German forces to occupy for the duration of the war all northern and western France from the coast of Belgium to the coast of Spain, including Paris and the industrial Northeast; (2) a promise to turn over to the Germans all military facilities, supplies, and equipment in the occupied and unoccupied zones; (3) the pledge to demobilize the French fleet and keep it in French naval bases; (4) recognition of the right of the Nazis to hold all French prisoners of war until the signing of permanent peace; (5) an agreement to pay the costs of the German army of occupation—a sum which the first year's experience was to show totaled as much as the cost of actually fighting the war from September 1939 to the collapse ten months later. Similarly harsh were the terms of the Franco-Italian armistice. Marshal Pétain insisted, however, that the armistice arrangements were honorable and that they left France a free nation.

The results of the defeat of France were manifold. In France itself it meant the end of the Third Republic. On July 10 the French National Assembly, composed of both houses of parliament, by a vote of 569-80, conferred upon Pétain the power to draft a new French constitution and directed him, after completing it, to submit it to a

The Franco-
German
armistice


End of
the Third
Republic

national plebiscite for approval or rejection. In the interval Pétain was authorized to govern the nation by constitutional acts, i.e., governmental decrees promulgated by himself as "Chief of the French State." Thus France became a dictatorship, with a conservative antirepublican, and clerical leadership. Unwilling to accept this as a solution either legitimate or desirable, a group of French officers and officials who had escaped to London followed the example of other defeated states and set up a government in exile. Led by General Charles de Gaulle, the "Free French" repudiated Pétain's regime and called upon all Frenchmen to do likewise. The huge French colonial empire began to disintegrate, minor portions of it accepting de Gaulle, and the larger colonies holding fast to the Pétain government which had set up its temporary capital at Vichy. As months passed, the gulf between the two French factions grew ever wider. In August, 1940, de Gaulle was tried *in absentia* by a Vichy court martial and condemned to death for treason and desertion. The Free French responded by denouncing the Pétain government and in September co-operated with the British in an unsuccessful attempt to seize Dakar, the chief Vichy stronghold in west Africa.

On British policy the French surrender had important results. Realizing that Great Britain must necessarily soon become the object of Nazi assault, Churchill and his colleagues strove to remedy the weakness left by the French collapse. Three decisions were made in the fortnight after the Franco-German armistice. In the first place, the de Gaulle group was given official recognition. Secondly, all territories of the late French ally were put under naval blockade to prevent any leaks in the economic dikes built around Germany and Italy by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. In the third place, an effort was made to get into British hands all units of the French fleet. Shortly after the signing of the armistice, French naval vessels in British ports were seized. The bulk of the French fleet, however, was in French harbors, a large fraction being in Oran harbor in Algeria. On July 3 a British squadron appeared before Oran and demanded that the French admiral accept one of three conditions: (1) turn over his ships to British control; (2) take them to a port in the French West Indies or in the United States for internment; or (3) accept battle with the British at the expiration of a deadline of six hours. The French commander chose to fight, but in a one-sided engagement later that day most of his fleet was sunk or severely damaged.

The result of this incident was the creation of hostility between two powers which for more than a generation had been allies. The antagonism deepened because of the exigencies forced upon France

British attitude toward France



GERMAN TIMETABLE

The speed of the German conquest is indicated by this record.
 (From *Life* Magazine, August 4, 1941)

by the British blockade. Although conditions among the French people were less terrible than among other national populations dominated by the Germans, there was greater awareness of the situation by the outside world. Occupied France languished under the heavy hands of the army of occupation, but unoccupied France was scarcely more comfortable. Humanitarians in neutral countries, like Herbert Hoover, who had aided in the relief of Belgium during the first World War, pleaded for a modification of the British blockade, but only occasionally was it relaxed to permit small shipments of food and medical supplies into unoccupied France. Even then it was well understood that the Red Cross or the Quakers were to supervise every scrap of material and guarantee that none of it fell into German hands. While arguments over relief to France continued throughout 1940 and 1941, the once smiling land

Anglo-French
schism

of the French knew such misery and hunger as it had not experienced in hundreds of years.

The repercussions of French defeat resounded in even more distant portions of Europe. The Russian government, eager to strengthen its border areas, had as already noted formally annexed to the domains of the U.S.S.R. the little Baltic republics. Moreover, on June 26, 1940, Russia demanded of Romania the immediate surrender of the province of Bessarabia, taken from Russia in 1918, and the northern portion of the province of Bukovina. Romania sought German advice and was counseled to yield to the ultimatum. Accepting her fate, on June 27 Romania surrendered more than twenty thousand square miles of fertile land to the U.S.S.R. By Russo-German agreement upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand persons of German origin in the ceded areas were evacuated to Germany. The Russian leaders, however, despite their treaty with the Nazis of the year before, were none too confident of the ultimate intentions of Germany, now enormously strengthened by successes in western Europe. Another indication of this trend in Russia was the decision at the end of June to restore in that country the eight-hour day and the seven-day working week. While a nervous Russia proceeded to steps designed to make the U.S.S.R. better able to defend itself, an elated Italy prepared leisurely to rid the Mediterranean once and for all of its British rivals. Italian bombing raids upon the British bases at Alexandria, Malta, and Gibraltar began in July, and in August and September respectively British forces in Somaliland and Egypt were attacked by Mussolini's forces.

By midsummer of 1940 Axis prestige was high. German military might appeared invincible, and Italian arms had met with no reverses. The sole remaining task was the defeat of Great Britain, and to optimistic Axis observers that seemed imminent.

III. THE WAR'S SECOND PHASE: DEADLOCK, AUGUST, 1940, TO DECEMBER, 1941

Despite the catastrophe of Dunkirk, followed by the loss of France as an ally, the leaders of Great Britain unhesitatingly determined to continue the war. With all hope of a compromise peace with the British at an end the Germans in August began their offensive in the "Battle for Britain." Basically, their endeavors were twofold: (1) a gigantic air assault upon the British Isles; and (2) a total naval blockade of Great Britain and northern Ireland.

The German effort to knock out Great Britain from the air began in its full sweep on August 8. If Great Britain were successfully to be

Other
effects of
French
defeat

British
determina-
tion to
fight

**The attack
of the
*Luftwaffe***

"softened up" for an actual invasion, it was necessary to destroy her coastal convoys, to sink or immobilize as much of her navy as possible, to render helpless British air power—the Royal Air Force—, and to scatter so much destruction throughout the country that civilian morale would crack and the people be ready to sue for peace as soon as the invading Nazi forces appeared. In determined and incessant efforts from the beginning of August to the end of October the German air force—the *Luftwaffe*—by massed daylight raids strove to carry out these objectives. Despite certain spectacular accomplishments like the burning of large areas in eastern London, the Nazi air assault was a failure. In the short space of twelve weeks thousands of German airmen were killed or captured, and more than twenty-three hundred Nazi planes were reported destroyed by the R.A.F. British personnel casualties during the same period were relatively small, and admitted plane losses fewer than one-third those of the enemy.

After October, 1940, the Germans abandoned large-scale daylight raiding and henceforth employed chiefly night-bombing attacks. Once again, after months of effort, they accomplished less than they had anticipated. Many British ports and industrial cities were savagely pounded—notably Coventry on November 15—and London itself was severely damaged. Late in December, 1940, and again in May, 1941, terrible destruction was wrought by German incendiary bombs scattered wholesale over the British capital. Yet British morale remained unshaken; military and civilian tactics of resistance steadily improved; and at no time was British industrial output seriously threatened. After May, 1941, the German air force contented itself for many months with only desultory raids.

As the German effort to beat down Britain from the air slackened, the R.A.F. attacks on Germany increased in volume. The British airmen often used American planes that were equipped with the invention of an American scientist named Sanford A. Moss: the turbo-supercharger. This mechanism enabled the planes to fly at altitudes of more than thirty thousand feet—above the effective range of ordinary defense devices. On the whole, however, the Germans reacted to British bombings much as had their enemies before them. As time went on, the Nazis developed more effective techniques of resistance which until the late spring of 1942 checked the British.

As unsuccessful as the *Luftwaffe* attack on the British Isles had been, was the German naval blockade of Great Britain. Beginning with the winter months of 1940-41, intensive efforts were made by Nazi submarines, naval aircraft, and surface raiders to defeat the British by cutting the supply lanes from abroad. The conquered

**The R.A.F.
counter-
attack**

ports of Europe from Bordeaux to Narvik provided natural sally ports for German naval craft, and great efforts were made to equip and improve these new bases with every facility needed for intensive attack. For a time success seemed to be within the Nazi grasp. Sinkings of ships bound for Britain in January, 1941, were averaging more than one hundred thousand tons a week; these losses were about twice the current output of new construction. The alarmed British leaders pleaded with Ireland for permission to use its western ports as emergency transfer points, but were refused. A shipping crisis as serious as that in April, 1917, impended. Yet once again British stubbornness and resourcefulness proved equal to the task. An ever growing volume of American supplies, increasing use of Iceland as a base for convoy grouping, and steadily improved apparatus for detecting and dealing with U-boats enabled the British to win out. By the summer months the crisis in the "Battle of the Atlantic," as it was popularly termed, had been surmounted; and until the end of 1941 sinkings remained relatively unimportant.


The German
naval attack
on Great
Britain

Thus foiled doubly in their efforts to eliminate Great Britain from the war, Germany and Italy were reluctantly driven to a different type of campaign. Imperative to Axis success in a long war were the resources of the Near East and Middle East. Preliminary steps had already been taken to assure a satisfactory outcome to such a long-range program. At the end of August Romania was forced to surrender portions of her territory to two states which the Axis desired to favor. To Hungary went the northern portion of Transylvania; to Bulgaria the southern part of the Dobruja. Partly in protest, King Carol of Romania abdicated in favor of his son, Prince Michael. Actually, the effective power in Romania remained in the hands of General Jon Antonescu who believed that only by co-operation with the Axis could any sort of national sovereignty be preserved. Between November 20 and 24, Romania, Hungary, and the Nazi puppet state of Slovakia formally joined the Axis, and on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria did likewise.

Axis sorties
in the
Balkans

Meanwhile in what was expected to be a routine move in advancing Axis hegemony in the Balkans, on October 28 Italy had declared war on Greece. To the surprise of the Italians and of many in the outside world, Greece fought back effectively. Assisted by British air power in the Mediterranean, the Greeks not only prevented any Italian incursion into their country, they carried the war into the Fascist puppet state Albania. Moreover, within two weeks of the outbreak of the war, the R.A.F. executed a successful raid on the Italian base at Taranto, seriously damaging some of the chief units of the Italian fleet. The list of Italian reverses had only

Italian
set-backs




CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE—THE SUEZ CANAL

The strategic importance of the Suez Canal to Britain, France, and Italy during the second World War is indicated here.

(Adapted, courtesy "The New York Times")

begun. On December 9 the British forces in Egypt under the command of General Archibald Wavell took the offensive, routed the Fascist armies which had invaded Egypt, and in a few weeks drove them some hundreds of miles backward into western Libya. Within two months the British took one hundred and fifty thousand Italian prisoners and huge quantities of war matériel. Simultaneously other British armies attacked in Italian East Africa. Aided by the capture of secret Italian codes and army and navy plans and assisted by a vengeful Haile Selassie who had never forgiven the Italians for his loss of the Ethiopian throne in 1936, the British went from success to success. In May, 1941, almost all of Italian East Africa—Somaliland, Eritrea, and Ethiopia itself—were in British hands.⁸

⁸ The last remaining center of Italian resistance in Ethiopia, a fortress town named Gondar, held out until November 29, 1941.



Top: Acme. Bottom: Ewing Galloway

Top left, POPE PIUS XII. Top right, ARISTIDE BRIAND. Bottom left, GUSTAV STRESEMANN. Bottom right, AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.



Acme

Top left, HITLER. Top right, ATATÜRK. Bottom left, STALIN. Bottom right, MUSSOLINI.



Acme

Top, Daladier arrives at the airport in Munich, September, 1938.
Bottom, the Cabinet sees Chamberlain off for Munich.



Acme

ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL confer aboard *H. M. S. Prince of Wales* before issuance of the Atlantic Charter. In the background are General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army Chief of Staff; Sumner Welles, U. S. Undersecretary of State; and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

Italian reverses in the Balkans and in Africa convinced Hitler early in 1941 that Germany must take a more active role in these theaters of the war. German aviators and armored forces under General Erwin Rommel were sent to reinforce the Italians in Libya; German economists and technicians virtually took over the productive enterprise of Italy; and German diplomats turned to the problem of winning Yugoslavia to the Axis camp. All through the winter months, Nazi agents pointed out to Yugoslav statesmen the ominous fact that all the Balkan countries contiguous to Yugoslavia on the north and east were filling up with German troop concentrations. Although British representatives attempted to counteract the political effect of these German preparations in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, on March 25 Premier Cvetkovitch surrendered to the growing pressure and officially added Yugoslavia to the list of Axis satellite states. It was apparently another triumph for Hitler. Two days later, however, a military *coup d'état* occurred in Belgrade. The pro-Nazi premier was arrested; Prince Paul, the regent, was forced to resign; and seventeen-year-old King Peter assumed his rights as sovereign. He immediately formed a government headed by the strongly anti-Nazi General Dushan Simovitch. Professing to desire a continuance of good relations with the Axis, the Simovitch government made clear, nevertheless, that it could not carry out all the implications of the agreement signed on March 25.

German policy toward Yugoslavia

The Nazis determined to demonstrate once and for all that half-hearted allegiance to the Axis did not pay. On April 6, therefore, the German army simultaneously attacked Yugoslavia and Greece. Advancing over mountain passes and down narrow river valleys supposed to be impassable for mechanized warfare, and aided—especially in the case of Yugoslavia—by the now familiar phenomenon of treachery, the Nazis crushed the Yugoslav army in thirteen days, and the Greek in seventeen. The Italians claimed a minor share of the victory by attacking when the enemy was preoccupied with the greater Nazi threat. By the end of April Axis flags waved in triumph over a half-destroyed Belgrade and on the Acropolis. Puppet governments were promptly set up by the conquerors in each country, but the regular regimes of King Peter in Yugoslavia and King George in Greece refused to deal with the Axis and moved to London to continue in the anti-Axis coalition. On June 17, having looted Greece, the bulk of the German armed forces withdrew, leaving that impoverished country to the Italians to police. Under Fascist administration conditions soon bordered upon anarchy. In Yugoslavia, however, the Germans were forced to maintain substantial forces long after the Yugoslav army had formally capitulated. Guerrilla

German conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece

warfare, led by native partisans known as *chetniks*, proved a formidable obstacle to any quick pacification of the country.

British reverses

A British expeditionary force sent to Greece to aid in stemming the Nazi onrush in April had been forced precipitately to withdraw. The Germans styled their retreat a "second Dunkirk" and spoke exultantly of the British losses in men and material. Moreover, during the first fortnight in April, the British troops in Libya, weakened by withdrawals of men for the campaign in Greece, had been forced to give up most of their gains in Libya and retire once again to Egypt. Of their conquests in north Africa, General Wavell's men retained only the fortress of Tobruk. In May, by a daring parachute-troop assault on a large scale—the first of its kind in history—the Germans captured the Greek island of Crete and once again drove the British into retreat. It was a striking demonstration of what air power could do, and military men all over the world revised their concepts of the factors of success in modern war.

New British successes

As a result of these setbacks to British prestige in the Near East and Middle East, the leaders of Great Britain were forced into several new strokes to recoup their losses. In the first days of May a pro-Nazi revolt had broken out in Iraq; promptly the British sent to that country an expeditionary force to assist in chastising the rebels. Successful in this endeavor, the British troops remained in Iraq to safeguard the oil wells of Mesopotamia against any possible Axis-inspired sabotage attempts. Early in June, acting in co-operation with the Free French, the British undertook the invasion of Syria, a French mandate still loyal to the Pétain government at Vichy. After a slow campaign the invasion succeeded, and Syria for the time being appeared to be safely in the anti-Axis camp. In August and September, after the outbreak of the Russo-German conflict, Iran was similarly taken over by the British and the Russians.⁹ Its ruler, Reza Shah Pahlevi, suspected of Nazi sympathies, abdicated. As a result of these positive steps taken by the British, their prestige in the Near East and Middle East revived. Nevertheless, the Turkish government indicated its uncertainty for the future and its desire to play safe by signing a friendship and nonaggression treaty with Germany supplemented by a trade agreement.

Before considering the German attack on Russia which began on June 22, 1941, it is necessary to summarize briefly the initial impact of the war on the Far East. When the European conflict

⁹ Primarily Iran was important to the Allies because of the Trans-Iranian Railway. This line connected the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea and was the best route over which to ship supplies to Russia from bases in the Indian Ocean. It had been completed in 1938 by German and Swedish engineers.

broke out, Japan had for more than two years been waging an undeclared war on China. Despite many Japanese victories and the occupation of much of north and coastal China, Chinese will to resist was unimpaired. Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from the new capital of the nation at Chungking, Chinese armies fought on against the invader. A vital element in their resistance was the flow of war materials to China by three routes from the outside world. Since Japan held all the principal seaports of China, save British Hong Kong, supplies for the embattled Chinese came chiefly over (1) the caravan trail from southern Siberia; and (2) a railway from French Indo-China; and (3) a tortuous


Effects of
the war in
the Far East

rail and highway route from Rangoon, popularly known as the "Burma Road." Frustrated in their attempts to conquer the Chinese on the field of battle, the Japanese in 1940 determined to accomplish the same result indirectly by throttling the Chinese supply lines. First, however, they established a puppet government at Nanking headed by a Chinese advocate of appeasement named Wang Ching-wei.

The defeat of France provided an opportunity for the

Japanese
diplomatic
successes

Japanese to bring pressure on French authorities in the Far East. Early in July the French closed the railway from Indo-China. Then the British agreed to suspend all traffic on the Burma Road for three months.Flushed by these successes, the Japanese cabinet announced its intentions to construct a Japanese-dominated "Greater East Asia"—a phrase which soon took on the connotation of Hitler's "New Order" in Europe. At the same time Japan underwent internal "reforms" which reorganized the state on a totalitarian basis. The new regime speedily won additional successes in the field of international pressure politics. In late August Great Britain withdrew the British garrisons from their posts in Japanese-dominated north China and Shanghai. France went even further. In effect, the French surrendered their sovereignty in Indo-China in favor of the Japanese. Gradually the Japanese moved in, the process not being complete until July 1, 1941. By the latter date, the aggressors had full control of all French bases in the Far East. Thus, a year after the collapse of France in Europe,



THE BURMA ROAD

the Japanese in Asia had firmly based themselves barely seven hundred miles from Singapore, fewer than a thousand miles from Manila, and only twelve hundred miles from Batavia, the capital of the Netherlands East Indies.

In the autumn of 1940 the United States, for many months a protesting spectator of these Japanese moves in the Far East, turned from diplomatic insistence that the status quo be preserved to vigorous economic counterthrusts. The Japanese countered these moves by formally declaring their adherence to the Axis.¹⁰ In a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed on September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan publicly affirmed their determination to bring about a new order in Europe and in Asia and implied that they would jointly resist efforts by any other nation to turn them aside from their objective. Within a month Japan put her principles into practice by offering to mediate a boundary quarrel between Thailand and Indo-China. In March, 1941, the Japanese arbitral award of several thousand square miles to Thailand further weakened French influence in southeastern Asia and gave Japan a strong diplomatic position at Bangkok. The government at Tokyo shortly afterward turned to Russia and on April 13, 1941, signed a ten-year neutrality pact with the U.S.S.R. If the treaty meant what its published articles declared, both countries had prevented an attack from the rear while they were engaged in plans elsewhere.

This move on the part of Japan was closely related to developments in the main theater of war in Europe. Since the end of 1940 there had been increasing evidences that Russo-German relations, despite the treaty of August, 1939, were not running smoothly. For neither partner were the economic and political fruits of the agreement as satisfactory as had been anticipated. Throughout the months before the final break both nations were busy with steps which indicated a desire to be ready for any emergency. In Russia, as already indicated, a decree for the eight-hour working day and the seven-day working week had been promulgated in 1940. The educational system of the U.S.S.R. was radically altered in the same year, and millions of Russian youths from the age of fourteen upward were ordered into the industrial system to increase the production of the country. In October, 1940, also, a sweeping reorganization of the army was completed: all leveling vestiges of the earlier years of Communism were abolished; henceforth strict dis-

¹⁰ The Japanese signatory to this document was Japan's ambassador to Germany, Saburu Kurusu. This was the same diplomat who was dilatorily talking peace with American officials fourteen months later when the Japanese armed forces suddenly attacked Pearl Harbor.

cipline with a return to conventional military titles was ordered. An intensive development of the internal waterways of the U.S.S.R. was decreed and every phase of the Third Five-Year Plan pushed vigorously. Elaborate military installations were set up in the territories secured in 1940 along the Baltic and Black seas. Finally, on May 6, 1941, Joseph Stalin became the Premier of Russia, thus for the first time in his career officially taking the leadership of his country directly into his own hands.

If fear of the Nazis thus grew apace in Russia, so likewise did distrust of the Russians rapidly increase in Germany. All through the spring of 1941 there were heavy troop concentrations along the German border with Russia. Articles about the U.S.S.R. disappeared from the Nazi press, and there was official silence in Berlin about the Russian partner. The basic assumptions in the minds of Nazi leaders seem to have been the following convictions: (1) a break with Russia was inevitable sooner or later; therefore let it come in 1941 while Germany was at the optimum military strength and Russian war preparations were yet incomplete; (2) since the United States was increasingly proving to be the supply base for the Allies, in order to cope with American resources Germany must have complete access to Russian raw materials, particularly oil and foodstuffs; (3) an attack by Germany on the U.S.S.R. would cause an ideological split abroad especially in the United States where anti-Communist feeling might prove stronger than anti-Nazi sentiment.

The Germans scored a technical surprise when at dawn on Sunday morning, June 22, without warning their armies attacked the Russian frontier troops. The large Russian forces encountered by the Germans in the areas just behind the border, however, indicated that the U.S.S.R. had not wholly been caught napping, and desperate fighting characterized the campaign. On the day the German attack began Prime Minister Churchill pledged full British aid to Russia, and two days later President Roosevelt made a similar declaration for his country. Thus, in her hour of greatest need, Soviet Russia found powerful friends. The Germans acquired friends also, although individually they were far less important. Joined almost at once by such other Axis nations as Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia, the Nazis were assisted also by Finland, which sought revenge on the U.S.S.R. for the latter's aggressiveness the year before. Many divisions from the armies of these smaller states, plus "volunteer" contingents from such pro-Axis powers as France and Spain, supported the German armies.

A series of concentric attacks against the Russians along the entire two thousand miles of front from the Arctic Sea to the Black Sea

The Russo-German War

Initial
German
successes

brought the Nazis and their allies many initial successes. Pushed steadily back by the invaders, the Russians sought to make the conquered areas as useless as possible to the conqueror. Obeying orders from Moscow the retreating forces destroyed every possible asset in the territory abandoned. Included in the destruction under this "scorched-earth" policy was the hydroelectric dam on the lower Dnieper River, the largest structure of its kind in Europe. It had been built by American engineers and was the most impressive single accomplishment of the first two Five-Year plans. Its deliberate destruction by the Russians was heralded as evidence of Soviet determination to win the struggle. Nevertheless, the Germans and their allies steadily advanced into the U.S.S.R. and at the end of six months had more than five hundred thousand square miles of Russia under their control. The conquered regions included most of the long-coveted Ukraine, all the Soviet acquisitions of 1939-40 along the Baltic, the Russian share of conquered Poland, White Russia, and much of the Crimea. Kiev and Kharkov, respectively the third and fourth cities of the U.S.S.R., were in German hands, and Hitler's troops were close to Moscow and Leningrad, the first and second cities of Russia.

Russian
resistance

Yet, notwithstanding these major defeats, the Russian armies did not crack nor did the civilian morale weaken. Millions of women took the places of men in agriculture and industry. No treasonable elements in Russia appeared at all analogous to those factions which had so aided the Germans in their previous conquests. Despite the grievous injury dealt Russian economy by the loss of the important areas already mentioned, the industrial capacity and raw materials of the Ural mountain area and of central Siberia proved great. Assisted by supplies sent from Great Britain and from the United States, and aided by the effects of the bitter Russian winter upon the unprepared Nazis, the Russians by early December had fought the Germans to a standstill. For the first time in their experience the Nazis had met a foe as tough as themselves, with numbers and equipment comparable to their own.

Russian
counter-
attacks

The Russians were not content to halt the Germans. As December, 1941, wore on, they launched a counteroffensive. Soviet armies, reinforced by veteran Siberian divisions, drove the Germans back for considerable distances at numerous points along the lengthy battleline. The Germans sought to stabilize the front in hastily constructed positions behind their extreme advances and alleged that their withdrawal to these fortified positions was "proceeding according to plan." Meantime, to satisfy its Russian ally, Great Britain declared war on Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Among the many national readjustments set in motion by the German attack on Russia, none was more noteworthy than the increasing co-ordination of policies between France and Germany. Among the probable reasons for Pétain's policy the following were perhaps most important: (1) continued indignation against Great Britain over the incidents at Oran, Dakar, and in Syria, and over the R.A.F. bombing raids on such German "invasion bases" as the French seaports of Havre, Brest, Saint Nazaire, Boulogne, and Calais; (2) Vichy's dislike of Bolshevism which led Pétain to declare that Germany's attack on Russia was "a defense of civilization"; (3) the feeling that Hitler must be dealt with gently so long as he still held in prison camps more than a million and a half French prisoners of war; (4) a widespread feeling among Pétain's advisers that Great Britain could not possibly win the war and that the future of Europe would be stamped in the Nazi mold. Such being the trend of thought in Vichy, Pétain named Admiral Darlan, a pronounced Germanophile, head of the French army, navy, and air force; and then, presumably at German urging, he removed his old comrade-in-arms, General Weygand, from the command of French North Africa, appointing in his stead a more pronounced Nazi sympathizer.

Effects of
the war on
Franco-
German
policies

While Germany thus apparently gained additional support from the Vichy government, her Italian partner in the Axis was sustaining new and heavy blows in the Mediterranean. In November, 1941, the British army again crossed the Egyptian frontier into Libya. Supported this time by great quantities of American-made war material, the British forces for a time moved forward. Simultaneously, British forces ravaged the Axis supply lines from the mainland to Africa and seriously interfered with efforts to reinforce the German and Italian army in Libya. The British attack soon lost its momentum, and the Axis again took the offensive. By midsummer of 1942 Rommel's forces were threatening Egypt again.

New
Italian
defeats

IV. THE WAR'S THIRD PHASE: AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

From the outbreak of the war in 1939 most American hearts sympathized with the nations arrayed against Germany and her Axis colleagues. But American heads were sharply divided on how best to express this emotional support. For more than two years basic cleavages in American thought persisted. Many persons maintained that for the United States to participate in European wars, as the experience of 1917-1919 had demonstrated, was to exchange real gold for "fool's gold." Americans favoring this policy of aloofness were commonly dubbed "isolationists." Others, probably for the first

Cleavages
in American
public
opinion

two years of the war a majority of the American people, insisted that the United States could do its full duty by co-operating with the Allies in measures "short of war." This concept of a vicarious conflict in which the American people would contribute their wealth to buy materials for others to use in fighting, was given many concrete manifestations, both unofficial and official. Finally, there were those in the United States who early in the war came to the conviction that their country ought to participate directly in the struggle against the Axis. As a large part in the infinitely varying ebb and flow of American public opinion these three viewpoints on the second World War strove for mastery, until in December, 1941, the third almost unanimously prevailed.

Until the German invasion of Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France, the United States government officially had followed a policy of strictly defensive actions. On September 3, 1939, the president had proclaimed American neutrality; three weeks later this proclamation was implemented with similar actions by the other western hemisphere countries. A Pan-American Conference, meeting at Panama, announced a wide neutrality zone completely encircling both continents and barred to belligerent activity of any kind. Early in November, at President Roosevelt's request, Congress passed a revised version of the neutrality law which had been on the statute books since 1935. Under the terms of this revision the president was instructed to delimit war zones in all waters adjacent to belligerent countries, and American ships were forbidden to traverse such areas. Moreover, it was declared to be American policy to sell war supplies for cash only and to require that they be transported in the purchaser's own ships. In pursuance of this nominally impartial policy, the United States during the early months of the war on more than one occasion protested Allied interference with American mail and freight service to nonbelligerent portions of Europe.

All this leisurely and somewhat pedantic attitude towards the war was changed by the startling victories of the Nazis in the spring and summer of 1940 and by the entrance of Italy into the war. Within two months after the German invasion of the Lowlands, President Roosevelt requested from Congress for defense purposes more than seven billion dollars. On the night that Italy entered the war President Roosevelt castigated Mussolini for his action and again expressed his complete opposition to Axis methods. In the weeks following the evacuation from Dunkirk the President ordered American arsenals to turn over to the British, whose armies were almost weaponless for the moment, nearly one million rifles and more than a thousand pieces of field artillery. Moreover, he invited into his cabinet two members

Initial
U.S. moves
in the war

Rising
American
alarm

of the Republican party, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox. Both men believed in a maximum of immediate aid to Great Britain.

The political campaign of 1940, in which President Roosevelt successfully sought the unprecedented privilege of a third term, did not involve a diminution of the increasingly extensive, but still nonbelligerent, American participation in the war. The candidates and platforms of both major parties agreed in their desire to keep the country at peace, except in case of attack, and also agreed upon the desirability of giving all possible aid, short of war, to Great Britain. Early in August, General John J. Pershing, the American commander in the first World War, as a matter of national defense urged the gift of "at least fifty" destroyers from the American navy to the British. On September 2 the president reported to Congress that this had actually been done. In return for the gift of these much-needed fighting ships, the British offered to lease to the United States for ninety-nine years a chain of naval bases from Newfoundland to Trinidad. Already, between July 21 and 30, meeting in a second extraordinary session at Havana, Cuba, the Pan-American republics had drawn more closely together through mutual agreement on defense measures and the adoption of policies for reciprocal protection. On August 17 President Roosevelt announced that the United States and Canada had agreed immediately to establish a Permanent Joint Board of Defense to supplement the Pan-American agreement. Finally, on September 16 the president signed the law establishing for the first time in American history compulsory peacetime military training for selected men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five inclusive.

The United States generally followed a policy of nonrecognition of Nazi conquests. From the American point of view the lawful governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Greece, were those regimes existing in London and partly dependent upon British support.¹¹ Only towards defeated France did the United States pursue a different policy. With the Vichy regime regular diplomatic relations were maintained. Not until the closing weeks of 1941 did the United States officially acknowledge that there was such a movement as the Free French and even then its attitude towards the de Gaulle organization was equivocal. The American government continued to believe that the sole way of preventing complete collaboration between Vichy and Berlin, thereby giving the Nazis control over the French fleet and important

American attitude toward German conquests

¹¹ Four of these governments in exile by the end of 1941 were training in Canadian camps foreign legions of their own nationals to fight the Axis at some future day. A Norwegian division was in training at Toronto; a Netherlands force at Stratford; a Polish unit at Owen Sound; and a Belgian contingent at Joliette, Quebec.

sections of the French colonial empire in Africa, was to treat the Pétain government with consideration. Critics of the State Department declared that the American policy was appeasement under a different name, but they did not sway the government. The French ship of state had been almost a derelict after June, 1940. Every month of delay in preventing the Germans from salvaging the entire cargo was time gained in the long pull against the Axis.

With the presidential election out of the way, President Roosevelt, supported by an increasingly large segment of American public opinion, began to proceed upon the assumption that the defeat of the Axis had become more important for the United States than merely keeping out of war. In a vigorous address on December 29, 1940, the president declared that the United States must become the "arsenal of democracy," and a "Lend-Lease" program, begun in March, 1941, sought to implement this phrase. Huge quantities of American materials were soon flowing across the oceans to the countries actively fighting the Axis. Early in 1941 Great Britain was suffering from an acute food shortage. Accordingly the United States supplied the British with hundreds of thousands of tons of canned goods, dehydrated vegetables, meat, cheese, butter, and eggs. British shipyards were overcrowded with new construction and repair work. Consequently the United States undertook to repair numerous British ships that had been damaged by Axis bombs or torpedoes. Meantime the regular weapons of war were sent across the oceans to Egypt, to China, to Russia, to the Middle East, and, of course, to Britain proper, in a never ending stream. All this was tantamount to making the United States an actual partner of the Allied nations in the war in all but an officially declared sense. On May 28, President Roosevelt proclaimed an "unlimited national emergency." On July 7 American troops appeared in Iceland, and shortly thereafter the navy began a "neutrality patrol" for that place. In September convoy operations began, with American naval vessels escorting ships to European waters.

While these events were occurring, a little publicized but important series of moves against the economic front of the Axis powers was made by the American government. Early in the war all Axis assets and credits in the United States, including those of the conquered nations, had been "frozen," so that neither Germany nor Italy could derive any financial help from American sources. An increasingly strict system of export licenses for commodities going to countries adjacent to Germany—e.g., Spain, Switzerland, or Sweden—was put into effect in 1940. Early in 1941, the Coast Guard seized sixty-five Axis ships interned in American harbors and

The "Lend-Lease" program

Increasing U. S. participation in the war

Anti-Axis economic moves

prepared to put them into war service. In June the American government closed all German and Italian consulates and ordered their personnel home. A month later the United States black-listed approximately eighteen hundred business firms in Latin America suspected of doing business with Germany or Italy and forbade any further American business relations with any of them. A Board of Economic Welfare to render these measures effective and to correlate them with similar British endeavors was created, headed by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace.

In August, 1941, convinced that American and world public opinion demanded a clarification of the aims of the entente now in effect between Great Britain and the United States, President Roosevelt arranged a conference with Prime Minister Churchill. Meeting alternately on a British and an American naval vessel in the quiet waters of Placentia Bay off the southern shores of Newfoundland, the two leaders on August 14 issued the eight-point Atlantic Charter, summarized in a previous paragraph. Fully aware, after his conferences with Churchill, that Great Britain by herself could not do much more than fight a defensive war, President Roosevelt returned to Washington determined to enlarge the scope of American aid to the Allies. Well understanding the importance of keeping his foreign policy democratic, the president endeavored to win the widest popular support for his plans by making the people understand the reality of the Axis peril to the world. The Germans and Italians played directly into his hands.

The Axis powers soon sensed the import of the Lend-Lease program. They recognized also that they could not win the war if the Allies were able freely to receive the masses of material now pouring across the ocean. Accordingly, Axis submarines began a vigorous campaign against American cargo ships bound for Europe. Moreover, the U-boats began to direct their attention to American destroyers on patrol and convoy duty. During September and October the *Greer* and the *Kearney* were attacked, the latter with some loss of life, and the *Reuben James* sunk, with the loss of about one hundred of her crew. President Roosevelt expressed a rising tide of American indignation at these sinkings by denouncing them as "piracy" and ordering the American navy to shoot on sight any Axis submarine or airplane observed anywhere in the Atlantic. Meantime, the original year's term for the drafted men in the army had been lengthened to two and a half years (August); most of the Neutrality Law of 1939 was repealed (November); and American troops were sent to occupy Dutch Guiana in South America (November).

While Americans thus drew close to war with the European

Greater U.S.
co-operation
with Great
Britain

Axis
counter-
measures

Japanese attitude toward war and peace


members of the Axis, open fighting actually began with the Asiatic partner, Japan. It is not known how closely the aggressor powers correlated their moves, but it is clear that by the middle of 1941 the Japanese had strongly ensconced themselves in southeastern Asia. Their potential threat to the "ABCD" powers—America, Britain, China, and the Dutch state—was well understood, and early in August these powers determined to take a bold stand against the Japanese. Reversing policies under which Americans had sold more than a billion dollars' worth of raw materials to Japan since 1937 and under which during the same time British exporters had sold almost seven hundred million dollars' worth, the American, British, and Dutch governments "froze" all Japanese assets in their respective countries and clapped down a strict embargo on trade with Japan. Moreover, on August 6, the three powers warned Japan against any invasion or encroachment on the integrity of Thailand. Japan retaliated by economic measures in kind, but in October the newly formed cabinet of General Hideki Tojo indicated that it would like to discuss the situation with American officials in Washington.

Japan strikes!

Willing to negotiate rather than fight, the American government spent most of November in unsatisfactory conferences with the Japanese emissaries. Despite the pacific tone of the conversations, rumors of Japanese war preparations flew thick and fast. Prime Minister Churchill took occasion to warn the Tokyo government not to go too far, and President Roosevelt on December 6 addressed a personal plea to the Japanese emperor to keep the peace. It was not to be. Apparently months before, the die had been cast by the Japanese military and naval clique that dominated the politics of Tokyo. All that had intervened since their decision had been only a smoke screen to conceal their designs from the world.

American response

On the morning of December 7, while peace talks were still in process in Washington, suddenly the Japanese attacked all American outposts in the Pacific, especially the great naval base of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Because of the complete tactical surprise achieved by the Japanese, their attacks were effective. On that same day the Japanese Empire formally declared war on the United States and Great Britain and proceeded to undertake the creation of "Greater East Asia" by force. The American response to the attack on Hawaii was overwhelming. On Monday, December 8, with only one dissenting vote the Congress heeded the president's recommendations and recognized that a state of war existed between the United States and Japan. Three days later, Germany and Italy signalized their approval of their Axis partner's action by declaring war on the United States, and Congress promptly and unanimously made a reciprocal declara-




JAPANESE POWER ON DECEMBER 8, 1941

tion. Shortly afterward the draft age was extended to include all men between the ages of twenty and forty-four inclusive.

Once again in a world war, the American people from the beginning were united in the belief that the only alternative to defeat and national extinction was total victory. Their navy, despite its initial losses, was the strongest it had ever been and was rapidly being enlarged. Their merchant marine was more nearly prepared for war than at any previous time in American history. Their army was already large and reasonably well trained. Their industrial and financial resources were immense, and there was every evidence that

American
resources



THE PACIFIC OCEAN

Shown here are the mandated zones, chief naval and air bases, islands, and countries, as well as the distances between main points, prior to December, 1941.

the people would approve any sacrifice of civilian luxuries to permit an "all-out" industrial contribution to the battle of production. As the nation girded for the greatest economic activity and effort of its history, it was widely realized that orthodox notions of wages and profits would have to be abandoned, and new and audacious methods of war financing attempted.

Nevertheless, the American people were not permitted long to retain any easy optimism that the war would be short and easy. Thanks to the usual Axis technique of carefully prepared treason in the countries invaded, and thanks also to the minute care with which Japanese plans had been worked out, the Japanese forces in the opening stages of the war swept all before them. Most Americans at first doubted whether Japan could long carry on a modern war, but President Roosevelt and many competent British experts hastened to inform the people that the Japanese might have resources enough to endure for years. Moreover, the initial Japanese capture of Guam, Wake, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Manila, followed by victories in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma, exerted a sobering effect on any overconfidence that might have existed.

Initial
Japanese
victories

On December 22 Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Washington

Preparations
for a long
war

for a long series of conferences with American and other Allied officials.¹² Worked out by the conferees were the preliminary plans for inter-Allied co-operation on a grand scale. Early in January, 1942, twenty-six nations formally indicated their adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and agreed not to make a separate peace with the Axis until a united victory had been achieved. A joint Allied command in the southwestern Pacific was set up. An inter-Allied supply board was projected, and the American people were presented with a fifty-six-billion-dollar budget for the first full year of the war. As 1942 began, the members of the great alliance against the Axis issued reassuring statements about the months ahead. Many people craved such expressions of confidence, for rarely had a year dawned on a more fratricidal world. Twenty-six nations were united against nine, and war was raging on or near all six continents and on the seven seas. More so than at any other time in history the entire world was at war. It was a conflict of titanic proportions, titanic objectives, and titanic costs.

¹² On December 27, 1941 Churchill addressed a joint session of the American Congress. He thus joined a select group of foreigners who had been accorded this privilege: Lafayette, Kossuth, King Albert of Belgium, Ramsay MacDonald, and Lord Tweedsmuir.

The Second World War: From Pearl Harbor to the Surrender of Italy

I. CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES


AS THE WAR increased in magnitude following American entry therein, more clearly than ever its ramifications developed along military, economic, and political lines. The same three-dimensional pattern which had been manifest between 1917-1918 reappeared in the months after Pearl Harbor. Each of these three dimensions is worthy of careful consideration, for unless all are comprehended no proper understanding of the second World War is possible.

Militarily, the conflict was waged on the land, in the air, and at sea. Increasingly, as time wore on, the campaigns represented a highly co-ordinated combination of all three services. Indeed, the development of what were officially called "combined operations" was the chief tactical accomplishment of the war. The Germans had made an impressive beginning of such tactics in the campaigns of 1939-1941, but the United Nations' efforts in the South Pacific, in the Mediterranean area, and in Russia during 1942-1943 attained a higher degree of co-ordination than the Axis Powers had been able to achieve.

In the Far East the Japanese had things their own way until mid-summer of 1942. Singapore surrendered with 60,000 men on February 15; the Netherlands East Indies were wholly occupied by the end of March; Rangoon in Burma capitulated on March 7; and Lashio at the southern end of the Burma Road fell on April 29. Manila was captured on January 2; the defenders of the Bataan peninsula northwest of the former Philippine capital surrendered on April 8; and the island fortress of Corregidor fell on May 6. By June 1 the Japa-

Military developments

Initial Japanese victories



SEPTEMBER 1, 1943

nese tide was lapping at the fringes of Australia and India and beginning to move in the direction of American insular possessions in the north Pacific and central Pacific. In a few months the Japanese had doubled the size of their empire; on June 1, 1942, it was estimated by American experts that the government in Tokyo ruled 300,000,000 people, inhabiting 3,250,000 square miles. Against these impressive successes of the enemy, the United Nations could counter only with General Douglas MacArthur's appointment in March as commander in chief of the southwest Pacific; with the dramatic and daringly executed American air raid on Tokyo on April 18; and with an American naval victory over a Japanese squadron in the Coral Sea, northeast of Australia, in May.

Early in June, 1942, flushed with six months of success, the Japanese dispatched a powerful expeditionary force, apparently designed to seize Midway Island, occupy certain of the Aleutians, attack Hawaii, and—assuming that the previous operations had gone well—actually threaten the American west coast. In a great and decisive encounter west of Midway Island, however, American naval and military air forces turned back the Japanese fleet with heavy losses to the enemy. Although their main push eastward across the Pacific had been stopped, the Japanese successfully occupied a few small islands in the Aleutians. Undeterred by the Midway disaster, they now turned the principal direction of their assault southward. Through June and July they landed many men and large quantities of material in the Solomon Islands archipelago and on the huge island of New Guinea, from either or both of which Australia could be menaced.

Subsequent
Japanese
setbacks

On August 7 American forces, seizing the offensive in their turn, proceeded from the United Nations base at New Caledonia and landed simultaneously on several of the Solomon Islands. Chief among these was one which soon became a household word in the United States, Guadalcanal. The possession of Guadalcanal by the enemy imperiled American communications with Australia; possession of it by the Americans would threaten the whole outer string of island bases which the Japanese had been hurriedly building to protect their newly won empire. For exactly six months American troops, air squadrons, and naval forces engaged in an unrelenting struggle against the Japanese for control of this island. Finally, in February, 1943, the last Japanese was ousted from Guadalcanal. Both sides had lost heavily in the conflict, but there was good reason to think that actually and relatively the Japanese loss had been the greater.

In the ensuing months of 1943 the United Nations' forces sought to maintain the momentum of victory thus begun. The Japanese were driven from the Papuan portion of New Guinea by late spring. During

the summer the Americans simultaneously attacked the Japanese in the Aleutians and in the Solomons, expelling the Japanese completely from the former area and conquering Munda and adjacent islands in the latter. Early in the autumn, General MacArthur's forces embarked on a final campaign to drive the Japanese from northeast New Guinea. American naval and air forces increasingly raided Japanese bases in the Kurile Islands, on Marcus Island, and elsewhere. It was a slow and painful process, for the Japanese fought tenaciously for every inch of every island, and there were thousands of islands between the Solomons and Tokyo.


Affairs in
India and
China

Meantime, complications were developing in military affairs in India and China. England was threatened with the possibility of a direct Japanese assault upon India, following the collapse of British power in Burma. The British leaders began hastily to repair their fences in Asia. In March and April, 1942, the London government sent to India the liberal-minded Sir Stafford Cripps with the proposal that India be given dominion status "immediately" after the war, but that in appreciation of this pledge India agree to throw herself wholeheartedly into the struggle against Japan. The National Congress Party led by Gandhi and Nehru refused the offer, and demanded instead immediate independence. This not being forthcoming, in August they instituted a campaign of civil disobedience and passive resistance. The British put down these activities with a heavy hand, arresting thousands, including Gandhi and Nehru, and inflicting drastic punishment upon rioters. In January, 1943, when General Sir Archibald Wavell was named Viceroy of India, it was hoped that conditions would improve. The situation, however, was not a happy one. In the words of a discriminating American journalist:

India's tragedy is only too clear. It lies in the inability of the Indians to get together. . . . How few among the thousands of Indians I met were willing or able to say "I'm an Indian first, last and always." Not they. They were Hindus or Moslems or Brahmins or non-Brahmins or Punjabs or Bengalis. . . . Strife, perhaps even chaos, lies ahead. All the elements are there and the fires are being fanned by the Indians themselves.¹

In China, likewise, there were many difficulties. Almost entirely blockaded from the outside world after the fall of Burma, the war-weary Chinese in July, 1943, began their seventh year of conflict against the enemy with undimmed spirit but with weakened force.

¹ Herbert Matthews, "India: A Year's Visit Summed Up," *New York Times Magazine*, August 8, 1943, p. 16.



ALLIED SUPPLY ROUTES

(Adapted, courtesy *Life Magazine*, copyright, Time, Inc.)

Early in 1943 Mme. Chiang Kai-shek had come to the United States to plead for more help for China. She was enthusiastically welcomed everywhere, and additional aid was promised. In July the venerable Chinese president Lin Sen died, and shortly after Generalissimo Chiang became the eighth president of the Republic of China. Seeking to support him and his government, the United States undertook to supply needed war materials by air ferry from India, but only relatively small quantities of goods could be carried in this way. American air forces based in China, under the command of Major General Claire L. Chennault, made numerous forays against Japanese bases along the Chinese east coast, while British and American airmen from India joined Chennault's men in attacks on Japanese-occupied points in Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China. Although the Allies invariably did more damage than they suffered, and although their operations were admittedly harassing to the enemy, it seemed doubtful that airpower alone could succor China. Sensing that fact, the British in the winter of 1942-43 strove to reinvoke Burma from the northwest. They made little progress and in the spring were forced to retire from

their hard-won positions. Following the Quebec Conference, however, the United Nations' leaders selected Lord Louis Mountbatten as chief of the Southeast Asia command. Plans for a far-reaching attack were at once initiated.

Defeat of
the Africa
Korps

Different by far was the story in the Mediterranean area. Here, it will be remembered, 1942 began with the Axis forces, under the command of the German general Rommel, on the offensive. After skillful maneuvering in May and June, during which Rommel's troops inflicted serious losses on the British, Axis divisions arrived at a point in Egypt only sixty-five miles from Alexandria. Not sensing how close he was to final victory, Rommel allowed his pressure to relax until late in August. By that time the British were ready for him. Under new leadership, particularly that of General Bernard Law Montgomery, the British in their turn took the offensive. At the battle of El Alamein (October 23—November 12), the Axis forces were completely outmaneuvered and outfought. They began a precipitous westward retreat which was to last for six months and extend over 1500 miles.²

Anglo-
American
intervention

Early on the morning of November 8, 1942, an expeditionary force of more than a hundred thousand men—including American and British divisions—landed simultaneously at ports in French Morocco and Algeria. Excellently equipped, and escorted by Anglo-American naval forces almost without loss, the army was commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Apparently the landings came as a surprise not only to the Axis but also to Marshal Pétain whose authority still controlled North Africa. Nevertheless, within four days Admiral Darlan, chief French official of the Vichy government on the scene, ordered all French resistance to cease and a little later was recognized by Eisenhower as head of French Africa. Meantime, General Henri H. Giraud, recently escaped from a German prison camp, was named military commander and a French army was hastily assembled to take the field along with the Anglo-American troops. After this series of actions, the Germans repudiated the armistice of 1940 with France, and in one day, save for the French naval base at Toulon, took over all that portion of the country previously unoccupied. On Novem-

² One of the major factors in this complete defeat of Rommel's Afrika Korps was overwhelming Allied air superiority. On February 18, 1943, the Allied air forces in northern Africa were organized into four Commands: Strategical under the American Major General Doolittle; Tactical under the British Air Marshal Coningham; Coastal under the British Air Marshal Lloyd; and Photographic under the American Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. One military expert wrote: "The results of this reorganization in terms of air and land power were so impressive that responsible officers feel that February 18, 1943, will go down as a milestone in the history of war."

ber 27, however, when German crews attempted to seize the French fleet based at Toulon, much of the fleet was scuttled according to a prearranged plan.

While these events were transpiring, both sides were racing across North Africa to obtain control of Tunisia. This strategically located area, nominally under Vichy France, commanded the bottleneck at the narrowest point of the Mediterranean. If the United Nations could establish themselves there, all Axis troops in Africa were trapped. If the Axis could secure Tunisia, they might be able to fight a delaying action sufficiently long for Rommel's army to retreat westward from Egypt and partially, at least, be evacuated to Europe. American troops from the west crossed into Tunisia late in November and hurried toward Tunis and Bizerte, the chief ports of the country. They were met by Axis units which were flown across from Sicily in time to stop the Americans. There ensued, therefore, a five-months' interim of savage fighting in the valleys and mountains of Tunisia. By mid-February, 1943, the Axis armies from Egypt had reached Tunisia with the British close at their heels.

The Tunisian campaign

During March and April, the British from the south, the French from the southwest, and the Anglo-American forces from the west pushed the Axis divisions into an ever narrowing "coffin corner" in the northeast tip of Tunisia. By skillful use of air power in constant support of ground forces—"strategic" air squadrons bombing enemy bases and supply areas hundreds of miles from the front lines, while "tactical" squadrons assaulted the enemy's ground troops and artillery—General Eisenhower's army on May 7 won through to Tunis and Bizerte.³ Four days later all Axis resistance ceased. Although Rommel had been recalled "for reasons of health" in March, his successor, General von Arnim, and 175,000 officers and men with large supplies of war material were captured. It was the second major German capitulation in a few months, the defeat at Stalingrad having been the first.

Slightly more than two months later General Eisenhower's victorious army landed in great strength on Sicily. The transport of the initial landing forces for July 10 was the biggest single fleet movement in naval history. Manned by 80,000 men, the fleet consisted of more than 3,200 ships, ranging in size from battleships to motor boats; its craft were drawn from the fleets of America, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, India, Poland, and Greece. The expeditionary force in the beginning comprised 150,000 Americans, British, and Canadians. As the days passed, reinforcements were quickly brought over

The Sicilian campaign

³ The victorious Americans were touched to find in St. George's churchyard in Tunis a monument to John Howard Payne, author of "Home, Sweet Home."

from Africa. Axis strength in Sicily consisted of several Italian divisions and a smaller number of German units. The Italian troops for the most part surrendered after a token resistance, but the Germans fought stubbornly all across Sicily and successfully evacuated the bulk of their forces across Messina Strait to the Italian mainland. On August 17, thirty-eight days after the campaign started, the United Nations were in complete control of Sicily. General Eisenhower won wide commendation not only for his military ability, but also for the tact by which he managed his joint command.⁴

On July 25, as a direct consequence of the Allied victories in Sicily, Benito Mussolini, Italian Duce since October, 1922, resigned his offices and disappeared from public view. As the outer trappings of Fascism rapidly disappeared, King Victor Emmanuel III named as premier the 72-year-old soldier, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Never a member of the Fascist party, Badoglio presumably was to provide an interim government which would placate alike the United Nations and the Germans. During the ensuing weeks, caught between the millstones of Allied demands for unconditional surrender and German insistence that Italy continue as an Axis belligerent, Badoglio desperately sought some compromise which would save Italy from destruction. Meantime, Allied air fleets devasted Rome, Naples, Milan, Turin, and other important places with "saturation raids," and Sicily was completely overrun.⁵ Late in August Badoglio declared Rome an "open city," and sought to impress the Allies by bringing out of retirement the venerable anti-Fascist, Vittorio Orlando, one of the "Big Four" at Versailles in 1919.

While these events which were known to the general public were transpiring, secret negotiations to bring about Italy's capitulation were taking place behind the scenes. After preliminary meetings during August between Allied and Italian representatives in Lisbon and Madrid, on September 3, 1943, an armistice was signed at Palermo by the United Nations and the Badoglio government in Italy. Its terms signified an Italian unconditional surrender as sweeping as that of Germany in 1918. Among them were the cessation of all armed activity; the surrender of the Italian fleet; the use of Italian territory and Corsica for Allied military purposes; the denial of Italian facilities to the Germans; the release of all Allied prisoners of war in Italy;

Italian
disinte-
gration

Armistice
with
Italy


⁴ Under General Eisenhower as commander in chief, the responsible officers were: Land, General Sir Harold Alexander; Air, Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder; Sea, Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham.

⁵ As rapidly as Sicily was conquered, its administration was taken over by AMG, —Allied Military Government. One of AMG's first acts was to endeavor to restore the economic life of the island by putting into circulation 210 million lira of "Allied Military Currency," which was made legal tender anywhere in Sicily.



Acme

Top left, ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ. Top right, GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Bottom left, GENERAL BERNARD LAWS MONTGOMERY. Bottom right, GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.



Bottom left: Ewing Galloway. Other pictures: Acme

Top left, AT QUEBEC CONFERENCE. Principals pose with guest Princess Alice. *Top right, SICILIAN CAMPAIGN.* Americans march on Sicilian road to objective. *Bottom left, IN THE ALEUTIANS.* American troops crouch low in landing barges to avoid enemy snipers. *Bottom right, INVASION OF THE ITALIAN MAINLAND.* An Allied landing party keeps an eye on enemy bombers.

and the acceptance of such political, economic, and financial conditions as Allied discretion might impose. Although Italy's complete surrender was thus made on September 3, it was not publicly announced until five days later, just as the Allied armies were effecting their landings on the beaches south of Naples.

Crying treason and disloyalty against their late Axis partner, the Germans promptly took control of the northern half of hapless Italy and prepared to resist Allied invasion as long as possible. British troops which had landed in the "heel" and "toe" of the peninsula made rapid progress in their invasion northward, but the Allied Fifth Army, commanded by the American Lieutenant General Mark Clark, had a bitter struggle as it fought its way inland from the beachheads south of Naples. Meantime, on September 14, German parachute troops snatched ex-Duce Mussolini from the Italian jailers who were holding him under Badoglio's directions, and spirited him away to German territory. From this temporarily safe vantage point, Mussolini made radio broadcasts hailing the glories of a restored Fascism and calling upon Italians to take up the war again on the Nazi side. Premier Badoglio countered on October 13 by making an Italian declaration of war against Germany. On the whole, the Italian people welcomed the United Nations' troops as the latter took over an ever larger segment of the peninsula. Food was furnished to half-starved populations, and various rehabilitation measures were promptly begun. Denying that they had any intention of dismembering Italy proper, the Allies, including Russia, undertook to settle all their Italian problems in concert.

While Italy thus was torn by faction and riven by the battles waging between Nazi and Allied forces on its soil, United Nations' troops occupied Sardinia and Corsica on the west, threatened to invade the Balkans on the east, and seized certain of the Italian Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean. The Nazis rushed German troops into Italy proper and into the Balkans to bolster their sagging defenses where Italians were pulling out. Historic incidents of the past, such as Napoleon's incarceration on the island of Elba in 1814 and the German occupation of Rome in 1527, had modern analogues in the Nazi seizure of Elba and the "protective custody" in which they placed the Vatican. But such actions, no matter how superficially striking, could not disguise the facts that the Mediterranean was now an Allied lake; that the opening of a short seaborne route to the Far East was of the highest strategic importance; and that Nazi Europe was in the greatest peril from attack, especially by air, from the newly won Allied bases in Italy and its islands.

While the United Nations were enduring a temporary stalemate in

Campaign
in Italy




June 21, 1941



December, 1941



December, 1942



September 20, 1943

BATTLE LINES IN RUSSIA

(Adapted, courtesy *Time Magazine*, copyright, Time, Inc.)

the Far East and were winning a series of notable triumphs in the Mediterranean, Russian armies struggled with Axis forces in massive engagements on the eastern front. During the bitter winter of 1941-42 the Germans and their allies were barely able to hold their own on the long line from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. With the coming of warm weather, however, they resumed the offensive. This time they attacked, not on the whole front as in 1941, but only on its southernmost sector. In the late spring, Axis armies completed the occupation of the Crimean and Kerch peninsulas and on June 28, 1942, began a drive toward the Volga River and the oil wells of the Caucasus. After two months of steady progress east and south respectively, they reached the environs of Stalingrad, Russia's chief city on the lower Volga, and the outer fringe of oil fields in the Caucasus. But their supply lines were overextended, and once again Russian resilience and the oncoming winter proved too much for them. Late in November the Russian armies counterattacked, and the German forces began a long retreat westward.

The Russian generals threw their columns in a great noose around the Axis troops lingering in the Stalingrad area, and on February 2, 1943, forced a mass surrender. It was the first time since the battle of Jena in 1806 that a German unit as large as an army corps had formally surrendered in the course of a war. All the survivors of the German Sixth Army, including the commander, Field Marshal von Paulus, capitulated. It was a signal accomplishment for the Russians and alike in the military and political phases of the war was justly regarded as a turning point in the mighty struggle—perhaps in Prime Minister Churchill's phrase, the "end of the beginning."

Not pausing to rest on their laurels, the Russians pushed steadily onward until by March the Germans were generally back to the positions they had occupied previously to their 1942 offensive; the exception to this was their retention of a toe hold in the northwestern Caucasus and continued occupation of Kerch and Crimea. The bad months of the spring forced a slowing-down of the Russian attack, but in midsummer it was resumed again with great intensity. After fierce and sanguinary struggles the Russians recaptured Kharkov, Smolensk, and other key points. Under the enormous pressure of this campaign the Axis forces began a general retreat to a shorter and more defensible line in western Russia, there to attempt a final stand during the winter. The Russian struggle illustrated again the difficulties of winning a war in a region as huge as the U.S.S.R. Territories might change hands successively, but unless and until the main force of the enemy could be brought to decisive defeat no mortal blow had been struck. Hence, all through 1943 Premier Stalin—by now also Marshal

Russo-
German
campaign:
1942

Stalingrad

Russo-
German
campaign:
1943

Stalin—called insistently for a “second front” in western Europe. Such a major assault, Moscow believed, would draw enough Germans from the East to permit the U.S.S.R. to deal the long-desired fatal blow to Nazi power.

Both sides in the battles in the East received great aid from their allies. The Russians drew immense quantities of munitions and food from their Anglo-American partners. From the United States alone during the first two years of Lend-Lease, Russia secured several thousand tanks and airplanes, 85,000 motor vehicles, and huge stocks of food, drugs, and other vital war supplies. Partly to expedite this program, W. Averell Harriman was appointed U. S. Ambassador to Russia late in 1943. For this American aid Premier Stalin officially expressed thanks to the people of the United States on September 22, 1943. Great Britain was proportionately generous in her shipments. Deliveries were made either by way of Iran and the Caspian Sea or by convoy to Murmansk and Archangel on the White Sea. Almost as important as Lend-Lease was to Russia was Germany’s use of the man power of the satellite Axis states to supplement her divisions on the eastern front. Hitler’s forces included:

. . . Finns, Hungarians, Rumanians, Italians, Slovaks and Bulgars, whom he calls allies; as legionaries, he has used or is using: Spanish, French, Walloons, Flemings, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, Croats, Cossacks, Turkomans from Turkestan, Volga Tartars, tribes from Azerbaijan, Armenians, Georgians, and other Caucasians. Moreover, individuals from several neutral countries are serving in either the German army or the SS-in-Arms, such as Swedes, Swiss, and others. This does not include men from the annexed or reannexed territories such as Austria, Sudetenland, Luxemburg, Eupen-Malmedy, and Alsace-Lorraine, whose military duties are exactly the same as those of Germans.⁶

Defense status in western Europe

While the Far East, the Mediterranean, and Russia were seeing land actions of major importance, the historic battle area of the European powers, *i. e.*, France and its adjacent states, witnessed little activity. In the spring of 1942 the Germans appointed to their Western

⁶ Alfred Vagts, “Hitler’s Foreign Legions,” *The Infantry Journal*, LIII (1943), pp. 31-36. Quoted by permission. Among the more than 200 Axis divisions on the eastern front in 1942 perhaps a quarter of them were from Hitler’s satellite states.

Russian prowess in withstanding this horde of enemies was better appreciated in Great Britain than in the United States. In answer to a Gallup poll taken in the summer of 1943 in both countries on the question, “Which country has done the most toward winning the war,” the replies were:

<i>British</i>		<i>American</i>	
Russia	50%	U.S.	55%
Great Britain	42%	Russia	32%
China	5%	Great Britain	9%
U.S.	3%	China	4%

Command Marshal von Rundstedt, a recognized expert at defensive warfare. The Allies likewise recognized the deadlock in the West by limiting their military operations to hit-and-run raids by small amphibious groups of specially trained men known as "commandos." Of such raids the chief one—participated in by 6,000 men, of whom more than half were lost—in the three years following the defeat of France was that on Dieppe in August, 1942. During this period, from the northern end of occupied Norway to the Spanish border, the Germans sought to build a network of defensive positions which would frustrate any Allied attempt at invasion from the West. Increasingly German spokesmen characterized their position as a *Festung Europa*, a "European Fortress," and compared their status to that of Prussia during the later years of the Seven Years' War under Frederick the Great. Meantime, while maintaining a defensive position in western Europe, the Germans sought desperately to move their heavy industry eastward to the "Four-Year-Plan Gau," well out of easy Allied bombing range.⁷

As already intimated, the months following American entry into the war saw an ever increasing crescendo of Allied air activity. In February, 1942, Air Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris was placed in charge of the British Bomber Command. Within a week there came the first of a long series of gigantic night attacks by huge R.A.F. bombers. In August the United States Eighth Air Force, composed of hundreds of "Flying Fortresses," began its precision daylight raids to supplement the British night assaults. These attacks were on a vaster scale and far more destructive than the worst of the Nazi raids on Great Britain in 1940-41. Key German cities like Cologne and Hamburg, and numerous places in the Ruhr and Rhineland regions, were laid in almost complete ruin. The cost was heavy. In the first eight months of 1943 alone, Anglo-American bomber losses over Western Europe totaled 2,098. Nevertheless, the advocates of bombing insisted that these losses were nothing compared to the carefully planned pattern of ruin that the bombers had wrought over Axis lands and declared

The air assault on Germany

⁷ The "Four-Year-Plan Gau," included the industrial area of Upper Silesia, Galicia, and Moravia. Its core—approximately 20,000 square miles, normally inhabited by 5,000,000 people—was a separate administrative province of the Reich, under the supreme control of Marshal Goering and his assistant, General von Hanneken. Tributary to it were the industrial regions of Hungary, eastern Austria, parts of Yugoslavia, and most of the industrial wealth of Poland. By 1943, this economic complex had surpassed in some important respects the actual production of the famed Ruhr Valley region. Simultaneously, however, with its initial successes as a war-production area, the Allied bombers first began to reach into its environs; for example, in August, 1943 there were American raids on Romanian Ploesti and Austrian Wiener-Neustadt.

that the future would see an intensification of the attack.⁸ The Luftwaffe fought back stubbornly but under the terrific Allied pressure seemed to deteriorate alike quantitatively and qualitatively.

The struggle against the U-boats

At sea the principal type of combat continued to be the struggle with the German U-boats. During the period immediately after the entry of the United States into the war, Axis submarines had a field day in the western Atlantic. In 1942 the U-boats sank more Allied tonnage than could be built to replace the losses, averaging probably close to 1,000,000 tons a month. It was the greatest destruction of its kind in history and largely exceeded simultaneous Axis losses from Allied bombing. Operating in squadrons popularly called "wolf packs," by the end of 1942 the submarines were threatening to win the "Battle of the Atlantic." Gradually, however, the United Nations mastered the menace. From Great Britain, after November, 1942, the fight against the submarine was centralized under Admiral Sir Max Horton, who devised many new techniques to conquer the U-boat. Convoys were improved in organization and protection. Air patrols extending to the mid-Atlantic were set up. Hastily improvised aircraft carriers with bombing planes accompanied the convoys. Hundreds of antisubmarine ships called "D-E boats" (destroyer-escorts) and "corvettes" were built, especially in Canada, which made a major contribution in this development. In October, 1943, Portugal granted Great Britain and the United States naval and air bases on the strategically located Azores Islands. Perhaps most important of all, American builders began to slide ships down the ways at a rate unprecedented in history.⁹

Technology and the war

Technologically, the war witnessed the development and improvement of many devices during 1942 and 1943. Radar—the mechanism for detecting planes and ships over distances and through obstacles,

⁸ In the first four years of the war, to September 1, 1943, the R.A.F. dropped approximately 140,000 tons of bombs on German targets. More than half of this weight came in 1943. These figures may be put in a certain perspective by remembering that in fifteen days in 1918 the British army alone on the western front fired 150,000 tons of shells at German positions.

⁹ Consider the following statistics on American production of merchant ships only:

Year	No. of Ships Built	Deadweight Tons
1939	28	342,000
1940	53	619,000
1941	103	1,137,000
1942	746	8,088,000
1943 (est.)	1500	19,000,000

In addition, the Navy of the United States had been expanded until it exceeded in size and power any other fleet in history.

such as smoke and fog, impenetrable by human vision or hearing—was brought to perfection by the scientists of all belligerent states. Extensive research into quartz crystals further improved radio. Rocket projectiles were devised. Extraordinary developments in the use of the so-called “light metals” occurred. New drugs, such as the sulpha derivatives, penicillin, pentamidine, and synthalgin, came into common use. Blood plasma was collected on a large scale and proved extremely valuable for the war wounded.¹⁰ Dehydration of foods was improved. Synthetic products of all kinds, notably rubber, were devised and put into mass production for combatants and civilians. In the United States, and presumably elsewhere, new mechanisms for gun-sighting came into use, so that the time for accurate sighting, ranging, and firing of massed artillery was reduced from an hour to twenty-five seconds. Similarly, antiaircraft increased its effective range from a few thousand feet to more than seven miles.

Casualties in the American army, during the first two years after Pearl Harbor, were relatively light. To the end of September, 1943, estimated United States' losses in killed, wounded, and missing were a little more than 110,000.¹¹ By the end of 1943 America planned to have in more than fifty oversea areas 2,250,000 men. By the end of 1944 the figure was calculated to be 5,000,000. Including the trainees and members of all services at home, a total force of 11,000,000 was planned. Counted among this group were several hundred thousand members of the WACS, WAVES, SPARS, WASPS, and Women's Reserve of the United States Marine Corps. To those who questioned the need for such huge forces, late in August, 1943, War Mobilization Director James W. Byrnes pointed out that the Anglo-American armies since Pearl Harbor had met and defeated only 7 per cent of the Axis combat divisions in the European area, while even the Russians were containing only 40 per cent of the Axis strength there. He went on to say: “It is by no means clear that we are today as near to winning the war as the Axis was in the summer of 1940.” Similarly in his biennial report dated July 1, 1943, the American Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall wrote: “The end is not yet clearly in sight, . . . but victory is certain.” In a similar vein President Roosevelt warned Congress on September 17 that “we are still a long, long way from ultimate victory . . .,” and four days later, Prime Minister

The United
States in
the first two
years of war

¹⁰ Largely because of these medical developments the percentage of deaths from battle wounds declined from 7.1% in 1917-1918 to 3.7% in the American army during the second World War. British and Russian experience was similar.

¹¹ On July 14, 1943, the period of American participation in the second World War was precisely as long as was the period from April 6, 1917 to November 11, 1918, the time of American participation in the first World War. In that period in the first war American casualties had been over 350,000.

Churchill told parliament that "the bloodiest portion of this war for Great Britain and the United States lies ahead of us."

II. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS IN THE WARRING NATIONS

As the war became global after 1942, so the socioeconomic adjustments in each belligerent state became steadily more encompassing and complete. Significant developments in production, labor, transportation, finance, government controls over the national life, and the general standard of living will be noted here in respect of both the United Nations and the Axis powers.

Among the United Nations the United States, Great Britain and her Dominions, and Russia were the chief centers of war production. Precise data on Russian output were not available outside the U.S.S.R., but it was apparent that in any case Russia needed much help from her Allies. Great Britain and the Dominions in many ways performed prodigies of organization and production—in some fields individual British factories were turning out in 1943 as much as the whole nation had done in 1918—but Great Britain was inescapably a small island.

It fell to the United States to make good as "the arsenal of democracy," and indubitably it did so. By 1943 almost 60 per cent of American industrial potential had been converted to war purposes. The three states of Washington, Oregon, and California alone in 1943 probably produced more ships and airplanes than did all the rest of the world outside the United States. By that year each month saw the production of American war goods, measured in dollars and cents, equivalent to the construction of 15 TVA's. The automotive industry in its best peacetime year had never built more than 5½ million passenger cars and trucks; by 1943 it was making armaments at a rate equal to the production of 20 million automobiles a year. The extraordinary record in shipbuilding has already been noted. Approximately 90 million tons of steel—half the total world production—were made in American mills in 1943. Steel plants built after Pearl Harbor had a productive capacity almost equivalent to the entire steel industry of Great Britain. Much of the new industrial development was erected by private capital, but by 1943 the government itself owned more than 15 billion dollars' worth of war factories, shipyards, and extractive enterprises.

Unlike the experience of 1917-18, when American armies overseas were largely equipped from Allied sources, in the second World War American fighting men were supplied almost completely from home industry. In addition, the latter furnished huge quantities of goods for

United
Nations
production

Production
in the U.S.



Single man **INCOME \$1,000.00**



\$188.00 goes in TAX



Married man with two children **INCOME \$2,000.00**



\$304.00 goes in TAX



Married man with two children **INCOME \$4,000.00**



\$1,204.00 goes in TAX

INCOME TAX IN GREAT BRITAIN

Some examples of the direct income tax paid on earned income by British citizens are indicated here.

(Courtesy British Information Services)

sale to the other United Nations, and even greater amounts for the Lend-Lease program. This enormous development was under the direction of Harry Hopkins and Edward R. Stettinius. Through July 31, 1943, almost 14 billion dollars' worth of Lend-Lease supplies had been distributed; these included 20 per cent of all American airplane production; 23 per cent of all combat cars; 40 per cent of all railroad cars; 45 per cent of all tanks; and 46 per cent of all locomotives.

The
Lend-Lease
program

In all the United Nations an ever growing fraction of the adult population—in Great Britain, for instance, 22 million out of an effective total of 33 million—became laborers in the war effort. Everywhere laborers worked longer hours, and more women took their places at the machines. While the United States did not have to go to the lengths necessary in Great Britain and in Russia in female employment, by 1943 more than a third of all American war workers were women. In some plants, particularly in the aircraft industry, as many as three-fourths of the employees were women. In order to convince the people that government was genuinely appreciative of labor's part in the war, elaborate postwar social security plans were put forward by responsible leaders. Among these the two best known were the British Beveridge plan—announced in December, 1942—and the report of the American National Resources Planning Board—published in March, 1943.

Transportation facilities throughout the United Nations were strained to the utmost by the war effort. Because of the global nature

WHISKY 	TOBACCO 	SUGAR 	TEA 
Retail Price \$5.10 Tax \$3.68	Retail Price \$.44 Tax \$.36	Retail Price \$.05 Tax \$.04	Retail Price \$.50 Tax \$.10
MATCHES 	BEER 	CIGARETTES 	
Retail Price \$.02½ Tax \$.01	Retail Price \$.20 Tax \$.13	Retail Price \$.46½	Tax \$.35

INDIRECT TAXATION IN GREAT BRITAIN

The indirect tax is indicated in the cost of certain commodities in general demand.

(Courtesy British Information Services)

Transportation of the conflict, problems of logistics and communications were of unprecedented importance. In Russia the destruction of railroads and supply arteries in a wide belt along the 2,000-mile battle front was an ever present deterrent to decisive military action by either side. Great Britain endured many shortages because of the huge merchant-marine losses in the U-boat warfare. Even the United States had to restrict civilian transport to permit the passage of 20 million troops and 80 million tons of supplies on American railroads during the first year and a half of the war. Twenty million tons of cargo were shipped to the troops overseas, the supplies for North Africa alone being more than were shipped to the A.E.F. in 1917-18. A remarkable air-freight system was organized, and consignments of important goods from the United States often reached points as far away as India in five days.

Loans and taxes Every one of the nations in the anti-Axis coalition dug deep into its pocketbook to pay for the war. While national income increased in all the United Nations—in the United States an all-time record was reached in June, 1943, when the figure for that one month stood at 12 billion dollars—so did the costs of the conflict increase. In Great Britain early in the summer of 1943 the financial secretary to the Treasury announced that the British national debt had increased from 32 billion dollars in 1939 to 71 billion dollars, and that in each eight-

week period in 1943 his country was borrowing as much as the total cost of the Napoleonic wars from Trafalgar to Waterloo. In the United States equally startling figures were available. The American national debt increased from approximately 50 billion dollars in December, 1941, to more than 160 billion dollars in late 1943. A Third War Loan raised more than 18 billion dollars as the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor approached. Taxes went to unprecedented heights everywhere, more drastic elsewhere than in the United States. The British put a general ceiling of \$16,000 a year on personal incomes and levied a 100 per cent excess-profits tax. Canada and the Dominions almost equalled these figures. With such levies these countries paid half their war bills out of current government income, while in the United States, even after the new taxes of 1943, the proportion was only one-third.

Every member of the United Nations faced such economic difficulties as shortages of raw materials, rising prices, distribution problems, and housing inadequacies. Countries which had been in the war before Pearl Harbor had developed ways and means of meeting such matters. In the United States almost overnight a multitude of government agencies was created, designed to handle these problems with expedition and efficiency. By 1943 the WMC (War Manpower Commission, headed by Paul McNutt) regulated the military draft and the employment of men and women in industry; the WLB (War Labor Board, headed by William H. Davis) handled labor; the ODT (Office of Defense Transportation, headed by Joseph Eastman) supervised all railroad, bus, taxi, truck and airplane traffic; the OPA (Office of Price Administration) under various heads strove to control prices; the WPB (War Production Board, headed by Donald Nelson) sought to accelerate industrial production; the WSA (War Shipping Administration, headed by Admiral E. S. Land) expedited maritime construction; and special administrators handled such key problems as the supply of rubber, the allocation of fuel, and the maintenance of an adequate food supply.

Nevertheless, despite all efforts to the contrary, the cost of living went up, and in many ways the general standard of living declined throughout the United Nations. Notably was this true in China where a dangerous inflation by 1943 had raised wholesale prices to a figure fifty times higher than the prewar level. In Russia, despite herculean efforts to mitigate these conditions, civilian hunger and privation were widespread. In Australia, largely because of poor economic conditions, the triennial election in August, 1943, caused a marked strengthening of the Labor Party's political position. So it was likewise in Canada where the militantly socialistic Co-operative Common-

Govern-
mental war-
time admin-
istration

Living
standards

wealth Federation in Ontario "swamped" both old parties in the 1943 provincial elections. In Great Britain, too, the ABCA (Army Bureau of Current Affairs) and the program of the Common Wealth party headed by Sir Richard Acland gave abundant proof that there were stirrings in the popular mind about matters of living standards and democratic control. In the United States, despite the maintenance of relatively high living standards—probably higher than normal for some persons in war industry and a few farmers—the outbreak of race riots in several cities in 1943, the existence of "black markets," and the call for government subsidies in various areas of economic life showed that the pressures of war were making themselves felt. In all the major United Nations rationing programs were made more stringent, and coupons and ration books became as important as money and checkbooks in the purchase of many commodities, such as meat and processed foods, gasoline and fuel oil.

The Axis On the Axis side, it was difficult to get any exact data analogous to the figures frequently available in the western democracies. It was known that the Japanese had secured huge resources in raw materials—90 per cent of the world's crude rubber, for example—and were making every effort to exploit them. In September, 1943, however, the American Secretary of the Navy asserted that United States naval forces had reduced Japanese merchant shipping by a net total of 30 per cent, so that it was not certain that the Japanese would be able to use their acquisitions. The prevailing American view was that Japan was a second-rate industrial power which the accidents of war had temporarily transformed into a first-rate military menace. Nevertheless, there were not lacking Americans—such as Rear Admiral D. C. Ramsey, chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics—who warned that Japan's productive capacity was constantly increasing and must not be underestimated. Many others of a realistic turn of mind were far from convinced of Japan's vulnerability.

Production In Europe the industrial situation was more favorable to Germany. By 1943 the factories of all the occupied regions had been merged with German industry to such an extent that even the most cheerful of United Nations economists despaired of every wholly unscrambling them. The Nazis seized control of every bank, every insurance company, and every foreign exchange. They reorganized agricultural output and the extractive industries of every land which they conquered, and had much influence in the economic life of some of the remaining European neutrals. All this immense potential was geared solely to the war effort. In addition, by a universal confiscation of tangible goods which could aid in the war, the Germans secured huge supplies of raw materials. Included in this plunder from occupied

Europe were large fractions of all the flocks and herds of the continent.¹²

Labor was handled by the Axis powers in a way possible only because of their conquests in the opening stages of the war. Japan, for example, had millions of docile coolies to organize and put to work at any endeavor desired. For all that the outside world knew, these masses of workmen, although not of high productive capacity, toiled unresistingly for their new masters, and undoubtedly worked under wage, hour, and health standards inconceivable to countries like the United States. Germany, also, used millions of foreign laborers. The Nazis declared that in the Reich alone the number of foreign workers, including war prisoners, exceeded 12 million by the end of 1943.¹³ There was also available for war work the Reich Labor Service, directed by General Konstantin Hierl, which included hundreds of thousands of young German civilians of both sexes; by 1942 similar youth labor mobilizations had taken place in such Nazi-controlled or satellite states as the Netherlands, Norway, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, and Hungary. Finally, the Organization Todt, with a personnel numbering upwards of a million in 1943, was a highly trained and mobile labor force available for necessary work wherever the Nazi leaders desired it. None of these groups in wages or in working conditions was comparable to free and unionized labor in the democracies.

In the field of transportation the Axis powers faced many difficulties. The Japanese were handicapped by immense distances, coupled with an inadequate merchant marine undergoing the steady attrition of war. The European Axis likewise experienced severe losses in its seagoing merchant marine—according to British figures more than 9,000,000 tons during the first forty-six months of war. On land their situation was more favorable. Late in 1943 the Axis powers still controlled directly more than 150,000 miles of European railroads—equal to 60 per cent of the U. S. railway mileage—and interfered with the transport policy of the neighboring neutrals.¹⁴ In addition the Nazis operated tens of thousands of miles of important canal routes which by 1943 were carrying a third of all Germany's transport.

Labor

Transportation

¹² In 1943 the United States Board of Economic Warfare estimated that the Nazi loot to date had more than paid for all the war costs incurred by Germany from 1933 to 1939, a figure stated by Hitler to have been 90 billion marks, or roughly 36 billion dollars. Cf. E. S. Hediger, "Nazi Exploitation of Occupied Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XVIII (1942), June 1, 1942.

¹³ The United Nations in 1943 began the practice of using prisoners of war in certain types of work, chiefly agricultural.

¹⁴ In August, 1943, the Swedish government announced that Sweden's railways would no longer be available for German military passenger or freight traffic.

While pushing inland waterways, the Nazi Inspector General of transportation, Jakob Werlin, and the Reichminister in charge of industrial production, Albert Speer, in 1943 concentrated on railway improvements. They reported that Germany built 3,000 locomotives between 1939 and 1942 and planned to complete 4,200 in 1943. But a new threat to Axis transportation grew steadily. The R.A.F. deliberately concentrated on destroying locomotives, putting 1,500 out of commission by direct air attack in the one year from April, 1942, to April, 1943, and also bombing roundhouses, repair shops, junctions, and freight yards. Moreover, in an effort to disrupt the traffic on the important Mittelland Canal in the spring of 1943, the R.A.F. partially destroyed the Möhne and Eder dams. Even more disastrous was the wrecking of Italian transport facilities after the Allied conquest of Sicily.

Living standards

Not enough authentic information about wartime government controls, war finances, and living standards in Germany, Italy, and Japan was available to permit a clear view of conditions there. But all evidence leaking out of those countries indicated that everything that was characteristic of Great Britain and the United States was true in Axis lands also—only enormously more severe, drastic, and stringent. In Germany and Japan the situation had not deteriorated to the point where a strong war effort was not still possible. In Italy and in the occupied countries both in the Far East and in Europe, however, by 1943 it seemed as if the bow had been bent to the breaking point. Reports filtering out of the Philippines showed a precipitous decline in the economic welfare of the people, and similar information trickled into the United Nations from Malaya, Burma, and the East Indies. Allied armies were greeted like long-lost friends by the war-weary people in Tunis and in Sicily; some historically minded observers compared the warmth of their reception by the populace to the welcome accorded Napoleon by the Italians in the French conquest of Italy during the spring of 1796. Worse by comparison, since previously their standards had been higher, were the living conditions in some of the occupied countries of Europe: France, Norway, Poland, and Greece. Infant mortality increased to figures shocking to all humanitarians, while death rates for the aged likewise went rapidly upward. Even the so-called healthy adults were anemic and malnourished. Medical care was hopelessly inadequate, and the future of whole national populations seemed in serious jeopardy. Late in 1943 the English author Vera Brittain described famine conditions in Europe as “one of the most terrible things that has ever happened in the history of the world.”

III. POLITICAL PROBLEMS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

Just as the second World War brought forth unprecedented combat activities and techniques, and even as it produced socioeconomic developments hitherto unknown, so also it witnessed a range of political problems unparalleled in modern history. These involved both questions of national import and of international significance. At present an adequate consideration of the separate national political problems would be an impossible task, so that in the following discussion only a sketch of those pertaining to the United States will be given. Then some of the so-called global or international matters confronting all the United Nations will be summarized.

Any modern war must be accompanied by a complex mechanism to handle public opinion. This is especially true in a nation accustomed to democratic freedom. In the United States the Office of Censorship under Byron Price was set up shortly after Pearl Harbor to care for the many details involved in that type of regulation. So effective was its control of the news that, for example, not for a full year after Pearl Harbor and an equally long period after the American air attack on Tokyo in April, 1942, did the American public learn the full truth about either episode in the war. In midsummer, 1942, after various preliminary experiments, the Office of War Information under Elmer Davis was created to disseminate accurate factual matter at home and abroad as quickly as it could be released. The two organizations worked together smoothly, and on the whole did a satisfactory job. As time went on, the OWI concentrated most of its efforts on overseas work, short-wave broadcasts, pamphlets dropped from airplanes, and "public relations" activities among the neutral and occupied countries.

Public
opinion in
the United
States

Nevertheless, the right of criticism and the free play of public opinion certainly did not disappear from the American scene. Criticism, indeed, became one of the chief functions of Congress which it exercised unsparingly as the war progressed. The so-called Truman Committee, formed originally in February, 1941, consisted of ten Senators who spent much of their time and energy investigating reports of unsavory situations in the war effort; its friends claimed that in the first two years of its existence it had saved the American public at least a billion dollars. Similarly vigorous was considerable public criticism of the government's policy toward American-born Japanese; by late 1943 it appeared likely that the indiscriminate use of relocation camps for such people might be modified. American surveillance of German and Italian aliens in the United States was always

Maintenance
of civil
liberties

magnanimous, and in the case of the latter was almost abandoned after October, 1942. Interparty rivalries by no means disappeared, and there was much anticipation of the forthcoming presidential election of 1944. Civil liberties remained unmolested, and there was less popular hysteria than there had been in the first World War. In many ways the American people proudly lived up to their faith in the "Four Freedoms."¹⁵

On the international scene the major political accomplishments during the first two years after Pearl Harbor were the growth of the United Nations as a collective force in the world, and the increasingly intimate collaboration of the United States and Great Britain. At the time of the Washington Declaration of January 1, 1942, the United Nations numbered twenty-six states which subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Late in 1943 they had grown to thirty-three.¹⁶ Especially did the United Nations seek to cultivate Latin America. In that continent, although they did not enter the war, many countries showed their sympathies by breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, or Japan. Only Argentina remained obdurate. In that quarter of the world, at least, the United Nations had still a task to accomplish.

The United States and Great Britain became closer and more intimate in all their relationships as the war continued. There developed a mutual respect, a patience in seeking to understand one another's viewpoint, and a recognition of common purposes which were deeper and more solid than at any time in the history of the two countries. These intimate ties were symbolized in the frequent meetings of Prime Minister Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.¹⁷ Anglo-

¹⁵ As a tacit recognition of this fact, Premier Tojo of Japan in a broadcast to the "New Order in Eastern Asia" claimed in August, 1943, that the Japanese were fighting also for four freedoms. To "prove" this claim, Japan in 1943 granted "independence" to Burma and to the Philippines, organized under its Quisling Chandra Bose, an "Indian national army of liberation," enlarged Thailand at the expense of conquered Malaya, and granted its puppet Chinese government at Nanking the defunct foreign rights once held by the western powers, including Italy, in various Chinese cities. In "gratitude" both the Chinese puppet government at Nanking and the pro-Japanese regime in Burma "declared war" on the United Nations.

¹⁶ New United Nations members included Bolivia, Brazil (which in the autumn of 1943 was ready to send several divisions to Europe), Ethiopia, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines, and Iran. Not all these countries, however, declared war against all three of the main Axis powers.

¹⁷ Exclusive of the Atlantic Charter Conference off Newfoundland in August, 1941, prior to Pearl Harbor, the wartime meetings of the two national leaders and their respective staffs to the autumn of 1943 were as follows: at Washington, December, 1941-January, 1942; at Washington again, June, 1942; at Casablanca in French Morocco in January, 1943; at Washington in May, 1943; and at Quebec, Canada, in August, 1943, followed by further conferences the next month in Washington.

American collaboration was expressed in a constantly increasing stream of common decisions and actions. Perhaps the most important mutual decision made in the early months of American participation in the war was indicated by Prime Minister Churchill in his statement to Parliament on February 11, 1943:

British and American strategists and leaders are unanimous in adhering to their decision of a year ago, namely, that the defeat of Hitler and the breaking of German power must have priority over the decisive phase of the war against Japan.

This decision had been interpreted by President Roosevelt, shortly after his return from the Casablanca Conference, to mean eventually the "unconditional surrender" of all the Axis powers.

Substantial progress was made by American and British leaders along other lines. Lend-Lease developed not as a one-sided proposition, but as a reciprocal enterprise in which neither nation distinguished, save for accounting purposes, between gifts and loans. Discussions on a postwar international monetary stabilization program went steadily forward with the British J. M. Keynes and the American Harry White chiefly responsible for the plans from their respective countries. In April, 1943, a conference was held at Bermuda to consider ways and means of resettling Europe's uprooted peoples, estimated at that time to exceed 16,000,000 in number.¹⁸ Little was actually accomplished, and the refugee problem, particularly that connected with Jewish emigration to Palestine, continued to plague Allied leaders. Similarly, the enormous need for food relief and every manner of material rehabilitation led to mutual study of these matters. In the spring of 1942 five nations—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Argentina—signed an agreement to build up a reserve pool of wheat for postwar relief. In November, 1942, the United States, with Great Britain's approval, set up the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) under the direction of former governor H. H. Lehman of New York. In May and June, 1943, at Hot Springs, Virginia, Anglo-American delegates, together with representatives from forty-two other countries, met in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. After its adjournment a draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and

Conferences
on money,
refugees,
and food

¹⁸ Apropos of the appalling Nazi mass deportations and even wholesale massacres which were largely responsible for the unsettling of so many millions of Europeans, the United States and European members of the United Nations on December 17, 1942 jointly condemned such German actions, and warned that "those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution." This declaration followed previous similar statements by the European governments-in-exile on January 13, 1942; by President Roosevelt on October 7, 1942; and by the government of the U.S.S.R. on November 4, 1942.

Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was prepared and submitted to all the United Nations. Following its acceptance a UNRRA conference was planned.

Anglo-American relations with Russia

A political matter of major importance to the western democracies was their relations with the U.S.S.R. It can scarcely be doubted that alike in Russia and in the Anglo-American section of the United Nations there was a common desire for close and effective collaboration in the war against the Axis. But many difficulties in the way of such collaboration had to be surmounted. To begin with, immediately after Pearl Harbor Moscow had made it clear that Russia did not propose to get into war with Japan; on April 13, 1942, the first anniversary of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, the Russian government affirmed this position. It was an anomalous situation, for from the Anglo-American viewpoint Japan was a serious enemy whose defeat would obviously be made easier if Siberia could be used as a base of attack.

Problems among the Allies

Other difficulties arose. The Russians made clear their determination after the war to retain the western frontier they had possessed on June 22, 1941. A bitter protest arose immediately from the governments-in-exile of those countries. Since from the Anglo-American perspective one of the main objectives of the war was the right of all nations to freedom and independence, the Russian insistence presented an obviously embarrassing dilemma. Another difference of opinion developed over the postwar treatment of Germany. Premier Stalin as head of the Russian government was not present at any of the Roosevelt-Churchill conferences, and never gave enthusiastic allegiance to the slogan of "unconditional surrender." On the contrary, he asserted that "it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state," and in July, 1943, set up in Moscow a "National Committee of Free Germany," composed of thirty-three Germans who had either fled to Russia or been captured in the war. One of the members of this committee was said to be the great-grandson of Prince von Bismarck, Germany's famous chancellor of the nineteenth century. The committee's manifesto to Germany urged an immediate revolution against Hitler, the formation of a "genuine national German government," the recall of German troops to the prewar boundary, and peace. It was a program singularly reminiscent of that preceding the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Russia.¹⁹

¹⁹ The widely heralded "dissolution of the Third International" in May, 1943—a step purporting to show Russian desire to "forget and forgive" international communist propaganda activities of the past—was actually not an *action*, but only a *proposal*, subject to ratification by the various sections of the Communist International.

Perhaps influenced by this approach, the Anglo-American leaders at the Quebec Conference indicated that they, too, recognized a difference between the Nazi leadership and the German nation as a whole. In the absence of such a distinction previously the Nazis had sought to make their fate indistinguishable from that of the whole nation. As a counter to the Quebec Conference announcement, Hitler named the *Gestapo* chief, Himmler, Minister of the Interior. Hailing this appointment as proof of German internal weakness, the Russian, British, and American foreign ministers held a meeting at Moscow in October, 1943, and planned a gathering of their chiefs at a later date.

The apparent indecision of the Anglo-American section of the United Nations as to exactly how they proposed to handle a defeated Germany after "unconditional surrender"—in seeming contrast to the clear Russian program of a revolution along Communist lines—was reflected also in the political relationships of the United Nations with beaten Italy and with helpless France. While Italian patriots in exile urged the stimulation of a democratic revolt in Italy that would do away wholly with the monarchy and all its supporters, including the administration of Marshal Badoglio, Washington and London hesitated. Stressing the danger of "anarchy" in case government in Italy should collapse, they moved cautiously in the matter of encouraging a sweeping political and social revolution. In the case of France, likewise, there was tardiness in recognizing as a *de facto* government the Committee for National Liberation—formed in July, 1943, by a merger of the older "Free French" movement of General De Gaulle, and another French group which had rallied around General Henri Giraud after his escape to North Africa during the Anglo-American invasion in the autumn of 1942. Late in August, 1943, Russia accorded the Committee for National Liberation complete recognition as the *de facto* government of France, but even after the Quebec Conference the Anglo-American leaders refused to give it more than limited recognition. In like manner the Russians and the statesmen of the western democracies approached the intricate problems of the Balkans from somewhat differing viewpoints. This was well illustrated in Bulgaria following the unexpected death of Tsar Boris III in August, 1943.

Fortunately, the United Nations were able generally to agree on their support of the "underground" in Europe. By 1943 the countries occupied by the Axis since 1939 lived literally on two levels. The obvious one was that of Axis domination and control; underneath, however, was a complex social structure which steadily became a comprehensive organization of the whole life of the nation. Individual

United
Nations'
relations
with Italy
and France

The "under-
ground" in
Europe

acts of terror and assassination were less significant as time went on, and collective mass actions grew apace. These included "slow-downs" in factories, passive resistance to all Axis orders, and withholding or even destroying agricultural products. Former trade-union members, ex-army personnel, cultural societies like the formally disbanded *sokols* in Czechoslovakia, and religious groups were the sources from which the underground drew its strength. Underground newspapers flourished—no fewer than one hundred in Belgium alone; underground schools from kindergarten to college were formed; underground radio transmitters were set up; and underground routes of escape for certain individuals hunted by the Axis were established. In Yugoslavia effective patriot armies were in the field. All this underground effort was supported by the United Nations through radio encouragement and by the delivery of needed supplies from airplanes or submarines. It neutralized a considerable fraction of the Axis fighting forces; it reduced the industrial output of conquered Europe; and it prepared the way for the hoped-for arrival some day of United Nations relief armies.²⁰ Angry at such tactics in Denmark, their "model protectorate," the Nazi military late in the summer of 1943 finally took over that unhappy country.

The European neutrals With the European neutrals—Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Turkey, and Portugal—the United Nations played their cards shrewdly. As the tide of battle swung against the Axis in 1943, by various appeals in the case of the last five and by strong words of warning in the case of Spain, these nations were urged not to give aid and comfort to the Axis. Popular opinion in all the neutral states undoubtedly was anti-Axis in sentiment, but the governments *per se* sometimes hesitated to depart from a "correct" attitude of neutrality. Switzerland's position was especially difficult, since it was completely encircled by the Axis, and was, moreover, the country in which the International Red Cross had its headquarters. The enormous importance of that organization in its program of caring for prisoners of war in belligerent lands, and in its work of facilitating communications across warring borders, could not be jeopardized by either side.

Postwar planning Discussion of peace aims and postwar policies continued to be widespread in all the United Nations. Responsible leaders in the United States and in Great Britain publicly insisted that the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms were adequate outlines of guiding principles

²⁰ The United States had never recognized the Munich agreement of 1938 regarding Czechoslovakia; in August, 1942, Russia affirmed the same position, and Great Britain explicitly repudiated her part in that ill-fated affair. As a graceful gesture toward the indefatigable work of the various underground movements, the United States in 1943 issued 12 special stamps in the Overrun Countries Series. As multiple envoy to 6 of these countries after 1941 the United States maintained Ambassador A. J. Biddle, Jr. in London.

to be followed and only slowly could be drawn into more precise statements. But President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on September 17, 1943, bluntly declared that a primary postwar policy in the Far East would be to detach from Japan every imperial acquisition which that country had made since 1895. Ten days earlier, Prime Minister Churchill, speaking at Harvard University, had stated that a principal aim of the war was to erect a lasting system of Anglo-American solidarity.

The Russian leaders also caught the spirit of increasing harmony that seemed to be developing among the United Nations. Early in September, 1943, Premier Stalin authorized the re-establishment of the Russian Patriarchate, and a few days later the British Archbishop of York arrived in Moscow for a friendly conference with the Orthodox hierarchy of Russia. About the same time the pope at Rome issued a pastoral letter on the issues of peace and postwar policy. It was noteworthy that many clergymen—Catholic, Jew, and Protestant—were frequently called into consultation by political leaders, or entrusted with delicate diplomatic and political missions. Church support for such American congressional proposals as the Fulbright and "B2H2" resolutions was well-nigh universal and helped to account for the former's overwhelming adoption by the lower house of Congress on September 21, 1943. While the average man could not know precisely to what degree all these actions would affect the destinies of the nations, he continued to hope that out of the chaos and destruction of total war some kind of global peace organization could be built.

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